GHSA-VJJP-V767-CX96

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-04 18:30
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

iommu/io-pgtable-arm: fix size_t signedness bug in unmap path

__arm_lpae_unmap() returns size_t but was returning -ENOENT (negative error code) when encountering an unmapped PTE. Since size_t is unsigned, -ENOENT (typically -2) becomes a huge positive value (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE on 64-bit systems).

This corrupted value propagates through the call chain: __arm_lpae_unmap() returns -ENOENT as size_t -> arm_lpae_unmap_pages() returns it -> __iommu_unmap() adds it to iova address -> iommu_pgsize() triggers BUG_ON due to corrupted iova

This can cause IOVA address overflow in __iommu_unmap() loop and trigger BUG_ON in iommu_pgsize() from invalid address alignment.

Fix by returning 0 instead of -ENOENT. The WARN_ON already signals the error condition, and returning 0 (meaning "nothing unmapped") is the correct semantic for size_t return type. This matches the behavior of other io-pgtable implementations (io-pgtable-arm-v7s, io-pgtable-dart) which return 0 on error conditions.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-23067"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T17:16:17Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/io-pgtable-arm: fix size_t signedness bug in unmap path\n\n__arm_lpae_unmap() returns size_t but was returning -ENOENT (negative\nerror code) when encountering an unmapped PTE. Since size_t is unsigned,\n-ENOENT (typically -2) becomes a huge positive value (0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE\non 64-bit systems).\n\nThis corrupted value propagates through the call chain:\n  __arm_lpae_unmap() returns -ENOENT as size_t\n  -\u003e arm_lpae_unmap_pages() returns it\n  -\u003e __iommu_unmap() adds it to iova address\n  -\u003e iommu_pgsize() triggers BUG_ON due to corrupted iova\n\nThis can cause IOVA address overflow in __iommu_unmap() loop and\ntrigger BUG_ON in iommu_pgsize() from invalid address alignment.\n\nFix by returning 0 instead of -ENOENT. The WARN_ON already signals\nthe error condition, and returning 0 (meaning \"nothing unmapped\")\nis the correct semantic for size_t return type. This matches the\nbehavior of other io-pgtable implementations (io-pgtable-arm-v7s,\nio-pgtable-dart) which return 0 on error conditions.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjjp-v767-cx96",
  "modified": "2026-02-04T18:30:43Z",
  "published": "2026-02-04T18:30:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23067"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/374e7af67d9d9d6103c2cfc8eb32abfecf3a2fd8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41ec6988547819756fb65e94fc24f3e0dddf84ac"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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