GHSA-PXJV-J4WF-PFW9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pNFS: Fix a deadlock when returning a delegation during open()
Ben Coddington reports seeing a hang in the following stack trace: 0 [ffffd0b50e1774e0] __schedule at ffffffff9ca05415 1 [ffffd0b50e177548] schedule at ffffffff9ca05717 2 [ffffd0b50e177558] bit_wait at ffffffff9ca061e1 3 [ffffd0b50e177568] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05cfb 4 [ffffd0b50e1775c8] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05ea5 5 [ffffd0b50e177618] pnfs_roc at ffffffffc154207b [nfsv4] 6 [ffffd0b50e1776b8] _nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1506586 [nfsv4] 7 [ffffd0b50e177788] nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1507480 [nfsv4] 8 [ffffd0b50e1777f8] nfs_do_return_delegation at ffffffffc1523e41 [nfsv4] 9 [ffffd0b50e177838] nfs_inode_set_delegation at ffffffffc1524a75 [nfsv4] 10 [ffffd0b50e177888] nfs4_process_delegation at ffffffffc14f41dd [nfsv4] 11 [ffffd0b50e1778a0] _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state at ffffffffc1503edf [nfsv4] 12 [ffffd0b50e1778c0] _nfs4_open_and_get_state at ffffffffc1504e56 [nfsv4] 13 [ffffd0b50e177978] _nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc15051b8 [nfsv4] 14 [ffffd0b50e1779f8] nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc150559c [nfsv4] 15 [ffffd0b50e177a80] nfs4_atomic_open at ffffffffc15057fb [nfsv4] 16 [ffffd0b50e177ad0] nfs4_file_open at ffffffffc15219be [nfsv4] 17 [ffffd0b50e177b78] do_dentry_open at ffffffff9c09e6ea 18 [ffffd0b50e177ba8] vfs_open at ffffffff9c0a082e 19 [ffffd0b50e177bd0] dentry_open at ffffffff9c0a0935
The issue is that the delegreturn is being asked to wait for a layout return that cannot complete because a state recovery was initiated. The state recovery cannot complete until the open() finishes processing the delegations it was given.
The solution is to propagate the existing flags that indicate a non-blocking call to the function pnfs_roc(), so that it knows not to wait in this situation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23050"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T17:16:15Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\npNFS: Fix a deadlock when returning a delegation during open()\n\nBen Coddington reports seeing a hang in the following stack trace:\n 0 [ffffd0b50e1774e0] __schedule at ffffffff9ca05415\n 1 [ffffd0b50e177548] schedule at ffffffff9ca05717\n 2 [ffffd0b50e177558] bit_wait at ffffffff9ca061e1\n 3 [ffffd0b50e177568] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05cfb\n 4 [ffffd0b50e1775c8] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff9ca05ea5\n 5 [ffffd0b50e177618] pnfs_roc at ffffffffc154207b [nfsv4]\n 6 [ffffd0b50e1776b8] _nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1506586 [nfsv4]\n 7 [ffffd0b50e177788] nfs4_proc_delegreturn at ffffffffc1507480 [nfsv4]\n 8 [ffffd0b50e1777f8] nfs_do_return_delegation at ffffffffc1523e41 [nfsv4]\n 9 [ffffd0b50e177838] nfs_inode_set_delegation at ffffffffc1524a75 [nfsv4]\n 10 [ffffd0b50e177888] nfs4_process_delegation at ffffffffc14f41dd [nfsv4]\n 11 [ffffd0b50e1778a0] _nfs4_opendata_to_nfs4_state at ffffffffc1503edf [nfsv4]\n 12 [ffffd0b50e1778c0] _nfs4_open_and_get_state at ffffffffc1504e56 [nfsv4]\n 13 [ffffd0b50e177978] _nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc15051b8 [nfsv4]\n 14 [ffffd0b50e1779f8] nfs4_do_open at ffffffffc150559c [nfsv4]\n 15 [ffffd0b50e177a80] nfs4_atomic_open at ffffffffc15057fb [nfsv4]\n 16 [ffffd0b50e177ad0] nfs4_file_open at ffffffffc15219be [nfsv4]\n 17 [ffffd0b50e177b78] do_dentry_open at ffffffff9c09e6ea\n 18 [ffffd0b50e177ba8] vfs_open at ffffffff9c0a082e\n 19 [ffffd0b50e177bd0] dentry_open at ffffffff9c0a0935\n\nThe issue is that the delegreturn is being asked to wait for a layout\nreturn that cannot complete because a state recovery was initiated. The\nstate recovery cannot complete until the open() finishes processing the\ndelegations it was given.\n\nThe solution is to propagate the existing flags that indicate a\nnon-blocking call to the function pnfs_roc(), so that it knows not to\nwait in this situation.",
"id": "GHSA-pxjv-j4wf-pfw9",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-04T18:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23050"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05a685b38dbca489d5f21eac9e7f20959344076a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/857bf9056291a16785ae3be1d291026b2437fc48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a316fd9d3065b753b03d802530004aea481512cc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c57387d447a2bcbaea009ba5f9497adf3de5edeb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6c75aa9d607044d1e5c8498eff0259eed356c32"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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