GHSA-PV9C-9MFH-HVXQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-24 19:13 – Updated: 2026-03-24 19:13
VLAI?
Summary
iCalendar has ICS injection via unsanitized URI property values
Details

Summary

.ics serialization does not properly sanitize URI property values, enabling ICS injection through attacker-controlled input, adding arbitrary calendar lines to the output.

Details

Icalendar::Values::Uri falls back to the raw input string when URI.parse fails and later serializes it with value.to_s without removing or escaping \r or \n characters. That value is embedded directly into the final ICS line by the normal serializer, so a payload containing CRLF can terminate the original property and create a new ICS property or component. (It looks like you can inject via url, source, image, organizer, attach, attendee, conference, tzurl because of this)

Relevant code: - lib/icalendar/values/uri.rb:16

PoC

Run the following with the library loaded:

require "icalendar/value"
require "icalendar/values/uri"

v = Icalendar::Values::Uri.new("https://a.example/ok\r\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com")
puts v.to_ical(Icalendar::Values::Text)

output:

;VALUE=URI:https://a.example/ok
ATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com

Impact

Applications that generate .ics files from partially untrusted metadata are impacted. As a result, downstream calendar clients or importers may process attacker-supplied content as if it were legitimate event data, such as added attendees, modified URLs, alarms, or other calendar fields.

Fix

Reject raw CR and LF characters in URI-typed values before serialization, or escape/encode them so they cannot terminate the current ICS content line.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "icalendar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.12.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33635"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-24T19:13:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n.ics serialization does not properly sanitize URI property values, enabling ICS injection through attacker-controlled input, adding arbitrary calendar lines to the output.\n\n### Details\n`Icalendar::Values::Uri` falls back to the raw input string when `URI.parse` fails and later serializes it with `value.to_s` without removing or escaping `\\r` or `\\n` characters. That value is embedded directly into the final ICS line by the normal serializer, so a payload containing CRLF can terminate the original property and create a new ICS property or component. (It looks like you can inject via url, source, image, organizer, attach, attendee, conference, tzurl because of this)\n\nRelevant code:\n- `lib/icalendar/values/uri.rb:16`\n\n### PoC\nRun the following with the library loaded:\n\n```ruby\nrequire \"icalendar/value\"\nrequire \"icalendar/values/uri\"\n\nv = Icalendar::Values::Uri.new(\"https://a.example/ok\\r\\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com\")\nputs v.to_ical(Icalendar::Values::Text)\n```\n\noutput:\n\n```text\n;VALUE=URI:https://a.example/ok\nATTENDEE:mailto:evil@example.com\n```\n\n### Impact\nApplications that generate `.ics` files from partially untrusted metadata are impacted. As a result, downstream calendar clients or importers may process attacker-supplied content as if it were legitimate event data, such as added attendees, modified URLs, alarms, or other calendar fields.\n\n## Fix\nReject raw CR and LF characters in `URI`-typed values before serialization, or escape/encode them so they cannot terminate the current ICS content line.",
  "id": "GHSA-pv9c-9mfh-hvxq",
  "modified": "2026-03-24T19:13:41Z",
  "published": "2026-03-24T19:13:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/icalendar/icalendar/security/advisories/GHSA-pv9c-9mfh-hvxq"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/icalendar/icalendar/commit/b8d23b490363ee5fffaec1d269a8618a912ca265"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/icalendar/icalendar"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "iCalendar has ICS injection via unsanitized URI property values"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…