GHSA-VC34-39Q2-M6Q3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 19:18 – Updated: 2026-04-22 19:18
VLAI?
Summary
nimiq-account: Vesting insufficient funds error can panic
Details

Impact

VestingContract::can_change_balance returns AccountError::InsufficientFunds when new_balance < min_cap, but it constructs the error using balance: self.balance - min_cap. Coin::sub panics on underflow, so if an attacker can reach a state where min_cap > balance, the node crashes while trying to return an error.

The min_cap > balance precondition is attacker-reachable because the vesting contract creation data (32-byte format) allows encoding total_amount without validating total_amount <= transaction.value (the real contract balance). After creating such a vesting contract, the attacker can broadcast an outgoing transaction to trigger the panic during mempool admission and block processing.

Patches

The patch for this vulnerability is included as part of v1.3.0.

Workarounds

No known workarounds.

Severity ?
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "nimiq-account"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34064"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-191"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T19:18:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n`VestingContract::can_change_balance` returns `AccountError::InsufficientFunds` when `new_balance \u003c min_cap`, but it constructs the error using `balance: self.balance - min_cap`. `Coin::sub` panics on underflow, so if an attacker can reach a state where `min_cap \u003e balance`, the node crashes while trying to return an error.\n\nThe `min_cap \u003e balance` precondition is attacker-reachable because the vesting contract creation data (32-byte format) allows encoding `total_amount` without validating `total_amount \u003c= transaction.value` (the real contract balance). After creating such a vesting contract, the attacker can broadcast an outgoing transaction to trigger the panic during mempool admission and block processing.\n\n### Patches\n[The patch for this vulnerability](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/4d01946f0b3d6c6e31786f91cdfb3eb902908da0) is included as part of [v1.3.0](https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0).\n\n### Workarounds\nNo known workarounds.",
  "id": "GHSA-vc34-39q2-m6q3",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T19:18:55Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T19:18:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/security/advisories/GHSA-vc34-39q2-m6q3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/pull/3658"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/commit/4d01946f0b3d6c6e31786f91cdfb3eb902908da0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nimiq/core-rs-albatross/releases/tag/v1.3.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nimiq-account: Vesting insufficient funds error can panic"
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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