GHSA-RGR3-H3CV-574X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: cfg80211: cancel rfkill_block work in wiphy_unregister()
There is a use-after-free error in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces found by syzkaller:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112a78d98 by task kworker/0:5/5326 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5326 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: events cfg80211_rfkill_block_work Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 print_report+0xcd/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220 cfg80211_rfkill_block_work+0x1e/0x30 process_one_work+0x9cf/0x1b70 worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kthread+0x3c5/0x780 ret_from_fork+0x56d/0x700 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The problem arises due to the rfkill_block work is not cancelled when wiphy is being unregistered. In order to fix the issue cancel the corresponding work in wiphy_unregister().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23336"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: cfg80211: cancel rfkill_block work in wiphy_unregister()\n\nThere is a use-after-free error in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces found\nby syzkaller:\n\nBUG: KASAN: use-after-free in cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220\nRead of size 8 at addr ffff888112a78d98 by task kworker/0:5/5326\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5326 Comm: kworker/0:5 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2 #2 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014\nWorkqueue: events cfg80211_rfkill_block_work\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0\n print_report+0xcd/0x630\n kasan_report+0xe0/0x110\n cfg80211_shutdown_all_interfaces+0x213/0x220\n cfg80211_rfkill_block_work+0x1e/0x30\n process_one_work+0x9cf/0x1b70\n worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10\n kthread+0x3c5/0x780\n ret_from_fork+0x56d/0x700\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nThe problem arises due to the rfkill_block work is not cancelled when wiphy\nis being unregistered. In order to fix the issue cancel the corresponding\nwork in wiphy_unregister().\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.",
"id": "GHSA-rgr3-h3cv-574x",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:22Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T12:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23336"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-784472.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57e39fe8da573435fa35975f414f4dc17d9f8449"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/584279ad9ff1e8e7c5494b9fce286201f7d1f9e2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/767d23ade706d5fa51c36168e92a9c5533c351a1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82a35356b5c1f75fe6a8a561db44e8d0e49da8f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2e9626a9d16b9bbbd06498c9e73c93be354dc7a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd2f52944c7b95dcdfe0d87f385a2d96458a3ae5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eeea8da43ab86ac0a6b9cec225eec91564346940"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa18639deab4a3662d543200c5bfc29bf4e23173"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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