GHSA-R264-WHC7-WWFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-02-18 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: Implement settime64 as stub for MVM/MLD PTP
Since commit dfb073d32cac ("ptp: Return -EINVAL on ptp_clock_register if required ops are NULL"), PTP clock registered through ptp_clock_register is required to have ptp_clock_info.settime64 set, however, neither MVM nor MLD's PTP clock implementation sets it, resulting in warnings when the interface starts up, like
WARNING: drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:325 at ptp_clock_register+0x2c8/0x6b8, CPU#1: wpa_supplicant/469 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 469 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 6.18.0+ #101 PREEMPT(full) ra: ffff800002732cd4 iwl_mvm_ptp_init+0x114/0x188 [iwlmvm] ERA: 9000000002fdc468 ptp_clock_register+0x2c8/0x6b8 iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: Failed to register PHC clock (-22)
I don't find an appropriate firmware interface to implement settime64() for iwlwifi MLD/MVM, thus instead create a stub that returns -EOPTNOTSUPP only, suppressing the warning and allowing the PTP clock to be registered.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71226"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-18T15:18:40Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: iwlwifi: Implement settime64 as stub for MVM/MLD PTP\n\nSince commit dfb073d32cac (\"ptp: Return -EINVAL on ptp_clock_register if\nrequired ops are NULL\"), PTP clock registered through ptp_clock_register\nis required to have ptp_clock_info.settime64 set, however, neither MVM\nnor MLD\u0027s PTP clock implementation sets it, resulting in warnings when\nthe interface starts up, like\n\nWARNING: drivers/ptp/ptp_clock.c:325 at ptp_clock_register+0x2c8/0x6b8, CPU#1: wpa_supplicant/469\nCPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 469 Comm: wpa_supplicant Not tainted 6.18.0+ #101 PREEMPT(full)\nra: ffff800002732cd4 iwl_mvm_ptp_init+0x114/0x188 [iwlmvm]\nERA: 9000000002fdc468 ptp_clock_register+0x2c8/0x6b8\niwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: Failed to register PHC clock (-22)\n\nI don\u0027t find an appropriate firmware interface to implement settime64()\nfor iwlwifi MLD/MVM, thus instead create a stub that returns\n-EOPTNOTSUPP only, suppressing the warning and allowing the PTP clock to\nbe registered.",
"id": "GHSA-r264-whc7-wwfw",
"modified": "2026-02-18T15:31:26Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T15:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71226"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81d90d93d22ca4f61833cba921dce9a0bd82218f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff6892ea544c4052dd5799f675ebc20419953801"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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