GHSA-V92G-XGXW-VVMM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:16 – Updated: 2026-04-16 21:16
VLAI?
Summary
Mako: Path traversal via double-slash URI prefix in TemplateLookup
Details

Summary

TemplateLookup.get_template() is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with // (e.g., //../../../secret.txt). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations:

  • Template.__init__ strips one leading / using if/slice
  • TemplateLookup.get_template() strips all leading / using re.sub(r"^\/+", "")

When a URI like //../../../../etc/passwd is passed: 1. get_template() strips all /../../../../etc/passwd → file found via posixpath.join(dir_, u) 2. Template.__init__ strips one //../../../../etc/passwdnormpath/etc/passwd 3. /etc/passwd.startswith(..) → Falsecheck bypassed

Impact

Arbitrary file read: any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to TemplateLookup.get_template().

Note: this is exploitable at the library API level. HTTP-based exploitation is mitigated by Python's BaseHTTPRequestHandler which normalizes double-slash prefixes since CPython gh-87389. Applications using other HTTP servers that do not normalize paths may be affected.

Fix

Changed Template.__init__ to use lstrip("/") instead of stripping only a single leading slash, so both code paths handle leading slashes consistently.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.3.10"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Mako"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.3.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:16:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`TemplateLookup.get_template()` is vulnerable to path traversal when a URI starts with `//` (e.g., `//../../../secret.txt`). The root cause is an inconsistency between two slash-stripping implementations:\n\n- `Template.__init__` strips **one** leading `/` using `if`/slice\n- `TemplateLookup.get_template()` strips **all** leading `/` using `re.sub(r\"^\\/+\", \"\")`\n\nWhen a URI like `//../../../../etc/passwd` is passed:\n1. `get_template()` strips all `/` \u2192 `../../../../etc/passwd` \u2192 file found via `posixpath.join(dir_, u)`\n2. `Template.__init__` strips one `/` \u2192 `/../../../../etc/passwd` \u2192 `normpath` \u2192 `/etc/passwd`\n3. `/etc/passwd`.startswith(`..`) \u2192 `False` \u2192 **check bypassed**\n\n### Impact\n\nArbitrary file read: any file readable by the process can be returned as rendered template content when an application passes untrusted input directly to `TemplateLookup.get_template()`.\n\nNote: this is exploitable at the library API level. HTTP-based exploitation is mitigated by Python\u0027s `BaseHTTPRequestHandler` which normalizes double-slash prefixes since CPython gh-87389. Applications using other HTTP servers that do not normalize paths may be affected.\n\n### Fix\n\nChanged `Template.__init__` to use `lstrip(\"/\")` instead of stripping only a single leading slash, so both code paths handle leading slashes consistently.",
  "id": "GHSA-v92g-xgxw-vvmm",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T21:16:40Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T21:16:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako/security/advisories/GHSA-v92g-xgxw-vvmm"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sqlalchemy/mako"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mako: Path traversal via double-slash URI prefix in TemplateLookup"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…