GHSA-Q2MX-J4X2-2H74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:03Impact
We found that this vulnerability is present when the developer is implementing an OAuth 1 provider (by extension, it means Twitter, which is the only built-in provider using OAuth 1), but upgrading is still recommended.
next-auth v3 users before version 3.29.3 are impacted. (We recommend upgrading to v4, as v3 is considered unmaintained. See our migration guide)
next-auth v4 users before version 4.3.3 are impacted.
Patches
We've released patches for this vulnerability in:
- v3 -
3.29.3 - v4 -
4.3.3
You can do:
npm i next-auth@latest
or
yarn add next-auth@latest
or
pnpm add next-auth@latest
(This will update to the latest v4 version, but you can change latest to 3 if you want to stay on v3.)
Workarounds
If you are not able to upgrade for any reason, you can add the following configuration to your callbacks option:
// async redirect(url, baseUrl) { // v3
async redirect({ url, baseUrl }) { // v4
// Allows relative callback URLs
if (url.startsWith("/")) return `${baseUrl}${url}`
// Allows callback URLs on the same origin
else if (new URL(url).origin === baseUrl) return url
return baseUrl
}
References
This vulnerability was discovered right after https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-f9wg-5f46-cjmw was published and is very similar in nature.
Read more about the callbacks.redirect option in the documentation: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/callbacks#redirect-callback
For more information
If you have any concerns, we request responsible disclosure, outlined here: https://next-auth.js.org/security#reporting-a-vulnerability
Timeline
The issue was reported 2022 April 20th, a response was sent out to the reporter 8 minutes after, and a patch was produced within a few days.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.29.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "next-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-29214"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-05-24T22:03:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-21T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWe found that this vulnerability is present when the developer is implementing an OAuth 1 provider (by extension, it means Twitter, which is the only built-in provider using OAuth 1), but **upgrading** is **still recommended**.\n\n`next-auth` v3 users before version 3.29.3 are impacted. (We recommend upgrading to v4, as v3 is considered unmaintained. See our [migration guide](https://next-auth.js.org/getting-started/upgrade-v4))\n\n`next-auth` v4 users before version 4.3.3 are impacted.\n\n### Patches\n\nWe\u0027ve released patches for this vulnerability in:\n \n- v3 - `3.29.3`\n- v4 - `4.3.3`\n\nYou can do:\n\n```sh\nnpm i next-auth@latest\n```\n\nor\n\n```sh\nyarn add next-auth@latest\n```\n\nor\n\n```sh\npnpm add next-auth@latest\n```\n\n(This will update to the latest v4 version, but you can change `latest` to `3` if you want to stay on v3.)\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you are not able to upgrade for any reason, you can add the following configuration to your `callbacks` option:\n\n```ts\n// async redirect(url, baseUrl) { // v3\nasync redirect({ url, baseUrl }) { // v4\n // Allows relative callback URLs\n if (url.startsWith(\"/\")) return `${baseUrl}${url}`\n // Allows callback URLs on the same origin\n else if (new URL(url).origin === baseUrl) return url\n return baseUrl\n}\n```\n\n### References\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered right after https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-f9wg-5f46-cjmw was published and is very similar in nature.\n\nRead more about the `callbacks.redirect` option in the documentation: https://next-auth.js.org/configuration/callbacks#redirect-callback\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any concerns, we request responsible disclosure, outlined here: https://next-auth.js.org/security#reporting-a-vulnerability\n\n### Timeline\n\nThe issue was reported 2022 April 20th, a response was sent out to the reporter 8 minutes after, and a patch was produced within a few days.",
"id": "GHSA-q2mx-j4x2-2h74",
"modified": "2022-05-24T22:03:07Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T22:03:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-q2mx-j4x2-2h74"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29214"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/next-auth%40v4.3.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "URL Redirection to Untrusted Site (\u0027Open Redirect\u0027) in next-auth"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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