GHSA-R9PH-9M45-XJ6W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-08 21:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

EFI/CPER: don't go past the ARM processor CPER record buffer

There's a logic inside GHES/CPER to detect if the section_length is too small, but it doesn't detect if it is too big.

Currently, if the firmware receives an ARM processor CPER record stating that a section length is big, kernel will blindly trust section_length, producing a very long dump. For instance, a 67 bytes record with ERR_INFO_NUM set 46198 and section length set to 854918320 would dump a lot of data going a way past the firmware memory-mapped area.

Fix it by adding a logic to prevent it to go past the buffer if ERR_INFO_NUM is too big, making it report instead:

[Hardware Error]: Hardware error from APEI Generic Hardware Error Source: 1
[Hardware Error]: event severity: recoverable
[Hardware Error]:  Error 0, type: recoverable
[Hardware Error]:   section_type: ARM processor error
[Hardware Error]:   MIDR: 0xff304b2f8476870a
[Hardware Error]:   section length: 854918320, CPER size: 67
[Hardware Error]:   section length is too big
[Hardware Error]:   firmware-generated error record is incorrect
[Hardware Error]:   ERR_INFO_NUM is 46198

[ rjw: Subject and changelog tweaks ]

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43266"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T12:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nEFI/CPER: don\u0027t go past the ARM processor CPER record buffer\n\nThere\u0027s a logic inside GHES/CPER to detect if the section_length\nis too small, but it doesn\u0027t detect if it is too big.\n\nCurrently, if the firmware receives an ARM processor CPER record\nstating that a section length is big, kernel will blindly trust\nsection_length, producing a very long dump. For instance, a 67\nbytes record with ERR_INFO_NUM set 46198 and section length\nset to 854918320 would dump a lot of data going a way past the\nfirmware memory-mapped area.\n\nFix it by adding a logic to prevent it to go past the buffer\nif ERR_INFO_NUM is too big, making it report instead:\n\n\t[Hardware Error]: Hardware error from APEI Generic Hardware Error Source: 1\n\t[Hardware Error]: event severity: recoverable\n\t[Hardware Error]:  Error 0, type: recoverable\n\t[Hardware Error]:   section_type: ARM processor error\n\t[Hardware Error]:   MIDR: 0xff304b2f8476870a\n\t[Hardware Error]:   section length: 854918320, CPER size: 67\n\t[Hardware Error]:   section length is too big\n\t[Hardware Error]:   firmware-generated error record is incorrect\n\t[Hardware Error]:   ERR_INFO_NUM is 46198\n\n[ rjw: Subject and changelog tweaks ]",
  "id": "GHSA-r9ph-9m45-xj6w",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T21:31:21Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T12:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43266"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25b290624b0e3d2f0f90238709ee0b6009b9fde8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45766863baf899059e75595dd3cb1116467f2095"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64eb63f573f497553e1a0c388bbcdd639e0f0704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a68d22902a6916e10ee235fee609239004e129d0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be10c1bdf64a39832998f54900aa309b3917abcf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c80113dcfc807308f5ab33847fae77e07531aeb8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca2aad8771aa9091bc9e42e7d546bd40b72ddcd4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eae21beecb95a3b69ee5c38a659f774e171d730e"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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