Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-R8P8-QW9W-J9QV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-02-18 21:44

Summary

pretix unsafely evaluates variables in emails

Details

Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs:

It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject.
Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is {invoice_company}, which is very unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical conditions.

Out of caution, pretix recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P/RE:L/U:Red

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pretix"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2026.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pretix"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2025.10.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2025.10.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pretix"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2025.9.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2415"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-627"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T21:44:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-16T11:15:56Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when `{name}` is used in an email template, it will  be replaced with the buyer\u0027s name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs:\n\n -  It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as `{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}`. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject.\n\n -  Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is `{invoice_company}`, which is very unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical conditions.\n\nOut of caution, pretix recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ \u00a0file.",
  "id": "GHSA-r8p8-qw9w-j9qv",
  "modified": "2026-02-18T21:44:45Z",
  "published": "2026-02-16T12:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2415"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix/commit/ba11d24f8dfa4e9d8f03493e56fd8b43983fe297"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix/commit/c85afbc621b5f0b1afa618627c45f89323eb0154"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix/commit/edac35ed4c5466eb63a202575c337d117ddf1c8e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pretix/pretix"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pretix.eu/about/en/blog/20260216-release-2026-1-1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P/RE:L/U:Red",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pretix unsafely evaluates variables in emails"
}

CVE-2026-2415 (GCVE-0-2026-2415)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-02-16 10:15 – Updated: 2026-02-17 17:06

Title

Unsafe variable evaluation in email templates

Summary

Emails sent by pretix can utilize placeholders that will be filled with customer data. For example, when {name} is used in an email template, it will be replaced with the buyer's name for the final email. This mechanism contained two security-relevant bugs: * It was possible to exfiltrate information about the pretix system through specially crafted placeholder names such as {{event.__init__.__code__.co_filename}}. This way, an attacker with the ability to control email templates (usually every user of the pretix backend) could retrieve sensitive information from the system configuration, including even database passwords or API keys. pretix does include mechanisms to prevent the usage of such malicious placeholders, however due to a mistake in the code, they were not fully effective for the email subject. * Placeholders in subjects and plain text bodies of emails were wrongfully evaluated twice. Therefore, if the first evaluation of a placeholder again contains a placeholder, this second placeholder was rendered. This allows the rendering of placeholders controlled by the ticket buyer, and therefore the exploitation of the first issue as a ticket buyer. Luckily, the only buyer-controlled placeholder available in pretix by default (that is not validated in a way that prevents the issue) is {invoice_company}, which is very unusual (but not impossible) to be contained in an email subject template. In addition to broadening the attack surface of the first issue, this could theoretically also leak information about an order to one of the attendees within that order. However, we also consider this scenario very unlikely under typical conditions. Out of caution, we recommend that you rotate all passwords and API keys contained in your pretix.cfg https://docs.pretix.eu/self-hosting/config/ file.

Severity ?

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P/RE:L/U:Red

CWE

CWE-627 - Dynamic Variable Evaluation

Assigner

rami.io

References

URL

Tags

https://pretix.eu/about/en/blog/20260216-release-…

vendor-advisory

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	pretix	pretix	Affected: 4.16.0 , < 2025.9.0 (python) Affected: 2025.9.0 , < 2025.10.0 (python) Affected: 2025.10.0 , < 2026.1.0 (python) Affected: 2026.1.0 , < 2026.1.1 (python)

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-02-17T16:43:12.852157Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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            }
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          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-545 Pull Data from System Resources"
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        },
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-77",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-77 Manipulating User-Controlled Variables"
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        },
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          "descriptions": [
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            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "LOW"
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-R8P8-QW9W-J9QV

CVE-2026-2415 (GCVE-0-2026-2415)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature