{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "langchain-openai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T23:00:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`langchain-openai`\u0027s `_url_to_size()` helper (used by `get_num_tokens_from_messages` for image token counting) validated URLs for SSRF protection and then fetched them in a separate network operation with independent DNS resolution. This left a TOCTOU / DNS rebinding window: an attacker-controlled hostname could resolve to a public IP during validation and then to a private/localhost IP during the actual fetch.\n\nThe practical impact is limited because the fetched response body is passed directly to Pillow\u0027s `Image.open()` to extract dimensions \u2014 the response content is never returned, logged, or otherwise exposed to the caller. An attacker cannot exfiltrate data from internal services through this path. A potential risk is blind probing (inferring whether an internal host/port is open based on timing or error behavior).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `langchain-openai` \u003c 1.1.14\n\n## Patched versions\n\n- `langchain-openai` \u003e= 1.1.14 (requires `langchain-core` \u003e= 1.2.31)\n\n## Affected code\n\n**File:** `libs/partners/openai/langchain_openai/chat_models/base.py` \u2014 `_url_to_size()`\n\nThe vulnerable pattern was a validate-then-fetch with separate DNS resolution:\n\n```python\nvalidate_safe_url(image_source, allow_private=False, allow_http=True)\n# ... separate network operation with independent DNS resolution ...\nresponse = httpx.get(image_source, timeout=timeout)\n```\n\n## Fix\n\nThe fix replaces the validate-then-fetch pattern with an SSRF-safe httpx transport (`SSRFSafeSyncTransport` from `langchain-core`) that:\n\n- Resolves DNS once and validates all returned IPs against a policy (private ranges, cloud metadata, localhost, k8s internal DNS)\n- Pins the connection to the validated IP, eliminating the DNS rebinding window\n- Disables redirect following to prevent redirect-based SSRF bypasses\n\nThis fix was released in langchain-openai 1.1.14.",
  "id": "GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T23:00:12Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T23:00:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain/security/advisories/GHSA-r7w7-9xr2-qq2r"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "langchain-openai: Image token counting SSRF protection can be bypassed via DNS rebinding"
}