GHSA-V64W-49XW-QQ89
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-20 23:25 – Updated: 2023-11-20 23:25Impact
next-auth applications prior to version 4.24.5 that rely on the default Middleware authorization are affected.
A bad actor could create an empty/mock user, by getting hold of a NextAuth.js-issued JWT from an interrupted OAuth sign-in flow (state, PKCE or nonce).
Manually overriding the next-auth.session-token cookie value with this non-related JWT would let the user simulate a logged in user, albeit having no user information associated with it. (The only property on this user is an opaque randomly generated string).
This vulnerability does not give access to other users' data, neither to resources that require proper authorization via scopes or other means. The created mock user has no information associated with it (ie. no name, email, access_token, etc.)
This vulnerability can be exploited by bad actors to peek at logged in user states (e.g. dashboard layout).
Note: Regardless of the vulnerability, the existence of a NextAuth.js session state can provide simple authentication, but not authorization in your applications. For role-based access control, you can check out our guide.
Patches
We patched the vulnerability in next-auth v4.24.5. To upgrade, run one of the following:
npm i next-auth@latest
yarn add next-auth@latest
pnpm add next-auth@latest
Workarounds
Upgrading to latest is the recommended way to fix this issue. However, using a custom authorization callback for Middleware, developers can manually do a basic authentication:
// middleware.ts
import { withAuth } from "next-auth/middleware"
export default withAuth(/*your middleware function*/, {
// checking the existence of any property - besides `value` which might be a random string - on the `token` object is sufficient to prevent this vulnerability
callbacks: { authorized: ({ token }) => !!token?.email }
})
References
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.24.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-48309"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-20T23:25:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-20T19:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`next-auth` applications prior to version **4.24.5** that rely on the default [Middleware authorization](https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/nextjs#middleware) are affected.\n\nA bad actor could create an empty/mock user, by getting hold of a NextAuth.js-issued JWT from an interrupted OAuth sign-in flow (state, PKCE or nonce).\n\nManually overriding the `next-auth.session-token` cookie value with this non-related JWT would let the user simulate a logged in user, albeit having no user information associated with it. (The only property on this user is an opaque randomly generated string).\n\nThis vulnerability does **not** give access to other users\u0027 data, neither to resources that require proper authorization via scopes or other means. The created mock user has no information associated with it (ie. no name, email, access_token, etc.)\n\nThis vulnerability can be exploited by bad actors to peek at logged in user states (e.g. dashboard layout).\n\n_Note: Regardless of the vulnerability, the existence of a NextAuth.js session state can provide simple authentication, but not authorization in your applications. For role-based access control, you can check out [our guide](https://authjs.dev/guides/basics/role-based-access-control)._\n\n### Patches\n\nWe patched the vulnerability in `next-auth` `v4.24.5`. To upgrade, run one of the following:\n\n```\nnpm i next-auth@latest\n```\n```\nyarn add next-auth@latest\n```\n```\npnpm add next-auth@latest\n```\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrading to `latest` is the recommended way to fix this issue. However, using [a custom authorization callback for Middleware](https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/nextjs#advanced-usage), developers can manually do a basic authentication:\n\n```ts\n// middleware.ts\nimport { withAuth } from \"next-auth/middleware\"\n\nexport default withAuth(/*your middleware function*/, {\n // checking the existence of any property - besides `value` which might be a random string - on the `token` object is sufficient to prevent this vulnerability\n callbacks: { authorized: ({ token }) =\u003e !!token?.email }\n})\n```\n\n### References\n\n- [NextAuth.js Middleware](https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/nextjs#middleware)\n- [Role-based access contorl (RBAC) guide](https://authjs.dev/guides/basics/role-based-access-control)",
"id": "GHSA-v64w-49xw-qq89",
"modified": "2023-11-20T23:25:36Z",
"published": "2023-11-20T23:25:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-v64w-49xw-qq89"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48309"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/commit/d237059b6d0cb868c041ba18b698e0cee20a2f10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://authjs.dev/guides/basics/role-based-access-control"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/nextjs#advanced-usage"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/nextjs#middlewar"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Possible user mocking that bypasses basic authentication"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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