GHSA-VGVF-M4FW-938J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 19:48 – Updated: 2026-03-05 22:28
VLAI
Summary
Gogs: Stored XSS in branch and wiki views through author and committer names
Details

Summary

Stored XSS is still possible through unsafe template rendering that mixes user input with safe() plus permissive sanitizer handling of data URLs.

Details

safe() still turns off escaping: - internal/template/template.go - func safe(raw string) template.HTML { return template.HTML(raw) }

Branch pages still render committer names using safe(): - templates/repo/branches/overview.tmpl - templates/repo/branches/all.tmpl - templates/repo/wiki/view.tmpl

The locale still injects a raw second argument: conf/locale/locale_en-US.ini (branches.updated_by = updated %[1]s by %[2]s)

Impact

An attacker who can inject commit metadata such as author/committer name can trigger script execution on affected pages, leading to session abuse, CSRF token theft, or unauthorized actions.

Recommended Fix

  • Untrusted arguments should be escaped before being used in translations.
  • Data URLs should be limited or blocked in the sanitizer.

Remediation

A fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.

Severity
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gogs.io/gogs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.13.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26195"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T19:48:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nStored XSS is still possible through unsafe template rendering that mixes user input with `safe()` plus permissive sanitizer handling of data URLs.\n\n### Details\n\n`safe()` still turns off escaping:\n- internal/template/template.go\n- `func safe(raw string) template.HTML { return template.HTML(raw) }`\n\nBranch pages still render committer names using `safe()`:\n- templates/repo/branches/overview.tmpl\n- templates/repo/branches/all.tmpl\n- templates/repo/wiki/view.tmpl\n\nThe locale still injects a raw second argument: conf/locale/locale_en-US.ini (`branches.updated_by = updated %[1]s by %[2]s`)\n\n### Impact\n\nAn attacker who can inject commit metadata such as author/committer name can trigger script execution on affected pages, leading to session abuse, CSRF token theft, or unauthorized actions.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n- Untrusted arguments should be escaped before being used in translations.\n- Data URLs should be limited or blocked in the sanitizer.\n\n### Remediation\nA fix is available at https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-vgvf-m4fw-938j",
  "modified": "2026-03-05T22:28:44Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T19:48:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-vgvf-m4fw-938j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8176"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/ac21150a53bef3a3061f4da787ab193a8d68ecfc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gogs: Stored XSS in branch and wiki views through author and committer names"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.