GHSA-PGCQ-8HV5-FRGJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

team: fix header_ops type confusion with non-Ethernet ports

Similar to commit 950803f72547 ("bonding: fix type confusion in bond_setup_by_slave()") team has the same class of header_ops type confusion.

For non-Ethernet ports, team_setup_by_port() copies port_dev->header_ops directly. When the team device later calls dev_hard_header() or dev_parse_header(), these callbacks can run with the team net_device instead of the real lower device, so netdev_priv(dev) is interpreted as the wrong private type and can crash.

The syzbot report shows a crash in bond_header_create(), but the root cause is in team: the topology is gre -> bond -> team, and team calls the inherited header_ops with its own net_device instead of the lower device, so bond_header_create() receives a team device and interprets netdev_priv() as bonding private data, causing a type confusion crash.

Fix this by introducing team header_ops wrappers for create/parse, selecting a team port under RCU, and calling the lower device callbacks with port->dev, so each callback always sees the correct net_device context.

Also pass the selected lower device to the lower parse callback, so recursion is bounded in stacked non-Ethernet topologies and parse callbacks always run with the correct device context.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31502"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-843"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T14:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nteam: fix header_ops type confusion with non-Ethernet ports\n\nSimilar to commit 950803f72547 (\"bonding: fix type confusion in\nbond_setup_by_slave()\") team has the same class of header_ops type\nconfusion.\n\nFor non-Ethernet ports, team_setup_by_port() copies port_dev-\u003eheader_ops\ndirectly. When the team device later calls dev_hard_header() or\ndev_parse_header(), these callbacks can run with the team net_device\ninstead of the real lower device, so netdev_priv(dev) is interpreted as\nthe wrong private type and can crash.\n\nThe syzbot report shows a crash in bond_header_create(), but the root\ncause is in team: the topology is gre -\u003e bond -\u003e team, and team calls\nthe inherited header_ops with its own net_device instead of the lower\ndevice, so bond_header_create() receives a team device and interprets\nnetdev_priv() as bonding private data, causing a type confusion crash.\n\nFix this by introducing team header_ops wrappers for create/parse,\nselecting a team port under RCU, and calling the lower device callbacks\nwith port-\u003edev, so each callback always sees the correct net_device\ncontext.\n\nAlso pass the selected lower device to the lower parse callback, so\nrecursion is bounded in stacked non-Ethernet topologies and parse\ncallbacks always run with the correct device context.",
  "id": "GHSA-pgcq-8hv5-frgj",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:28Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T15:31:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31502"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a7468ed49a6b65d34abcc6eb60e15f7f6d34da0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20491d384d973a63fbdaf7a71e38d69b0659ea55"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/420e5aad7ba89e8f79e2dc8327b0c0c24c1c1d53"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/425000dbf17373a4ab8be9428f5dc055ef870a56"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d3161fa3eee64d46b766fb0db33ec7f300ef52d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6e255b0ce30cdea37e34d6d87e2212eb8c7f7a4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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