GHSA-PFQ2-HH62-7M96
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 19:54 – Updated: 2026-01-13 19:54Summary
Renovate can be tricked into executing shell code while updating the Gradle Wrapper. A malicious distributionUrl in gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties can lead to command execution in the Renovate runtime.
Details
When Renovate handles Gradle Wrapper artifacts, it may run a wrapper update command such as:
- ./gradlew :wrapper --gradle-distribution-url <value>
In the observed behavior, Renovate executes this via a shell (e.g., /bin/sh -c ...).
If distributionUrl contains shell command substitution syntax like $(...), the shell evaluates it before Gradle validates/parses the URL.
After that, Gradle attempts to parse the URL as a URI and fails with URISyntaxException, but the shell substitution has already executed.
This is reproducible even when allowScripts is disabled (default is OFF), because this execution happens as part of Gradle Wrapper artifact handling rather than “repository install scripts”.
Prerequisites / attack conditions:
- The attacker must be able to get a malicious gradle-wrapper.properties into a repository that Renovate scans (e.g., direct write access, or a maintainer merges an attacker’s change/PR).
- Renovate must be configured to process Gradle Wrapper updates/artifacts for that repository (default behavior for the Gradle Wrapper manager).
PoC
- Create a repository with a Gradle Wrapper (
gradlew,gradlew.bat,gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar, andgradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties). - Set
distributionUrlingradle-wrapper.propertiesto include$(...). - Run Renovate against the repository.
- Observe that a file is created during Renovate’s wrapper update step before Gradle fails with
URISyntaxException.
A screen recording is attached showing end-to-end reproduction. In the demo, the payload creates /tmp/passwd_dump containing /etc/passwd, demonstrating that file read/exfiltration is possible within the Renovate execution context.
Impact
This allows arbitrary command execution in the Renovate runtime during Gradle Wrapper updates. Depending on deployment, this may expose credentials/tokens available to the bot and may allow an attacker to modify repositories or access internal resources reachable from the Renovate environment.
Remediation
Upgrading to Renovate 42.68.5 (2025-12-31) fixes this issue, and closes out other risks of shell evaluation for commands run by Renovate.
If using the composer, yarn (v1) or flux managers, please upgrade to 42.74.5 (2026-01-08), as there were follow-up fixes to keep these managers working.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "renovate"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "32.124.0"
},
{
"fixed": "42.68.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-13T19:54:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nRenovate can be tricked into executing shell code while updating the Gradle Wrapper. A malicious `distributionUrl` in `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties` can lead to command execution in the Renovate runtime.\n\n### Details\nWhen Renovate handles Gradle Wrapper artifacts, it may run a wrapper update command such as:\n- `./gradlew :wrapper --gradle-distribution-url \u003cvalue\u003e`\n\nIn the observed behavior, Renovate executes this via a shell (e.g., `/bin/sh -c ...`). \nIf `distributionUrl` contains shell command substitution syntax like `$(...)`, the shell evaluates it **before** Gradle validates/parses the URL.\n\nAfter that, Gradle attempts to parse the URL as a URI and fails with `URISyntaxException`, but the shell substitution has already executed.\n\nThis is reproducible even when `allowScripts` is disabled (default is OFF), because this execution happens as part of Gradle Wrapper artifact handling rather than \u201crepository install scripts\u201d.\n\nPrerequisites / attack conditions:\n- The attacker must be able to get a malicious `gradle-wrapper.properties` into a repository that Renovate scans (e.g., direct write access, or a maintainer merges an attacker\u2019s change/PR).\n- Renovate must be configured to process Gradle Wrapper updates/artifacts for that repository (default behavior for the Gradle Wrapper manager).\n\n### PoC\n1. Create a repository with a Gradle Wrapper (`gradlew`, `gradlew.bat`, `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.jar`, and `gradle/wrapper/gradle-wrapper.properties`).\n2. Set `distributionUrl` in `gradle-wrapper.properties` to include `$(...)`.\n3. Run Renovate against the repository.\n4. Observe that a file is created during Renovate\u2019s wrapper update step **before** Gradle fails with `URISyntaxException`.\n\nA [screen recording](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1nveSCgyz4pKPCZuelqDD_xGEO00DXr4P/view) is attached showing end-to-end reproduction. In the demo, the payload creates `/tmp/passwd_dump` containing `/etc/passwd`, demonstrating that file read/exfiltration is possible within the Renovate execution context.\n\n### Impact\nThis allows arbitrary command execution in the Renovate runtime during Gradle Wrapper updates. Depending on deployment, this may expose credentials/tokens available to the bot and may allow an attacker to modify repositories or access internal resources reachable from the Renovate environment.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrading to Renovate [42.68.5](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/42.68.5) (2025-12-31) fixes this issue, and closes out other risks of shell evaluation for commands run by Renovate.\n\nIf using the `composer`, `yarn` (v1) or `flux` managers, please upgrade to [42.74.5](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/42.74.5) (2026-01-08), as there were follow-up fixes to keep these managers working.",
"id": "GHSA-pfq2-hh62-7m96",
"modified": "2026-01-13T19:54:29Z",
"published": "2026-01-13T19:54:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/security/advisories/GHSA-pfq2-hh62-7m96"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/42.68.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Renovate vulnerable to arbitrary command injection via Gradle Wrapper and malicious `distributionUrl`"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.