GHSA-MVVV-V22X-XQWP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-15 19:43 – Updated: 2026-04-15 19:43
VLAI?
Summary
NocoBase has SSRF in Workflow HTTP Request and Custom Request Plugins
Details
Summary
NocoBase's workflow HTTP request plugin and custom request action plugin make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs without any SSRF protection. An authenticated user can access internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost.
Vulnerable Code
1. Workflow HTTP Request Plugin
packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-workflow-request/src/server/RequestInstruction.ts lines 117-128:
return axios.request({
url: trim(url), // User-controlled, no validation
method,
headers,
params,
timeout,
...(method.toLowerCase() !== 'get' && data != null
? { data: transformer ? await transformer(data) : data }
: {}),
});
The url at line 98 comes directly from user workflow configuration with only whitespace trimming.
2. Custom Request Action Plugin
packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/actions/send.ts lines 172-198:
const axiosRequestConfig = {
baseURL: ctx.origin,
...options,
url: getParsedValue(url, variables), // User-controlled via template
headers: { ... },
params: getParsedValue(arrayToObject(params), variables),
data: getParsedValue(toJSON(data), variables),
};
const res = await axios(axiosRequestConfig); // No IP validation
Missing Protections
- No
request-filtering-agentor SSRF library (confirmed via grep across entire codebase) - No private IP range filtering
- No cloud metadata endpoint blocking
- No URL scheme validation
- No DNS rebinding protection
Attack Scenario
- Authenticated user creates a workflow with HTTP Request node
- Sets URL to
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ - Triggers the workflow
- Server fetches AWS metadata and returns IAM credentials in workflow execution logs
Alternatively via Custom Request action:
1. Create custom request with URL http://127.0.0.1:5432 or http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin
2. Execute the action
3. Server makes request to internal service
Impact
- Cloud metadata theft: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials via metadata endpoints
- Internal network access: Scan and interact with services on private IP ranges
- Database access: Connect to localhost databases (PostgreSQL, Redis, etc.)
- Authentication required: Yes (authenticated user), but any workspace member can create workflows
Severity ?
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nocobase/plugin-workflow-request"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.37"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40346"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-15T19:43:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nNocoBase\u0027s workflow HTTP request plugin and custom request action plugin make server-side HTTP requests to user-provided URLs without any SSRF protection. An authenticated user can access internal network services, cloud metadata endpoints, and localhost.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### 1. Workflow HTTP Request Plugin\n\n**`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-workflow-request/src/server/RequestInstruction.ts` lines 117-128:**\n```typescript\nreturn axios.request({\n url: trim(url), // User-controlled, no validation\n method,\n headers,\n params,\n timeout,\n ...(method.toLowerCase() !== \u0027get\u0027 \u0026\u0026 data != null\n ? { data: transformer ? await transformer(data) : data }\n : {}),\n});\n```\n\nThe `url` at line 98 comes directly from user workflow configuration with only whitespace trimming.\n\n### 2. Custom Request Action Plugin\n\n**`packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-action-custom-request/src/server/actions/send.ts` lines 172-198:**\n```typescript\nconst axiosRequestConfig = {\n baseURL: ctx.origin,\n ...options,\n url: getParsedValue(url, variables), // User-controlled via template\n headers: { ... },\n params: getParsedValue(arrayToObject(params), variables),\n data: getParsedValue(toJSON(data), variables),\n};\nconst res = await axios(axiosRequestConfig); // No IP validation\n```\n\n## Missing Protections\n\n- No `request-filtering-agent` or SSRF library (confirmed via grep across entire codebase)\n- No private IP range filtering\n- No cloud metadata endpoint blocking\n- No URL scheme validation\n- No DNS rebinding protection\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Authenticated user creates a workflow with HTTP Request node\n2. Sets URL to `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n3. Triggers the workflow\n4. Server fetches AWS metadata and returns IAM credentials in workflow execution logs\n\nAlternatively via Custom Request action:\n1. Create custom request with URL `http://127.0.0.1:5432` or `http://10.0.0.1:8080/admin`\n2. Execute the action\n3. Server makes request to internal service\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata theft**: AWS/GCP/Azure credentials via metadata endpoints\n- **Internal network access**: Scan and interact with services on private IP ranges\n- **Database access**: Connect to localhost databases (PostgreSQL, Redis, etc.)\n- **Authentication required**: Yes (authenticated user), but any workspace member can create workflows",
"id": "GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp",
"modified": "2026-04-15T19:43:50Z",
"published": "2026-04-15T19:43:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase/security/advisories/GHSA-mvvv-v22x-xqwp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nocobase/nocobase"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "NocoBase has SSRF in Workflow HTTP Request and Custom Request Plugins"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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