GHSA-VCGP-9326-PQCP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 22:01 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:48Summary
A man-in-the-middle attacker can cause Net::IMAP#starttls to return "successfully", without starting TLS.
Details
When using Net::IMAP#starttls to upgrade a plaintext connection to use TLS, a man-in-the-middle attacker can inject a tagged OK response with an easily predictable tag. By sending the response before the client finishes sending the command, the command completes "successfully" before the response handler is registered. This allows #starttls to return without error, but the response handler is never invoked, the TLS connection is never established, and the socket remains unencrypted.
This allows man-in-the-middle attackers to perform a STARTTLS stripping attack, unless the client code explicitly checks Net::IMAP#tls_verified?.
Impact
TLS bypass, leading to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a patched version of net-imap that raises an exception whenever
#starttlsdoes not establish TLS. - Connect to an implicit TLS port, rather than use
STARTTLSwith a cleartext port. This is strongly recommended anyway: - RFC 8314: Cleartext Considered Obsolete: Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Email Submission and Access
- NO STARTTLS: Why TLS is better without STARTTLS, A Security Analysis of STARTTLS in the Email Context
- Explicitly verify
Net::IMAP#tls_verified?istrue, before using the connection after#starttls.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.6.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.5.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.5.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.23"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.3.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "net-imap"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-392",
"CWE-393",
"CWE-636",
"CWE-754",
"CWE-841"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T22:01:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-09T20:16:28Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA man-in-the-middle attacker can cause `Net::IMAP#starttls` to return \"successfully\", without starting TLS.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen using `Net::IMAP#starttls` to upgrade a plaintext connection to use TLS, a man-in-the-middle attacker can inject a tagged `OK` response with an easily predictable tag. By sending the response before the client finishes sending the command, the command completes \"successfully\" before the response handler is registered. This allows `#starttls` to return without error, but the response handler is never invoked, the TLS connection is never established, and the socket remains unencrypted.\n\nThis allows man-in-the-middle attackers to perform a STARTTLS stripping attack, unless the client code explicitly checks `Net::IMAP#tls_verified?`.\n\n### Impact\n\nTLS bypass, leading to cleartext transmission of sensitive information.\n\n### Mitigation\n\n* Upgrade to a patched version of net-imap that raises an exception whenever `#starttls` does not establish TLS.\n* Connect to an implicit TLS port, rather than use `STARTTLS` with a cleartext port.\n This is strongly recommended anyway:\n * [RFC 8314](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8314): Cleartext Considered Obsolete: Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) for Email Submission and Access\n * [NO STARTTLS](https://nostarttls.secvuln.info/): Why TLS is better without STARTTLS, A Security Analysis of STARTTLS in the Email Context\n* Explicitly verify `Net::IMAP#tls_verified?` is `true`, before using the connection after `#starttls`.",
"id": "GHSA-vcgp-9326-pqcp",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:48:01Z",
"published": "2026-05-04T22:01:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/security/advisories/GHSA-vcgp-9326-pqcp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42246"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/0ede4c40b1523dfeaf95777b2678e54cc0fd9618"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/24a4e770b43230286a05aa2a9746cdbb3eb8485e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/97e2488fb5401a1783bddd959dde007d9fbce42c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/commit/f79d35bf5833f186e81044c57c843eda30c873da"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.3.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.4.24"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.5.14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ruby/net-imap/releases/tag/v0.6.4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/net-imap/CVE-2026-42246.yml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nostarttls.secvuln.info"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8314"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "net-imap vulnerable to STARTTLS stripping via invalid response timing"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.