{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/daptin/daptin"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.11.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41422"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T17:38:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/aggregate/:typename` endpoint accepted `column` and `group` query parameters that were passed verbatim to `goqu.L()` \u2014 a raw SQL literal expression builder \u2014 without any validation. This bypassed all parameterization and allowed authenticated users with any valid session to inject arbitrary SQL expressions.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated low-privilege user could:\n- Extract data from any table via subquery: `(SELECT group_concat(email) FROM user_account) as leak`\n- Disclose database internals: `sqlite_version()`, `(SELECT sql FROM sqlite_master)`\n- Exfiltrate cross-table data via correlated subqueries\n\nThe vulnerability was confirmed locally; `user_account.email` values were extracted via a crafted `column` parameter by a non-admin user.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`goqu.L(userInput)` in `server/resource/resource_aggregate.go` inserted user-supplied query parameters directly into the SQL string with no validation.\n\n## Fix (v0.11.4)\n\nAll `goqu.L()` calls on user-controlled input were eliminated and replaced with:\n- Structural expression parsing supporting all documented API forms\n- Schema-based column validation (column names checked against entity schema via `TableInfo().GetColumnByName()`)\n- Exact-match allowlist for aggregate functions (`count`, `sum`, `avg`, `min`, `max`, `first`, `last`) and scalar functions (`date`, `strftime`, `upper`, `lower`, etc.)\n- Safe goqu constructors (`goqu.I()`, `goqu.SUM()`, `goqu.Func()`) for all generated expressions\n- `allowedTables` scope enforcement: qualified column refs (`table.col`) validated against root entity + explicitly joined tables only\n\nTwo additional DoS bugs were fixed in the same commit: `uuid.MustParse` panic on malformed UUID input and an index-out-of-range panic in `ToOrderedExpressionArray` on empty sort expressions.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by @VashuVats.",
  "id": "GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T17:38:02Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T17:38:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/daptin/daptin/security/advisories/GHSA-rw2c-8rfq-gwfv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/daptin/daptin"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/daptin/daptin/releases/tag/v0.11.4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Daptin: SQL injection via unvalidated goqu.L() calls in aggregate API"
}