GHSA-PP9R-XG4C-8J4X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 12:44 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:48
VLAI?
Summary
Salvo Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Memory Allocation in Form Data Parsing
Details

Summary

Salvo's form data parsing implementations (form_data() method and Extractible macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.

Details

Vulnerability Description

Three attack vectors exist in Salvo's form handling:

  1. URL-encoded form data (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)
  2. Request::form_data() calls BodyExt::collect(body) which reads the entire body into memory without size checking
  3. Affects handlers using req.form_data().await directly

  4. Multipart form data (multipart/form-data)

  5. Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing
  6. Affects handlers processing multipart uploads

  7. Extractible macro

  8. #[derive(Extractible)] with #[salvo(extract(default_source(from = "body")))] internally calls form_data()
  9. Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources

Root Cause

The FormData::read() implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when Request::payload_with_max_size() is available, it's not automatically applied in the form parsing path.

PoC

  1. run Extract data from request example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.
  2. Send application/x-www-form-urlencoded OR multipart/form-data payload to the endpoint.
  3. The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.

Impact

Immediate Effects

  • Service Unavailability: Servers crash under memory pressure
  • Resource Exhaustion: Single request can consume all available memory
  • Cascading Failures: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services

Attack Characteristics

  • Low Cost: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)
  • No Authentication: Exploitable on public endpoints
  • Difficult to Rate-Limit: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request
  • Amplification: Small network cost → large memory consumption

Real-World Scenarios

  1. Public API endpoints accepting form data
  2. User registration/profile update handlers
  3. File upload endpoints using multipart forms
  4. Any endpoint using #[derive(Extractible)] with body sources

Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In

Problem Statement

Currently, Salvo's multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:

  1. Unintended File Storage: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields
  2. Disk Space Exhaustion: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits
  3. Resource Cleanup: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don't expect them
  4. Attack Surface: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "salvo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.89.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33241"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T12:44:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T00:16:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nSalvo\u0027s form data parsing implementations (`form_data()` method and `Extractible` macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.\n\n## Details\n### Vulnerability Description\nThree attack vectors exist in Salvo\u0027s form handling:\n\n1. **URL-encoded form data** (`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`)\n   - `Request::form_data()` calls `BodyExt::collect(body)` which reads the entire body into memory without size checking\n   - Affects handlers using `req.form_data().await` directly\n\n2. **Multipart form data** (`multipart/form-data`)\n   - Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing\n   - Affects handlers processing multipart uploads\n\n3. **Extractible macro**\n   - `#[derive(Extractible)]` with `#[salvo(extract(default_source(from = \"body\")))]` internally calls `form_data()`\n   - Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources\n\n### Root Cause\nThe `FormData::read()` implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when `Request::payload_with_max_size()` is available, it\u0027s not automatically applied in the form parsing path.\n\n### PoC\n1. run `Extract data from request` example in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.\n2. Send `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` OR `multipart/form-data` payload to the endpoint.\n3. The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.\n\n\n## Impact\n### Immediate Effects\n- **Service Unavailability**: Servers crash under memory pressure\n- **Resource Exhaustion**: Single request can consume all available memory\n- **Cascading Failures**: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services\n\n### Attack Characteristics\n- **Low Cost**: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)\n- **No Authentication**: Exploitable on public endpoints\n- **Difficult to Rate-Limit**: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request\n- **Amplification**: Small network cost \u2192 large memory consumption\n\n### Real-World Scenarios\n1. Public API endpoints accepting form data\n2. User registration/profile update handlers\n3. File upload endpoints using multipart forms\n4. Any endpoint using `#[derive(Extractible)]` with body sources\n\n## Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In\n\n### Problem Statement\n\nCurrently, Salvo\u0027s multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:\n\n1. **Unintended File Storage**: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields\n2. **Disk Space Exhaustion**: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits\n3. **Resource Cleanup**: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don\u0027t expect them\n4. **Attack Surface**: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets",
  "id": "GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T20:48:57Z",
  "published": "2026-03-19T12:44:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/security/advisories/GHSA-pp9r-xg4c-8j4x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33241"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/salvo-rs/salvo/releases/tag/v0.89.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Salvo Affected by Denial of Service via Unbounded Memory Allocation in Form Data Parsing"
}


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