GHSA-RXPJ-7QVF-XV32

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-16 21:49
VLAI?
Summary
Authenticated Apache ActiveMQ Broker and Apache ActiveMQ users could perform RCE via Jolokia MBeans
Details

Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection') vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ.

Apache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at /api/jolokia/ on the web console. The default Jolokia access policy permits exec operations on all ActiveMQ MBeans (org.apache.activemq:*), including BrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String) and BrokerService.addConnector(String).

An authenticated attacker can invoke these operations with a crafted discovery URI that triggers the VM transport's brokerConfig parameter to load a remote Spring XML application context using ResourceXmlApplicationContext. Because Spring's ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs on the broker's JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec(). This issue affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.4, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.3; Apache ActiveMQ: .

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.5 or 6.2.3, which fixes the issue.

Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.activemq:activemq-broker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.19.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.activemq:activemq-broker"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.activemq:activemq-all"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.19.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.apache.activemq:activemq-all"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34197"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-13T19:21:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T09:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Input Validation, Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Apache ActiveMQ Broker, Apache ActiveMQ.\n\nApache ActiveMQ Classic exposes the Jolokia JMX-HTTP bridge at\u00a0/api/jolokia/ on the web console. The default Jolokia access policy permits\u00a0exec operations on all ActiveMQ\u00a0MBeans (org.apache.activemq:*), including\nBrokerService.addNetworkConnector(String) and BrokerService.addConnector(String). \n\nAn authenticated attacker can\u00a0invoke these operations with a crafted discovery URI that triggers the VM\u00a0transport\u0027s brokerConfig parameter to load a remote Spring XML application\u00a0context using ResourceXmlApplicationContext. \nBecause Spring\u0027s\u00a0ResourceXmlApplicationContext instantiates all singleton beans before the\u00a0BrokerService validates the configuration, arbitrary code execution occurs\u00a0on the broker\u0027s JVM through bean factory methods such as Runtime.exec().\nThis issue affects Apache ActiveMQ Broker: before 5.19.4, from 6.0.0 before 6.2.3; Apache ActiveMQ: .\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 5.19.5 or 6.2.3, which fixes the issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-rxpj-7qvf-xv32",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T21:49:16Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T09:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34197"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://activemq.apache.org/security-advisories.data/CVE-2026-34197-announcement.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/activemq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2026-34197"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/04/06/3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Authenticated Apache ActiveMQ Broker and Apache ActiveMQ users could perform RCE via Jolokia MBeans"
}


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