{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.0.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "admidio/admidio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41663"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-29T21:54:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T04:16:30Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nSeveral administrative operations in Admidio\u0027s preferences module (database backup, test email, htaccess generation) fire via GET requests with no CSRF token validation. Because `SameSite=Lax` cookies travel with top-level GET navigations, an attacker forces an authenticated admin to trigger these actions from a malicious page.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `modules/preferences.php`, the `backup`, `test_email`, and `htaccess` modes accept GET parameters with no CSRF token check:\n\n```php\n// modules/preferences.php - backup mode\ncase \u0027backup\u0027:\n    // Creates full database dump and serves as download\n    // No CSRF token validation\n    $backupFile = $gDb-\u003ebackup();\n    // ... sends file to client\n    break;\n\ncase \u0027test_email\u0027:\n    // Sends test email from the server\n    // No CSRF token validation\n    break;\n\ncase \u0027htaccess\u0027:\n    // Writes .htaccess file to disk\n    // No CSRF token validation\n    break;\n```\n\nThe `save` mode in the same file validates CSRF via `getFormObject()`, confirming the developers intended CSRF protection but did not apply it to these other modes.\n\nBecause these are GET requests, `SameSite=Lax` browsers include session cookies on top-level cross-origin navigations, making CSRF exploitation trivial.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSimplified attacker page (`csrf.html` hosted on attacker origin):\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eLoading...\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003c!-- Trigger backup creation on victim\u0027s browser --\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003ewindow.location = \u0027https://target-admidio.example.com/adm_program/modules/preferences.php?mode=backup\u0027;\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nWhen an administrator visits this page, the browser navigates to the Admidio backup URL with full session cookies. The server generates a database dump and serves it as a download to the victim\u0027s browser. Note: the backup downloads to the victim\u0027s machine, not to the attacker. The attacker cannot read the response cross-origin.\n\nFor `htaccess` mode, the CSRF overwrites the `.htaccess` file on the server, disrupting the application. For `test_email` mode, it triggers email sends from the server, which an attacker can abuse for spam or to probe internal email infrastructure.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker tricks an Admidio administrator into visiting a malicious page that triggers state-changing operations on the server:\n\n- **Backup creation**: forces the server to generate a full database dump. The backup downloads to the victim\u0027s browser, not to the attacker. However, repeated backup triggers can cause disk I/O and storage pressure on the server.\n- **htaccess modification**: overwrites the server\u0027s `.htaccess` file, breaking URL routing or disabling security headers.\n- **Test email**: fires email sends from the server, usable as a spam relay or to probe internal mail configuration.\n\nThe core issue is that state-changing operations run via unprotected GET requests. The victim only needs to visit a single attacker-controlled page while logged in.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n1. Change `backup`, `test_email`, and `htaccess` operations to require POST requests.\n2. Add CSRF token validation using the existing `getFormObject()` mechanism.\n3. As defense in depth, set `SameSite=Strict` on session cookies or add a confirmation step for destructive operations like database backup.\n\n---\n*Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*",
  "id": "GHSA-rw74-vc9h-534j",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T20:13:59Z",
  "published": "2026-04-29T21:54:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-rw74-vc9h-534j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41663"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/releases/tag/v5.0.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Admidio has CSRF on Admin Preferences that Triggers Unauthorized Backup, .htaccess Write, and Email Send"
}