GHSA-PXQ7-H93F-9JRG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-15 19:24 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:40Impact
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.
Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:
- Use of
skip_auth_routesor the legacyskip_auth_regex* Use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as^/foo/.*/bar$causing potential exposure of/foo/secret* Protected upstream applications that interpret#as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path
In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form %23, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource.
Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, ARE NOT affected.
Patches
A fix has been implemented to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions.
Released as part of v7.15.2
Workarounds
Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments.
Recommended mitigations:
- Replace broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods
- Reject requests whose path contains
%23or#at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level - Avoid placing sensitive application paths behind broad
skip_auth_routesrules
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.15.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41059"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-288"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-15T19:24:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T00:16:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nA configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.\n\nDeployments are affected when all of the following are true:\n\n* Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex` * Use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret` * Protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path\n\nIn deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource.\n\nDeployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, **ARE NOT** affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nA fix has been implemented to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions.\n\nReleased as part of `v7.15.2`\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments.\n\nRecommended mitigations:\n\n* Replace broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods\n* Reject requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level\n* Avoid placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules",
"id": "GHSA-pxq7-h93f-9jrg",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:40:56Z",
"published": "2026-04-15T19:24:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-pxq7-h93f-9jrg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41059"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via Fragment Confusion in skip_auth_routes and skip_auth_regex"
}
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