GHSA-PGCQ-8HV5-FRGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-27 15:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
team: fix header_ops type confusion with non-Ethernet ports
Similar to commit 950803f72547 ("bonding: fix type confusion in bond_setup_by_slave()") team has the same class of header_ops type confusion.
For non-Ethernet ports, team_setup_by_port() copies port_dev->header_ops directly. When the team device later calls dev_hard_header() or dev_parse_header(), these callbacks can run with the team net_device instead of the real lower device, so netdev_priv(dev) is interpreted as the wrong private type and can crash.
The syzbot report shows a crash in bond_header_create(), but the root cause is in team: the topology is gre -> bond -> team, and team calls the inherited header_ops with its own net_device instead of the lower device, so bond_header_create() receives a team device and interprets netdev_priv() as bonding private data, causing a type confusion crash.
Fix this by introducing team header_ops wrappers for create/parse, selecting a team port under RCU, and calling the lower device callbacks with port->dev, so each callback always sees the correct net_device context.
Also pass the selected lower device to the lower parse callback, so recursion is bounded in stacked non-Ethernet topologies and parse callbacks always run with the correct device context.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31502"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-843"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T14:16:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nteam: fix header_ops type confusion with non-Ethernet ports\n\nSimilar to commit 950803f72547 (\"bonding: fix type confusion in\nbond_setup_by_slave()\") team has the same class of header_ops type\nconfusion.\n\nFor non-Ethernet ports, team_setup_by_port() copies port_dev-\u003eheader_ops\ndirectly. When the team device later calls dev_hard_header() or\ndev_parse_header(), these callbacks can run with the team net_device\ninstead of the real lower device, so netdev_priv(dev) is interpreted as\nthe wrong private type and can crash.\n\nThe syzbot report shows a crash in bond_header_create(), but the root\ncause is in team: the topology is gre -\u003e bond -\u003e team, and team calls\nthe inherited header_ops with its own net_device instead of the lower\ndevice, so bond_header_create() receives a team device and interprets\nnetdev_priv() as bonding private data, causing a type confusion crash.\n\nFix this by introducing team header_ops wrappers for create/parse,\nselecting a team port under RCU, and calling the lower device callbacks\nwith port-\u003edev, so each callback always sees the correct net_device\ncontext.\n\nAlso pass the selected lower device to the lower parse callback, so\nrecursion is bounded in stacked non-Ethernet topologies and parse\ncallbacks always run with the correct device context.",
"id": "GHSA-pgcq-8hv5-frgj",
"modified": "2026-04-27T15:30:39Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T15:31:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a7468ed49a6b65d34abcc6eb60e15f7f6d34da0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20491d384d973a63fbdaf7a71e38d69b0659ea55"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/425000dbf17373a4ab8be9428f5dc055ef870a56"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d3161fa3eee64d46b766fb0db33ec7f300ef52d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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