GHSA-RP9M-7R4C-75QG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 04:07 – Updated: 2026-04-03 04:07Impact
Setting up a custom cacheKeyBuilder method which does not properly create unique keys for different tokens can lead to cache collisions. This could cause tokens to be mis-identified during the verification process leading to:
- Valid tokens returning claims from different valid tokens
- Users being mis-identified as other users based on the wrong token
This could result in: - User impersonation - UserB receives UserA's identity and permissions - Privilege escalation - Low-privilege users inherit admin-level access - Cross-tenant data access - Users gain access to other tenants' resources - Authorization bypass - Security decisions made on wrong user identity
Affected Configurations
This vulnerability ONLY affects applications that BOTH:
- Enable caching using the cache option
- Use custom cacheKeyBuilder functions that can produce collisions
VULNERABLE examples:
// Collision-prone: same audience = same cache key
cacheKeyBuilder: (token) => {
const { aud } = parseToken(token)
return `aud=${aud}`
}
// Collision-prone: grouping by user type
cacheKeyBuilder: (token) => {
const { aud } = parseToken(token)
return aud.includes('admin') ? 'admin-users' : 'regular-users'
}
// Collision-prone: tenant + service grouping
cacheKeyBuilder: (token) => {
const { iss, aud } = parseToken(token)
return `${iss}-${aud}`
}
SAFE examples:
// Default hash-based (recommended)
createVerifier({ cache: true }) // Uses secure default
// Include unique user identifier
cacheKeyBuilder: (token) => {
const { sub, aud, iat } = parseToken(token)
return `${sub}-${aud}-${iat}`
}
// No caching (always safe)
createVerifier({ cache: false })
Not Affected
- Applications using default caching
- Applications with caching disabled
Assessment Guide
To determine if a consumer application is affected:
- Check if caching is enabled: Look for cache: true or cache: in verifier configuration
- Check for custom cache key builders: Look for cacheKeyBuilder function in configuration
- Analyze collision potential: Review if the application's cacheKeyBuilder can produce identical keys for different users/tokens
- If no custom cacheKeyBuilder: The project is NOT affected (default is safe)
Mitigations
While fast-jwt will look to include a fix for this in the next version, immediate mitigations include:
- Ensure uniqueness of keys produced in cacheKeyBuilder
- Remove custom cacheKeyBuilder method
- Disable caching
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "fast-jwt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.1"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35039"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1289",
"CWE-345",
"CWE-706"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T04:07:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nSetting up a custom cacheKeyBuilder method which does not properly create unique keys for different tokens can lead to cache collisions. This could cause tokens to be mis-identified during the verification process leading to:\n\n- Valid tokens returning claims from different valid tokens\n- Users being mis-identified as other users based on the wrong token\n\nThis could result in:\n- User impersonation - UserB receives UserA\u0027s identity and permissions\n- Privilege escalation - Low-privilege users inherit admin-level access\n- Cross-tenant data access - Users gain access to other tenants\u0027 resources\n- Authorization bypass - Security decisions made on wrong user identity\n\n## Affected Configurations\n\nThis vulnerability ONLY affects applications that BOTH:\n\n1. Enable caching using the cache option\n2. Use custom cacheKeyBuilder functions that can produce collisions\n\nVULNERABLE examples:\n```\n// Collision-prone: same audience = same cache key\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n const { aud } = parseToken(token)\n return `aud=${aud}`\n}\n\n// Collision-prone: grouping by user type\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n const { aud } = parseToken(token)\n return aud.includes(\u0027admin\u0027) ? \u0027admin-users\u0027 : \u0027regular-users\u0027\n}\n\n// Collision-prone: tenant + service grouping\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n const { iss, aud } = parseToken(token)\n return `${iss}-${aud}`\n}\n```\n\nSAFE examples:\n```\n// Default hash-based (recommended)\ncreateVerifier({ cache: true }) // Uses secure default\n\n// Include unique user identifier\ncacheKeyBuilder: (token) =\u003e {\n const { sub, aud, iat } = parseToken(token)\n return `${sub}-${aud}-${iat}`\n}\n\n// No caching (always safe)\ncreateVerifier({ cache: false })\n```\n### Not Affected\n\n- Applications using **default caching**\n- Applications with **caching disabled**\n \n## Assessment Guide\n\nTo determine if a consumer application is affected:\n\n1. Check if caching is enabled: Look for cache: true or cache: \u003cnumber\u003e in verifier configuration\n2. Check for custom cache key builders: Look for cacheKeyBuilder function in configuration\n3. Analyze collision potential: Review if the application\u0027s cacheKeyBuilder can produce identical keys for different users/tokens\n4. If no custom cacheKeyBuilder: The project is NOT affected (default is safe)\n\n## Mitigations\n\nWhile fast-jwt will look to include a fix for this in the next version, immediate mitigations include:\n\n- Ensure uniqueness of keys produced in cacheKeyBuilder\n- Remove custom cacheKeyBuilder method\n- Disable caching",
"id": "GHSA-rp9m-7r4c-75qg",
"modified": "2026-04-03T04:07:09Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T04:07:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt/security/advisories/GHSA-rp9m-7r4c-75qg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nearform/fast-jwt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "fast-jwt: Cache Confusion via cacheKeyBuilder Collisions Can Return Claims From a Different Token (Identity/Authorization Mixup)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.