GHSA-QQ3V-279P-2285
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-24 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: fix incorrect buffer cleanup in gve_tx_clean_pending_packets for QPL
In DQ-QPL mode, gve_tx_clean_pending_packets() incorrectly uses the RDA buffer cleanup path. It iterates num_bufs times and attempts to unmap entries in the dma array.
This leads to two issues: 1. The dma array shares storage with tx_qpl_buf_ids (union). Interpreting buffer IDs as DMA addresses results in attempting to unmap incorrect memory locations. 2. num_bufs in QPL mode (counting 2K chunks) can significantly exceed the size of the dma array, causing out-of-bounds access warnings (trace below is how we noticed this issue).
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/net/ethernet/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_tx_dqo.c:178:5 index 18 is out of range for type 'dma_addr_t[18]' (aka 'unsigned long long[18]') Workqueue: gve gve_service_task [gve] Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0xa0 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xdc/0x110 gve_tx_stop_ring_dqo+0x182/0x200 [gve] gve_close+0x1be/0x450 [gve] gve_reset+0x99/0x120 [gve] gve_service_task+0x61/0x100 [gve] process_scheduled_works+0x1e9/0x380
Fix this by properly checking for QPL mode and delegating to gve_free_tx_qpl_bufs() to reclaim the buffers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23386"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngve: fix incorrect buffer cleanup in gve_tx_clean_pending_packets for QPL\n\nIn DQ-QPL mode, gve_tx_clean_pending_packets() incorrectly uses the RDA\nbuffer cleanup path. It iterates num_bufs times and attempts to unmap\nentries in the dma array.\n\nThis leads to two issues:\n1. The dma array shares storage with tx_qpl_buf_ids (union).\n Interpreting buffer IDs as DMA addresses results in attempting to\n unmap incorrect memory locations.\n2. num_bufs in QPL mode (counting 2K chunks) can significantly exceed\n the size of the dma array, causing out-of-bounds access warnings\n(trace below is how we noticed this issue).\n\nUBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in\ndrivers/net/ethernet/drivers/net/ethernet/google/gve/gve_tx_dqo.c:178:5 index 18 is out of\nrange for type \u0027dma_addr_t[18]\u0027 (aka \u0027unsigned long long[18]\u0027)\nWorkqueue: gve gve_service_task [gve]\nCall Trace:\n\u003cTASK\u003e\ndump_stack_lvl+0x33/0xa0\n__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0xdc/0x110\ngve_tx_stop_ring_dqo+0x182/0x200 [gve]\ngve_close+0x1be/0x450 [gve]\ngve_reset+0x99/0x120 [gve]\ngve_service_task+0x61/0x100 [gve]\nprocess_scheduled_works+0x1e9/0x380\n\nFix this by properly checking for QPL mode and delegating to\ngve_free_tx_qpl_bufs() to reclaim the buffers.",
"id": "GHSA-qq3v-279p-2285",
"modified": "2026-04-24T21:31:57Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T12:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07e0c80e17ef781799e7cd5c41a7bf44f1bf6a5f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3744ebd8ffaa542ae8110fb449adcac0202f4cc8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71511dae56a75ce161aa746741e5c498feaea393"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c171f90f58974c784db25e0606051541cb71b7f0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb868db5f4bccd7a78219313ab2917429f715cea"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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