{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.1.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@utcp/http"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45366"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:55:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `@utcp/http` package is vulnerable to a blind Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) caused by a trust-boundary inconsistency between manual discovery and tool invocation. `registerManual()` validates the discovery URL against an HTTPS / loopback allowlist, but `callTool()` reuses the resolved `toolCallTemplate.url` directly without revalidating, and the `OpenApiConverter` blindly trusts whatever `servers[0].url` an attacker-hosted spec declares. An attacker who hosts a malicious OpenAPI spec on a legitimate HTTPS endpoint can declare e.g. `servers: [{ url: \"http://127.0.0.1:9090\" }]` or `servers: [{ url: \"http://169.254.169.254\" }]`; the converter then produces tools whose URL points at internal services on the agent host.\n\nA separate prefix-bypass also affected the discovery-time check: the previous `startsWith(\u0027http://localhost\u0027)` guard let URLs like `http://localhost.evil.com` through.\n\n## Sister advisory\n\nThis is the npm/TypeScript counterpart of [GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w / CVE-2026-44661](https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp/security/advisories/GHSA-39j6-4867-gg4w) on the Python `utcp-http` package. Same vulnerability, same fix shape, same reporter.\n\n## Versions and patch state\n\n- `@utcp/http \u003c= 1.1.1` \u2014 vulnerable. Both the loopback-redirect (`http://127.0.0.1`) and the non-loopback internal-IP variants (e.g. `http://169.254.169.254`, `http://10.0.0.5`) succeed. Note: the `streamable_http` and `sse` `callToolStreaming` paths in 1.1.1 are TODO placeholders and don\u0027t actually fetch URLs, so the runtime SSRF surface in these protocols is currently confined to discovery \u2014 a future implementation must also call `ensureSecureUrl` before issuing the request.\n- `@utcp/http 1.1.2` \u2014 full fix. Runtime revalidation in `callTool` closes the non-loopback variants; the `OpenApiConverter` rejects, at conversion time, any spec fetched from a non-loopback source that declares a loopback `servers[0].url`, closing the loopback-redirect variant.\n\n## Impact\n\nA remote attacker who can convince the agent (via the LLM context, prompt injection, or a tool-discovery surface) to register their HTTPS OpenAPI URL can:\n- Map internal networks behind the agent.\n- Read AWS/GCP IAM credentials from cloud metadata endpoints (`http://169.254.169.254`, `http://metadata.google.internal`).\n- Reach unauthenticated internal services exposed on loopback (Elasticsearch, Redis HTTP, internal admin panels, the agent\u0027s own HTTP server).\n- Have responses returned to the LLM, which combined with prompt injection enables exfiltration back to the attacker.\n\n## Patch\n\nCommit on `dev`: 21f63e6.\n\nNew helper `packages/http/src/_security.ts` exposes `isSecureUrl`, `isLoopbackUrl`, `ensureSecureUrl`. Hostname-based validation closes the prefix bypass (`http://localhost.evil.com` \u2192 rejected). All three protocols\u0027 `registerManual` now call `ensureSecureUrl(url, \u0027manual discovery\u0027)`; `callTool` re-checks the resolved URL with `ensureSecureUrl(url, \u0027tool invocation\u0027)` immediately before the axios request. `OpenApiConverter` rejects remote spec \u2192 loopback server.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nFor users who cannot upgrade immediately:\n- Refuse to call `registerManual` with any URL controlled by an untrusted party, even over HTTPS.\n- Restrict outbound network access from the host running the agent so internal addresses (RFC1918, 169.254.0.0/16, loopback) are unreachable.\n\n## Credit\n\nDiscovered and reported by [@YLChen-007](https://github.com/YLChen-007) against the Python sibling implementation (universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp#83). The TypeScript port shared the same code shape and the same vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-r8j5-8747-88cm",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:55:05Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T20:55:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/typescript-utcp/security/advisories/GHSA-r8j5-8747-88cm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/python-utcp/issues/83"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/universal-tool-calling-protocol/typescript-utcp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@utcp/http: SSRF via attacker-controlled OpenAPI servers[0].url in HTTP communication protocol"
}