{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpunit/phpunit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "12.5.21"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.5.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "12.5.21"
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpunit/phpunit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "13.1.5"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "13.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "13.1.5"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-18T00:59:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nPHPUnit forwards PHP INI settings to child processes (used for isolated/PHPT test execution) as `-d name=value` command-line arguments without neutralizing INI metacharacters. Because PHP\u0027s INI parser interprets `\"` as a string delimiter, `;` as the start of a comment, and most importantly a newline as a directive separator, a value containing a newline is parsed by the child process as multiple INI directives.\n\nAn attacker able to influence a single INI value can therefore inject arbitrary additional directives into the child\u0027s configuration, including `auto_prepend_file`, `extension`, `disable_functions`, `open_basedir`, and others. Setting `auto_prepend_file` to an attacker-controlled path yields remote code execution in the child process.\n\nSources of INI values that participate in the attack:\n\n- `\u003cini name=\"\u2026\" value=\"\u2026\"/\u003e` entries in `phpunit.xml` / `phpunit.xml.dist`\n- INI settings inherited from the host PHP runtime via `ini_get_all()`\n\n### Threat Model\n\nExploitation requires the attacker to control the content of an INI value read by PHPUnit. In practice this means write access to the project\u0027s `phpunit.xml`, the host `php.ini`, or the PHP binary\u0027s environment. The most realistic exposure is [Poisoned Pipeline Execution](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/CICD-SEC-04-Poisoned-Pipeline-Execution) (PPE): a pull request from an untrusted contributor that modifies `phpunit.xml` to include a newline-containing INI value, executed by a CI system that runs PHPUnit against the PR without isolation. A malicious newline is not visibly distinguishable from a legitimate value in a typical diff review.\n\n### Affected component\n\n`PHPUnit\\Util\\PHP\\JobRunner::settingsToParameters()`.\n\n## Patches\n\nThe fix has two parts:\n\n**1. Reject line-break characters**\n\nBecause a newline or carriage return in an INI value has no legitimate use and is the primitive that enables directive injection, any PHP setting value containing `\\n` or `\\r` is now rejected with an explicit `PhpProcessException`. This follows the same \"visibility over silence\" principle applied in [CVE-2026-24765](https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/security/advisories/GHSA-vvj3-c3rp-c85p): the anomalous state fails loudly in CI output rather than being silently sanitized, giving operators an opportunity to investigate whether it reflects tampering, environment contamination, or an unexpected upstream change.\n\n**2. Quote remaining metacharacters**\n\nValues containing `\"` or `;`, both of which have legitimate uses (e.g., regex-valued INI settings such as `ddtrace`\u0027s `datadog.appsec.obfuscation_parameter_value_regexp`), are wrapped in double quotes with inner `\"` escaped as `\\\"`, so PHP\u0027s INI parser reads them as literal string contents rather than comment/delimiter tokens. Plain values are forwarded unchanged so that boolean keywords (`On`/`Off`) and bitwise expressions (`E_ALL \u0026 ~E_NOTICE`) retain their INI semantics.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible:\n\n- Audit INI values: Ensure no `\u003cini value=\"\u2026\"\u003e` entry in `phpunit.xml` / `phpunit.xml.dist` contains newline, `\"`, or `;` characters, and that nothing writes such values into configuration at build time.\n- Isolate CI execution of untrusted code: Run PHPUnit against pull requests only in ephemeral, containerized runners that discard filesystem state between jobs; require human review before executing PRs from forks; enforce branch protection on workflows that handle secrets (`pull_request_target` and similar). These mitigations apply to the broader PPE risk class and are effective against this vulnerability as well.\n- Restrict who can modify `phpunit.xml`: Treat `phpunit.xml` as security-sensitive in code review, particularly `\u003cini\u003e` entries.\n- Sanitize host INI: Ensure the host PHP\u0027s `php.ini` does not contain values with embedded newlines or unescaped metacharacters.\n\n## References\n\n- Fix: https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/pull/6592\n- Related advisory (same threat class, Poisoned Pipeline Execution): [GHSA-vvj3-c3rp-c85p / CVE-2026-24765](https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/security/advisories/GHSA-vvj3-c3rp-c85p)\n- OWASP CI/CD Top 10: [CICD-SEC-04 Poisoned Pipeline Execution](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/CICD-SEC-04-Poisoned-Pipeline-Execution)\n- CWE-88: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/88.html\n- CWE-93: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/93.html",
  "id": "GHSA-qrr6-mg7r-m243",
  "modified": "2026-04-20T18:58:42Z",
  "published": "2026-04-18T00:59:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/security/advisories/GHSA-qrr6-mg7r-m243"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit/pull/6592"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/sebastianbergmann/phpunit"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PHPUnit has Argument injection via newline in PHP INI values that are forwarded to child processes"
}