GHSA-P224-6X5R-FJPM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 20:51 – Updated: 2026-03-27 20:59Description
Ory Oathkeeper is vulnerable to an authorization bypass via HTTP path traversal. An attacker can craft a URL containing path traversal sequences (e.g. /public/../admin/secrets) that resolves to a protected path after normalization, but is matched against a permissive rule because the raw, un-normalized path is used during rule evaluation.
Preconditions
Ory Oathkeeper rules are typically configured with patterns like:
/public/<.*> → allow unauthenticated access
/admin/<.*> → require authentication
Without path normalization, a request to /public/../admin/secrets is matched against the raw path /public/../admin/secrets. This matches the /public/<.*> rule, bypassing the authentication required for /admin/secrets. After Ory Oathkeeper permits the request, the upstream server normalizes the path and serves the protected /admin/secrets resource.
Mitigation
Going forward, Ory Oathkeeper normalizes the request path before performing rule matching and before forwarding. The path /public/../admin/secrets is normalized to /admin/secrets, which correctly matches the /admin/<.*> rule and triggers authentication.
As an immediate mitigation, all requests reaching Oathkeeper should be normalized, as described in the section below. Oathkeeper should be upgraded to a fixed version as soon as possible.
Defense in depth: Cleaning paths before Oathkeeper
Even after this fix, it is good practice to normalize HTTP paths in the layers in front of Oathkeeper. This provides defense in depth and protects against similar bypasses in other components. The following examples show how to achieve this with common reverse proxies and CDNs.
Nginx
Nginx normalizes paths by default when using proxy_pass. Alternatively, use $uri (which Nginx normalizes) rather than $request_uri in your matching rules.
Envoy
Enable the normalize_path option (available since Envoy 1.14) to normalize the path components before matching and forwarding. See the Envoy docs on path normalization.
Cloudflare
Cloudflare normalizes URLs by default. In the Cloudflare dashboard, ensure Normalize incoming URLs is enabled under Rules → Normalization. See the Cloudflare URL normalization docs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ory/oathkeeper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.40.10-0.20260320084758-8e0002140491"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33494"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T20:51:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T18:16:30Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Description\n\nOry Oathkeeper is vulnerable to an authorization bypass via HTTP path traversal. An attacker can craft a URL containing path traversal sequences (e.g. `/public/../admin/secrets`) that resolves to a protected path after normalization, but is matched against a permissive rule because the raw, un-normalized path is used during rule evaluation.\n\n## Preconditions\n\nOry Oathkeeper rules are typically configured with patterns like:\n\n```\n/public/\u003c.*\u003e \u2192 allow unauthenticated access\n/admin/\u003c.*\u003e \u2192 require authentication\n```\n\nWithout path normalization, a request to `/public/../admin/secrets` is matched against the raw path `/public/../admin/secrets`. This matches the `/public/\u003c.*\u003e` rule, bypassing the authentication required for `/admin/secrets`. After Ory Oathkeeper permits the request, the upstream server normalizes the path and serves the protected `/admin/secrets` resource.\n\n## Mitigation\n\nGoing forward, Ory Oathkeeper normalizes the request path before performing rule matching and before forwarding. The path `/public/../admin/secrets` is normalized to `/admin/secrets`, which correctly matches the `/admin/\u003c.*\u003e` rule and triggers authentication.\n\nAs an immediate mitigation, all requests reaching Oathkeeper should be normalized, as described in the section below. Oathkeeper should be upgraded to a fixed version as soon as possible.\n\n## Defense in depth: Cleaning paths before Oathkeeper\n\nEven after this fix, it is good practice to normalize HTTP paths in the layers in front of Oathkeeper. This provides defense in depth and protects against similar bypasses in other components. The following examples show how to achieve this with common reverse proxies and CDNs.\n\n### Nginx\n\nNginx normalizes paths by default when using `proxy_pass`. Alternatively, use `$uri` (which Nginx normalizes) rather than `$request_uri` in your matching rules.\n\n### Envoy\n\nEnable the `normalize_path` option (available since Envoy 1.14) to normalize the path components before matching and forwarding. See the \u003ca href=\"https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-v3/extensions/filters/network/http_connection_manager/v3/http_connection_manager.proto#envoy-v3-api-field-extensions-filters-network-http-connection-manager-v3-httpconnectionmanager-normalize-path\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"\u003eEnvoy docs on path normalization\u003c/a\u003e.\n\n### Cloudflare\n\nCloudflare normalizes URLs by default. In the Cloudflare dashboard, ensure **Normalize incoming URLs** is enabled under **Rules \u2192 Normalization**.\nSee the \u003ca href=\"https://developers.cloudflare.com/rules/normalization/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"\u003eCloudflare URL normalization docs\u003c/a\u003e.",
"id": "GHSA-p224-6x5r-fjpm",
"modified": "2026-03-27T20:59:22Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T20:51:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/security/advisories/GHSA-p224-6x5r-fjpm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33494"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper/commit/8e0002140491c592db41fa141dc6ad68f417e2b2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ory/oathkeeper"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ory Oathkeeper has a path traversal authorization bypass"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.