GHSA-PP9R-XG4C-8J4X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 12:44 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:48Summary
Salvo's form data parsing implementations (form_data() method and Extractible macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.
Details
Vulnerability Description
Three attack vectors exist in Salvo's form handling:
- URL-encoded form data (
application/x-www-form-urlencoded) Request::form_data()callsBodyExt::collect(body)which reads the entire body into memory without size checking-
Affects handlers using
req.form_data().awaitdirectly -
Multipart form data (
multipart/form-data) - Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing
-
Affects handlers processing multipart uploads
-
Extractible macro
#[derive(Extractible)]with#[salvo(extract(default_source(from = "body")))]internally callsform_data()- Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources
Root Cause
The FormData::read() implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when Request::payload_with_max_size() is available, it's not automatically applied in the form parsing path.
PoC
- run
Extract data from requestexample in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb. - Send
application/x-www-form-urlencodedORmultipart/form-datapayload to the endpoint. - The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.
Impact
Immediate Effects
- Service Unavailability: Servers crash under memory pressure
- Resource Exhaustion: Single request can consume all available memory
- Cascading Failures: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services
Attack Characteristics
- Low Cost: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)
- No Authentication: Exploitable on public endpoints
- Difficult to Rate-Limit: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request
- Amplification: Small network cost → large memory consumption
Real-World Scenarios
- Public API endpoints accepting form data
- User registration/profile update handlers
- File upload endpoints using multipart forms
- Any endpoint using
#[derive(Extractible)]with body sources
Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In
Problem Statement
Currently, Salvo's multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:
- Unintended File Storage: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields
- Disk Space Exhaustion: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits
- Resource Cleanup: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don't expect them
- Attack Surface: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "salvo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.89.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33241"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T12:44:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T00:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nSalvo\u0027s form data parsing implementations (`form_data()` method and `Extractible` macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.\n\n## Details\n### Vulnerability Description\nThree attack vectors exist in Salvo\u0027s form handling:\n\n1. **URL-encoded form data** (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`)\n - `Request::form_data()` calls `BodyExt::collect(body)` which reads the entire body into memory without size checking\n - Affects handlers using `req.form_data().await` directly\n\n2. **Multipart form data** (`multipart/form-data`)\n - Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing\n - Affects handlers processing multipart uploads\n\n3. **Extractible macro**\n - `#[derive(Extractible)]` with `#[salvo(extract(default_source(from = \"body\")))]` internally calls `form_data()`\n - Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources\n\n### Root Cause\nThe `FormData::read()` implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when `Request::payload_with_max_size()` is available, it\u0027s not automatically applied in the form parsing path.\n\n### PoC\n1. run `Extract data from request` example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.\n2. Send `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` OR `multipart/form-data` payload to the endpoint.\n3. The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.\n\n\n## Impact\n### Immediate Effects\n- **Service Unavailability**: Servers crash under memory pressure\n- **Resource Exhaustion**: Single request can consume all available memory\n- **Cascading Failures**: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services\n\n### Attack Characteristics\n- **Low Cost**: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)\n- **No Authentication**: Exploitable on public endpoints\n- **Difficult to Rate-Limit**: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request\n- **Amplification**: Small network cost \u2192 large memory consumption\n\n### Real-World Scenarios\n1. Public API endpoints accepting form data\n2. User registration/profile update handlers\n3. File upload endpoints using multipart forms\n4. Any endpoint using `#[derive(Extractible)]` with body sources\n\n## Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In\n\n### Problem Statement\n\nCurrently, Salvo\u0027s multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:\n\n1. **Unintended File Storage**: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields\n2. **Disk Space Exhaustion**: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits\n3. **Resource Cleanup**: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don\u0027t expect them\n4. **Attack Surface**: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets",
"id": "GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x",
"modified": "2026-03-25T20:48:57Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T12:44:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/security/advisories/GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33241"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/releases/tag/v0.89.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Salvo Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Memory Allocation in Form Data Parsing"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.