GHSA-VFVF-6GX5-MQV6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-24 20:16 – Updated: 2021-06-23 20:38ORY Oathkeeper is an Identity & Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope foo using an access token granted with that foo scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope bar is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the bar scope, introspection will be valid. A patch will be released with v0.38.12-beta.1. Per default, caching is disabled for the oauth2_introspection authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. The cache is checked in func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...). From tokenFromCache() it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.38.11-beta.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ory/oathkeeper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.38.0-beta.2"
},
{
"fixed": "0.38.12-beta.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-32701"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-06-23T20:38:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-22T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ORY Oathkeeper is an Identity \u0026 Access Proxy (IAP) and Access Control Decision API that authorizes HTTP requests based on sets of Access Rules. When you make a request to an endpoint that requires the scope `foo` using an access token granted with that `foo` scope, introspection will be valid and that token will be cached. The problem comes when a second requests to an endpoint that requires the scope `bar` is made before the cache has expired. Whether the token is granted or not to the `bar` scope, introspection will be valid. A patch will be released with `v0.38.12-beta.1`. Per default, caching is disabled for the `oauth2_introspection` authenticator. When caching is disabled, this vulnerability does not exist. The cache is checked in [`func (a *AuthenticatorOAuth2Introspection) Authenticate(...)`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L152). From [`tokenFromCache()`](https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/blob/6a31df1c3779425e05db1c2a381166b087cb29a4/pipeline/authn/authenticator_oauth2_introspection.go#L97) it seems that it only validates the token expiration date, but ignores whether the token has or not the proper scopes. The vulnerability was introduced in PR #424. During review, we failed to require appropriate test coverage by the submitter which is the primary reason that the vulnerability passed the review process.",
"id": "GHSA-vfvf-6gx5-mqv6",
"modified": "2021-06-23T20:38:29Z",
"published": "2021-06-24T20:16:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/security/advisories/GHSA-qvp4-rpmr-xwrr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32701"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/pull/424"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/1f9f625c1a49e134ae2299ee95b8cf158feec932"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Incorrect Authorization in ORY Oathkeeper"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.