GHSA-MQPW-46FH-299H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:39 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:02Summary
What this means (plain language)
If you give a client “chat/write” access to the gateway (operator.write) but you do not intend to let that client approve exec requests (operator.approvals), affected versions could still let that client approve/deny a pending exec approval by sending the /approve chat command.
This is mainly relevant for shared or multi-client setups where different tokens are intentionally scoped differently. Single-operator installs are typically less impacted.
Technical summary
A gateway client authenticated with a device token scoped only to operator.write (without operator.approvals) could approve/deny pending exec approval requests by sending a chat message containing the built-in /approve command.
exec.approval.resolve is correctly scoped to operator.approvals for direct RPC calls, but the /approve command path invoked it via an internal privileged gateway client.
Affected Packages / Versions
openclaw(npm):< 2026.2.2
Fix
- Fixed in
openclaw2026.2.2. - Fix commit(s):
efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e. - Change: when
/approveis invoked from gateway clients (webchat/internal channel), it now requires the requesting client to haveoperator.approvals(oroperator.admin).
Workarounds
- Upgrade to
openclaw >= 2026.2.2. - If you cannot upgrade: avoid issuing write-only device tokens to untrusted clients; disable text commands (
commands.text=false) or restrict access to the webchat/control UI.
References
- Fix:
src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.ts - Coverage:
src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.test.ts
Release Process Note
This advisory is kept in draft; once the fixed npm versions are available, it can be published without further edits.
Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28473"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:39:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n### What this means (plain language)\n\nIf you give a client \u201cchat/write\u201d access to the gateway (`operator.write`) but you do not intend to let that client approve exec requests (`operator.approvals`), affected versions could still let that client approve/deny a pending exec approval by sending the `/approve` chat command.\n\nThis is mainly relevant for shared or multi-client setups where different tokens are intentionally scoped differently. Single-operator installs are typically less impacted.\n\n### Technical summary\n\nA gateway client authenticated with a device token scoped only to `operator.write` (without `operator.approvals`) could approve/deny pending exec approval requests by sending a chat message containing the built-in `/approve` command.\n\n`exec.approval.resolve` is correctly scoped to `operator.approvals` for direct RPC calls, but the `/approve` command path invoked it via an internal privileged gateway client.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c 2026.2.2`\n\n## Fix\n\n- Fixed in `openclaw` `2026.2.2`.\n- Fix commit(s): `efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e`.\n- Change: when `/approve` is invoked from gateway clients (webchat/internal channel), it now requires the requesting client to have `operator.approvals` (or `operator.admin`).\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade to `openclaw \u003e= 2026.2.2`.\n- If you cannot upgrade: avoid issuing write-only device tokens to untrusted clients; disable text commands (`commands.text=false`) or restrict access to the webchat/control UI.\n\n## References\n\n- Fix: `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.ts`\n- Coverage: `src/auto-reply/reply/commands-approve.test.ts`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nThis advisory is kept in draft; once the fixed npm versions are available, it can be published without further edits.\n\nThanks @yueyueL for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-mqpw-46fh-299h",
"modified": "2026-03-06T01:02:19Z",
"published": "2026-02-17T21:39:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-mqpw-46fh-299h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/efe2a464afcff55bb5a95b959e6bd9ec0fef086e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-approve-chat-command"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw authorization bypass: operator.write can resolve exec approvals via chat.send -\u003e /approve"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.