GHSA-P5W6-75F9-CC2P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-13 19:31 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:37Summary
A broken access control vulnerability allows unauthenticated users to retrieve note assets directly from the asset download endpoint when they know both the note UUID and asset UUID. This exposes the full contents of private note assets without authentication, even when the associated book is not public.
Details
The issue is caused by the asset download route being registered without authentication middleware.
Relevant route registration:
- handlers/assets.go, line 40
huma.Get(api, "/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}", h.GetNoteAssetContentByID)
By contrast, other asset operations correctly apply authentication middleware. For example:
huma.Delete(api, "/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}", h.DeleteNoteAsset,
huma.WithMiddleware(h.authMiddleware.AuthRequiredMiddleware))
The backend service for asset retrieval also does not enforce ownership or visibility checks. According to the provided code references, the lookup only queries the asset table by asset ID and note ID:
SELECT * FROM note_assets WHERE id = ? AND note_id = ?
Because the retrieval path does not join against the related notes or books records, it does not verify:
- whether the requester owns the parent book
- whether the parent book is public or private
- whether the related note has been deleted
As a result, possession of a valid noteID and assetID is sufficient to retrieve the asset binary, regardless of whether the note belongs to a private book.
The exploitability is constrained by identifier knowledge. Both noteID and assetID are UUIDv4 values, so blind guessing is impractical. However, the endpoint remains vulnerable whenever those identifiers are disclosed through another channel, such as leaked links, browser history, proxy logs, shared URLs, or other application behaviors that expose internal asset references.
PoC
The issue can be reproduced by creating a private note with an attached asset, then requesting the asset download endpoint without authentication using the valid noteID and assetID. The server returns the asset content even though the associated note is private.
Impact
- Type: Broken access control / unauthenticated information disclosure
- Who is impacted: Any deployment exposing the affected asset download endpoint
- Security impact: Full binary contents of private note assets can be disclosed to unauthenticated users who know the required identifiers
- Attack preconditions: The attacker must know both the target
noteIDandassetID; no authentication is required - Attack complexity: High, because successful exploitation depends on prior disclosure of both UUIDs rather than feasible online guessing
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260411145023-6593898855ad"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40265"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-13T19:31:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-17T01:17:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nA broken access control vulnerability allows unauthenticated users to retrieve note assets directly from the asset download endpoint when they know both the note UUID and asset UUID. This exposes the full contents of private note assets without authentication, even when the associated book is not public.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is caused by the asset download route being registered without authentication middleware.\n\nRelevant route registration:\n- `handlers/assets.go`, line 40\n\n```go\nhuma.Get(api, \"/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}\", h.GetNoteAssetContentByID)\n```\n\nBy contrast, other asset operations correctly apply authentication middleware. For example:\n\n```go\nhuma.Delete(api, \"/api/notes/{noteID}/assets/{assetID}\", h.DeleteNoteAsset,\n huma.WithMiddleware(h.authMiddleware.AuthRequiredMiddleware))\n```\n\nThe backend service for asset retrieval also does not enforce ownership or visibility checks. According to the provided code references, the lookup only queries the asset table by asset ID and note ID:\n\n```sql\nSELECT * FROM note_assets WHERE id = ? AND note_id = ?\n```\n\nBecause the retrieval path does not join against the related `notes` or `books` records, it does not verify:\n- whether the requester owns the parent book\n- whether the parent book is public or private\n- whether the related note has been deleted\n\nAs a result, possession of a valid `noteID` and `assetID` is sufficient to retrieve the asset binary, regardless of whether the note belongs to a private book.\n\nThe exploitability is constrained by identifier knowledge. Both `noteID` and `assetID` are UUIDv4 values, so blind guessing is impractical. However, the endpoint remains vulnerable whenever those identifiers are disclosed through another channel, such as leaked links, browser history, proxy logs, shared URLs, or other application behaviors that expose internal asset references.\n\n### PoC\nThe issue can be reproduced by creating a private note with an attached asset, then requesting the asset download endpoint without authentication using the valid `noteID` and `assetID`. The server returns the asset content even though the associated note is private.\n\n### Impact\n- **Type:** Broken access control / unauthenticated information disclosure\n- **Who is impacted:** Any deployment exposing the affected asset download endpoint\n- **Security impact:** Full binary contents of private note assets can be disclosed to unauthenticated users who know the required identifiers\n- **Attack preconditions:** The attacker must know both the target `noteID` and `assetID`; no authentication is required\n- **Attack complexity:** High, because successful exploitation depends on prior disclosure of both UUIDs rather than feasible online guessing",
"id": "GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:37:59Z",
"published": "2026-04-13T19:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/security/advisories/GHSA-p5w6-75f9-cc2p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40265"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/commit/6593898855add151eb9965d96998b05e14c62026"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/releases/tag/v0.19.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Note Mark has Broken Access Control on Asset Download"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.