GHSA-RQPP-RJJ8-7WV8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:55 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:04
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw: WebSocket shared-auth connections could self-declare elevated scopes
Details

Summary

A logic flaw in the OpenClaw gateway WebSocket connect path allowed certain device-less shared-token or password-authenticated backend connections to keep client-declared scopes without server-side binding. A shared-authenticated client could present elevated scopes such as operator.admin even though those scopes were not tied to a device identity or an explicitly trusted Control UI path.

Impact

This crossed the intended authorization boundary and could let a shared-secret-authenticated backend client perform admin-only gateway operations.

Affected versions

openclaw <= 2026.3.11

Patch

Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.12. The gateway now clears unbound scopes for non-Control-UI shared-auth connections, and regression tests cover the device-less shared-auth path.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.11"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.3.12"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22172"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:55:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nA logic flaw in the OpenClaw gateway WebSocket connect path allowed certain device-less shared-token or password-authenticated backend connections to keep client-declared scopes without server-side binding. A shared-authenticated client could present elevated scopes such as `operator.admin` even though those scopes were not tied to a device identity or an explicitly trusted Control UI path.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis crossed the intended authorization boundary and could let a shared-secret-authenticated backend client perform admin-only gateway operations.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`openclaw` `\u003c= 2026.3.11`\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.12`. The gateway now clears unbound scopes for non-Control-UI shared-auth connections, and regression tests cover the device-less shared-auth path.",
  "id": "GHSA-rqpp-rjj8-7wv8",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:04:19Z",
  "published": "2026-03-13T20:55:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rqpp-rjj8-7wv8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/44306"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5e389d5e7c9233ec91026ab2fea299ebaf3249f6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.12"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: WebSocket shared-auth connections could self-declare elevated scopes"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…