GHSA-PV58-549P-QH99

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 00:33 – Updated: 2026-02-20 16:45
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning
Details

Summary

Discovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as lanHost, tailnetDns, gatewayPort, and gatewayTlsSha256. TXT records are unauthenticated.

Prior to the fix, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs:

  • iOS and macOS: used TXT-provided host hints (lanHost/tailnetDns) and ports (gatewayPort) to build the connection URL.
  • iOS and Android: allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (gatewayTlsSha256) to override a previously stored TLS pin.

On a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue _openclaw-gw._tcp service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (auth.token / auth.password) during connection.

Distribution / Exposure

The iOS and Android apps are currently alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN.

CVSS can still be used for the technical (base) severity of the bug; limited distribution primarily affects environmental risk.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.2.13 (latest published on npm as of 2026-02-14)
  • Patched: planned for >= 2026.2.14 (not yet published at time of writing)

Fix

  • Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints.
  • Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins.
  • iOS/Android: first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU).
  • iOS/Android: discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only.
  • Android: hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).

Fix Commit(s)

  • d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586

Credits

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Severity ?
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-26327"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:33:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T23:16:26Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nDiscovery beacons (Bonjour/mDNS and DNS-SD) include TXT records such as `lanHost`, `tailnetDns`, `gatewayPort`, and `gatewayTlsSha256`. TXT records are unauthenticated.\n\nPrior to the fix, some clients treated TXT values as authoritative routing/pinning inputs:\n\n- iOS and macOS: used TXT-provided host hints (`lanHost`/`tailnetDns`) and ports (`gatewayPort`) to build the connection URL.\n- iOS and Android: allowed the discovery-provided TLS fingerprint (`gatewayTlsSha256`) to override a previously stored TLS pin.\n\nOn a shared/untrusted LAN, an attacker could advertise a rogue `_openclaw-gw._tcp` service. This could cause a client to connect to an attacker-controlled endpoint and/or accept an attacker certificate, potentially exfiltrating Gateway credentials (`auth.token` / `auth.password`) during connection.\n\n## Distribution / Exposure\n\nThe iOS and Android apps are currently alpha/not broadly shipped (no public App Store / Play Store release). Practical impact is primarily limited to developers/testers running those builds, plus any other shipped clients relying on discovery on a shared/untrusted LAN.\n\nCVSS can still be used for the technical (base) severity of the bug; limited distribution primarily affects environmental risk.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.2.13` (latest published on npm as of 2026-02-14)\n- Patched: planned for `\u003e= 2026.2.14` (not yet published at time of writing)\n\n## Fix\n\n- Clients now prefer the resolved service endpoint (SRV + A/AAAA) over TXT-provided routing hints.\n- Discovery-provided fingerprints no longer override stored TLS pins.\n- iOS/Android: first-time TLS pins require explicit user confirmation (fingerprint shown; no silent TOFU).\n- iOS/Android: discovery-based direct connects are TLS-only.\n- Android: hostname verification is no longer globally disabled (only bypassed when pinning).\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99",
  "modified": "2026-02-20T16:45:30Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T00:33:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-pv58-549p-qh99"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26327"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d583782ee322a6faa1fe87ae52455e0d349de586"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw allows unauthenticated discovery TXT records to steer routing and TLS pinning"
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.



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