{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0.beta1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.21"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32762"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-436"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-02T20:31:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-02T18:16:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`Rack::Utils.forwarded_values` parses the RFC 7239 `Forwarded` header by splitting on semicolons before handling quoted-string values. Because quoted values may legally contain semicolons, a header such as:\n\n```http\nForwarded: for=\"127.0.0.1;host=evil.com;proto=https\"\n```\n\ncan be interpreted by Rack as multiple `Forwarded` directives rather than as a single quoted `for` value.\n\nIn deployments where an upstream proxy, WAF, or intermediary validates or preserves quoted `Forwarded` values differently, this discrepancy can allow an attacker to smuggle `host`, `proto`, `for`, or `by` parameters through a single header value.\n\n## Details\n\n`Rack::Utils.forwarded_values` processes the header using logic equivalent to:\n\n```ruby\nforwarded_header.split(\u0027;\u0027).each_with_object({}) do |field, values|\n  field.split(\u0027,\u0027).each do |pair|\n    pair = pair.split(\u0027=\u0027).map(\u0026:strip).join(\u0027=\u0027)\n    return nil unless pair =~ /\\A(by|for|host|proto)=\"?([^\"]+)\"?\\Z/i\n    (values[$1.downcase.to_sym] ||= []) \u003c\u003c $2\n  end\nend\n```\n\nThe method splits on `;` before it parses individual `name=value` pairs. This is inconsistent with RFC 7239, which permits quoted-string values, and quoted strings may contain semicolons as literal content.\n\nAs a result, a header value such as:\n\n```http\nForwarded: for=\"127.0.0.1;host=evil.com;proto=https\"\n```\n\nis not treated as a single `for` value. Instead, Rack may interpret it as if the client had supplied separate `for`, `host`, and `proto` directives.\n\nThis creates an interpretation conflict when another component in front of Rack treats the quoted value as valid literal content, while Rack reparses it as multiple forwarding parameters.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications that rely on `Forwarded` to derive request metadata may observe attacker-controlled values for `host`, `proto`, `for`, or related URL components.\n\nIn affected deployments, this can lead to host or scheme spoofing in derived values such as `req.host`, `req.scheme`, `req.base_url`, or `req.url`. Applications that use those values for password reset links, redirects, absolute URL generation, logging, IP-based decisions, or backend requests may be vulnerable to downstream security impact.\n\nThe practical security impact depends on deployment architecture. If clients can already supply arbitrary trusted `Forwarded` parameters directly, this bug may not add meaningful attacker capability. The issue is most relevant where an upstream component and Rack interpret the same `Forwarded` header differently.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n* Update to a patched version of Rack that parses `Forwarded` quoted-string values before splitting on parameter delimiters.\n* Avoid trusting client-supplied `Forwarded` headers unless they are normalized or regenerated by a trusted reverse proxy.\n* Prefer stripping inbound `Forwarded` headers at the edge and reconstructing them from trusted proxy metadata.\n* Avoid using `req.host`, `req.scheme`, `req.base_url`, or `req.url` for security-sensitive operations unless the forwarding chain is explicitly trusted and validated.",
  "id": "GHSA-qfgr-crr9-7r49",
  "modified": "2026-04-02T20:31:52Z",
  "published": "2026-04-02T20:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack/security/advisories/GHSA-qfgr-crr9-7r49"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32762"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rack/rack"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Rack: Forwarded Header semicolon injection enables Host and Scheme spoofing"
}