GHSA-QQMV-5P3G-PX89
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 06:11 – Updated: 2026-04-07 14:20Summary
Directus' TUS resumable upload endpoint (/files/tus) allows any authenticated user with basic file upload permissions to overwrite arbitrary existing files by UUID. The TUS controller performs only collection-level authorization checks, verifying the user has some permission on directus_files, but never validates item-level access to the specific file being replaced. As a result, row-level permission rules (e.g., "users can only update their own files") are completely bypassed via the TUS path while being correctly enforced on the standard REST upload path.
Impact
- Arbitrary file overwrite: Any authenticated user with basic TUS upload permissions can overwrite any file in
directus_filesby UUID, regardless of row-level permission rules. - Permanent data loss: The victim file's original stored bytes are deleted from storage and replaced with attacker-controlled content.
- Metadata corruption: The victim file's database record is updated with the attacker's filename, type, and size metadata.
Privilege escalation potential: If admin-owned files (e.g., application assets, templates) are stored in
directus_files, a low-privilege user could replace them with malicious content.
Workaround
Disable TUS uploads by setting TUS_ENABLED=false if resumable uploads are not required.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "directus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.16.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35412"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:11:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T22:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nDirectus\u0027 TUS resumable upload endpoint (`/files/tus`) allows any authenticated user with basic file upload permissions to overwrite arbitrary existing files by UUID. The TUS controller performs only collection-level authorization checks, verifying the user has some permission on `directus_files`, but never validates item-level access to the specific file being replaced. As a result, row-level permission rules (e.g., \"users can only update their own files\") are completely bypassed via the TUS path while being correctly enforced on the standard REST upload path.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Arbitrary file overwrite:** Any authenticated user with basic TUS upload permissions can overwrite any file in `directus_files` by UUID, regardless of row-level permission rules.\n- **Permanent data loss:** The victim file\u0027s original stored bytes are deleted from storage and replaced with attacker-controlled content.\n- **Metadata corruption:** The victim file\u0027s database record is updated with the attacker\u0027s filename, type, and size metadata.\nPrivilege escalation potential: If admin-owned files (e.g., application assets, templates) are stored in `directus_files`, a low-privilege user could replace them with malicious content.\n\n## Workaround\n\nDisable TUS uploads by setting `TUS_ENABLED=false` if resumable uploads are not required.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
"id": "GHSA-qqmv-5p3g-px89",
"modified": "2026-04-07T14:20:12Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T06:11:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-qqmv-5p3g-px89"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35412"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directus: TUS Upload Authorization Bypass Allows Arbitrary File Overwrite"
}
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