GHSA-VCHX-5PR6-FFX2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 20:28 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:48Background
The Flannel project includes an experimental Extension backend that allows users to easily prototype new backend types. This backend uses shell commands stored in Kubernetes annotations to configure network connectivity on the node.
Note: consumers are only affected by this vulnerability if they use the experimental Extension backend. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.
Vulnerability
This Extension backend is vulnerable to a command injection that allows an attacker who can set Kubernetes Node annotations to achieve root-level arbitrary command execution on every flannel node in the cluster.
The Extension backend's SubnetAddCommand and SubnetRemoveCommand receive attacker-controlled data via stdin (from the flannel.alpha.coreos.com/backend-data Node annotation). The content of this annotation is unmarshalled and piped directly to a shell command without checks.
Impact
Kubernetes clusters using Flannel with the Extension backend are affected by this vulnerability. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.
Patches
This is fixed in version v0.28.2.
Workaround
If consumers cannot update to a patched version, then use Flannel with another backend such as vxlan or wireguard.
Credits
Flannel would like to thank Shachar Tal from Palo Alto Networks for reporting this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.28.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/flannel-io/flannel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.28.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32241"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T20:28:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T20:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Background\nThe Flannel project includes an experimental Extension backend that allows users to easily prototype new backend types. This backend uses shell commands stored in Kubernetes annotations to configure network connectivity on the node.\n\nNote: consumers are only affected by this vulnerability if they use the experimental Extension backend. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.\n\n### Vulnerability\nThis Extension backend is vulnerable to a command injection that allows an attacker who can set Kubernetes Node annotations to achieve root-level arbitrary command execution on every flannel node in the cluster.\n\nThe Extension backend\u0027s SubnetAddCommand and SubnetRemoveCommand receive attacker-controlled data via stdin (from the `flannel.alpha.coreos.com/backend-data` Node annotation). The content of this annotation is unmarshalled and piped directly to a shell command without checks.\n\n### Impact\nKubernetes clusters using Flannel with the Extension backend are affected by this vulnerability. Other backends such as vxlan and wireguard are unaffected.\n\n### Patches\nThis is fixed in version v0.28.2.\n\n### Workaround \nIf consumers cannot update to a patched version, then use Flannel with another backend such as vxlan or wireguard.\n\n### Credits\nFlannel would like to thank Shachar Tal from Palo Alto Networks for reporting this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-vchx-5pr6-ffx2",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:48:12Z",
"published": "2026-03-27T20:28:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel/security/advisories/GHSA-vchx-5pr6-ffx2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel/commit/08bc9a4c990ae785d2fcb448f4991b58485cd26a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flannel-io/flannel/releases/tag/v0.28.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Flannel has cross-node remote code execution via extension backend BackendData injection"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.