GHSA-MQPW-46FH-299H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:39 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:02
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw authorization bypass: operator.write can resolve exec approvals via chat.send -> /approve
Details

Summary

What this means (plain language)

If you give a client “chat/write” access to the gateway (operator.write) but you do not intend to let that client approve exec requests (operator.approvals), affected versions could still let that client approve/deny a pending exec approval by sending the /approve chat command.

This is mainly relevant for shared or multi-client setups where different tokens are intentionally scoped differently. Single-operator installs are typically less impacted.

Technical summary

A gateway client authenticated with a device token scoped only to operator.write (without operator.approvals) could approve/deny pending exec approval requests by sending a chat message containing the built-in /approve command.

exec.approval.resolve is correctly scoped to operator.approvals for direct RPC calls, but the /approve command path invoked it via an internal privileged gateway client.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • openclaw (npm): < 2026.2.2

Fix

  • Fixed in openclaw 2026.2.2.
  • Fix commit(s): efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e.
  • Change: when /approve is invoked from gateway clients (webchat/internal channel), it now requires the requesting client to have operator.approvals (or operator.admin).

Workarounds

  • Upgrade to openclaw >= 2026.2.2.
  • If you cannot upgrade: avoid issuing write-only device tokens to untrusted clients; disable text commands (commands.text=false) or restrict access to the webchat/control UI.

References

  • Fix: src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.ts
  • Coverage: src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.test.ts

Release Process Note

This advisory is kept in draft; once the fixed npm versions are available, it can be published without further edits.

Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28473"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:39:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n### What this means (plain language)\n\nIf you give a client \u201cchat/write\u201d access to the gateway (`operator.write`) but you do not intend to let that client approve exec requests (`operator.approvals`), affected versions could still let that client approve/deny a pending exec approval by sending the `/approve` chat command.\n\nThis is mainly relevant for shared or multi-client setups where different tokens are intentionally scoped differently. Single-operator installs are typically less impacted.\n\n### Technical summary\n\nA gateway client authenticated with a device token scoped only to `operator.write` (without `operator.approvals`) could approve/deny pending exec approval requests by sending a chat message containing the built-in `/approve` command.\n\n`exec.approval.resolve` is correctly scoped to `operator.approvals` for direct RPC calls, but the `/approve` command path invoked it via an internal privileged gateway client.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c 2026.2.2`\n\n## Fix\n\n- Fixed in `openclaw` `2026.2.2`.\n- Fix commit(s): `efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e`.\n- Change: when `/approve` is invoked from gateway clients (webchat/internal channel), it now requires the requesting client to have `operator.approvals` (or `operator.admin`).\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to `openclaw \u003e= 2026.2.2`.\n- If you cannot upgrade: avoid issuing write-only device tokens to untrusted clients; disable text commands (`commands.text=false`) or restrict access to the webchat/control UI.\n\n## References\n\n- Fix: `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.ts`\n- Coverage: `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.test.ts`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThis advisory is kept in draft; once the fixed npm versions are available, it can be published without further edits.\n\nThanks @yueyueL for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-mqpw-46fh-299h",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T01:02:19Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:39:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mqpw-46fh-299h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-approve-chat-command"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw authorization bypass: operator.write can resolve exec approvals via chat.send -\u003e /approve"
}


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