GHSA-PM8F-4P6P-6X53

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-15 15:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ptrace: slightly saner 'get_dumpable()' logic

The 'dumpability' of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of the task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and makes no sense when you don't have an associated mm.

And almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task has a mm pointer.

But we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses 'dumpable' to check various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically explicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS). Including for threads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel threads).

It's not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.

The ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to be uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the traditional "drop capabilities" model doesn't make any difference for this all.

Make it all make a bit more sense by saying that if you don't have a MM pointer, we'll use a cached "last dumpability" flag if the thread ever had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never set), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46333"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T14:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nptrace: slightly saner \u0027get_dumpable()\u0027 logic\n\nThe \u0027dumpability\u0027 of a task is fundamentally about the memory image of\nthe task - the concept comes from whether it can core dump or not - and\nmakes no sense when you don\u0027t have an associated mm.\n\nAnd almost all users do in fact use it only for the case where the task\nhas a mm pointer.\n\nBut we have one odd special case: ptrace_may_access() uses \u0027dumpable\u0027 to\ncheck various other things entirely independently of the MM (typically\nexplicitly using flags like PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS).  Including for\nthreads that no longer have a VM (and maybe never did, like most kernel\nthreads).\n\nIt\u0027s not what this flag was designed for, but it is what it is.\n\nThe ptrace code does check that the uid/gid matches, so you do have to\nbe uid-0 to see kernel thread details, but this means that the\ntraditional \"drop capabilities\" model doesn\u0027t make any difference for\nthis all.\n\nMake it all make a *bit* more sense by saying that if you don\u0027t have a\nMM pointer, we\u0027ll use a cached \"last dumpability\" flag if the thread\never had a MM (it will be zero for kernel threads since it is never\nset), and require a proper CAP_SYS_PTRACE capability to override.",
  "id": "GHSA-pm8f-4p6p-6x53",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:53Z",
  "published": "2026-05-15T15:30:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46333"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23471"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24814"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:33486"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-46333"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2477802"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01363cb3fbd0238ffdeb09f53e9039c9edf8a730"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15b828a46f305ae9f05a7c16914b3ce273474205"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a93a4fac7b6051d3be7cd1b015fe7320cd0404d"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31e62c2ebbfdc3fe3dbdf5e02c92a9dc67087a3a"
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    {
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      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4709234fd1b95136ceb789f639b1e7ea5de1b181"
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    {
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    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/0xdeadbeefnetwork/ssh-keysign-pwn"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/05/msg00032.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2026/05/msg00035.html"
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    {
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      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-46333.json"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19521"
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      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19540"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19568"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19569"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19664"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19666"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19705"
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    {
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      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:19711"
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    {
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      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20299"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:20593"
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    {
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      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:21701"
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    {
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    {
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      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:23470"
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    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/15/9"
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    {
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      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/20/14"
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  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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