GHSA-V535-7P5C-7XM9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: fix use-after-free in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() by reordering teardown
A potential race condition exists in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() where hwc->caller_ctx is freed before the HWC's Completion Queue (CQ) and Event Queue (EQ) are destroyed. This allows an in-flight CQ interrupt handler to dereference freed memory, leading to a use-after-free or NULL pointer dereference in mana_hwc_handle_resp().
mana_smc_teardown_hwc() signals the hardware to stop but does not synchronize against IRQ handlers already executing on other CPUs. The IRQ synchronization only happens in mana_hwc_destroy_cq() via mana_gd_destroy_eq() -> mana_gd_deregister_irq(). Since this runs after kfree(hwc->caller_ctx), a concurrent mana_hwc_rx_event_handler() can dereference freed caller_ctx (and rxq->msg_buf) in mana_hwc_handle_resp().
Fix this by reordering teardown to reverse-of-creation order: destroy the TX/RX work queues and CQ/EQ before freeing hwc->caller_ctx. This ensures all in-flight interrupt handlers complete before the memory they access is freed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23454"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T16:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: mana: fix use-after-free in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() by reordering teardown\n\nA potential race condition exists in mana_hwc_destroy_channel() where\nhwc-\u003ecaller_ctx is freed before the HWC\u0027s Completion Queue (CQ) and\nEvent Queue (EQ) are destroyed. This allows an in-flight CQ interrupt\nhandler to dereference freed memory, leading to a use-after-free or\nNULL pointer dereference in mana_hwc_handle_resp().\n\nmana_smc_teardown_hwc() signals the hardware to stop but does not\nsynchronize against IRQ handlers already executing on other CPUs. The\nIRQ synchronization only happens in mana_hwc_destroy_cq() via\nmana_gd_destroy_eq() -\u003e mana_gd_deregister_irq(). Since this runs\nafter kfree(hwc-\u003ecaller_ctx), a concurrent mana_hwc_rx_event_handler()\ncan dereference freed caller_ctx (and rxq-\u003emsg_buf) in\nmana_hwc_handle_resp().\n\nFix this by reordering teardown to reverse-of-creation order: destroy\nthe TX/RX work queues and CQ/EQ before freeing hwc-\u003ecaller_ctx. This\nensures all in-flight interrupt handlers complete before the memory they\naccess is freed.",
"id": "GHSA-v535-7p5c-7xm9",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:30Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T18:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05d345719d85b927cba74afac4d5322de3aa4256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/249e905571583a434d4ea8d6f92ccc0eef337115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b001901f689021acd7bf2dceed74a1bdcaaa1f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afdb1533eb9c05432aeb793a7280fa827c502f5c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b88edf12fc3779521ae5f6f1584153b15f7da6df"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e23bf444512cb85d76012080a76cd1f9e967448e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa103fc8f56954a60699a29215cb713448a39e87"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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