GHSA-MJJ8-GM8F-325H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 12:30 – Updated: 2026-05-08 15:31
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/rds: No shortcut out of RDS_CONN_ERROR

RDS connections carry a state "rds_conn_path::cp_state" and transitions from one state to another and are conditional upon an expected state: "rds_conn_path_transition."

There is one exception to this conditionality, which is "RDS_CONN_ERROR" that can be enforced by "rds_conn_path_drop" regardless of what state the condition is currently in.

But as soon as a connection enters state "RDS_CONN_ERROR", the connection handling code expects it to go through the shutdown-path.

The RDS/TCP multipath changes added a shortcut out of "RDS_CONN_ERROR" straight back to "RDS_CONN_CONNECTING" via "rds_tcp_accept_one_path" (e.g. after "rds_tcp_state_change").

A subsequent "rds_tcp_reset_callbacks" can then transition the state to "RDS_CONN_RESETTING" with a shutdown-worker queued.

That'll trip up "rds_conn_init_shutdown", which was never adjusted to handle "RDS_CONN_RESETTING" and subsequently drops the connection with the dreaded "DR_INV_CONN_STATE", which leaves "RDS_SHUTDOWN_WORK_QUEUED" on forever.

So we do two things here:

a) Don't shortcut "RDS_CONN_ERROR", but take the longer path through the shutdown code.

b) Add "RDS_CONN_RESETTING" to the expected states in "rds_conn_init_shutdown" so that we won't error out and get stuck, if we ever hit weird state transitions like this again."

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43226"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T12:16:42Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rds: No shortcut out of RDS_CONN_ERROR\n\nRDS connections carry a state \"rds_conn_path::cp_state\"\nand transitions from one state to another and are conditional\nupon an expected state: \"rds_conn_path_transition.\"\n\nThere is one exception to this conditionality, which is\n\"RDS_CONN_ERROR\" that can be enforced by \"rds_conn_path_drop\"\nregardless of what state the condition is currently in.\n\nBut as soon as a connection enters state \"RDS_CONN_ERROR\",\nthe connection handling code expects it to go through the\nshutdown-path.\n\nThe RDS/TCP multipath changes added a shortcut out of\n\"RDS_CONN_ERROR\" straight back to \"RDS_CONN_CONNECTING\"\nvia \"rds_tcp_accept_one_path\" (e.g. after \"rds_tcp_state_change\").\n\nA subsequent \"rds_tcp_reset_callbacks\" can then transition\nthe state to \"RDS_CONN_RESETTING\" with a shutdown-worker queued.\n\nThat\u0027ll trip up \"rds_conn_init_shutdown\", which was\nnever adjusted to handle \"RDS_CONN_RESETTING\" and subsequently\ndrops the connection with the dreaded \"DR_INV_CONN_STATE\",\nwhich leaves \"RDS_SHUTDOWN_WORK_QUEUED\" on forever.\n\nSo we do two things here:\n\na) Don\u0027t shortcut \"RDS_CONN_ERROR\", but take the longer\n   path through the shutdown code.\n\nb) Add \"RDS_CONN_RESETTING\" to the expected states in\n  \"rds_conn_init_shutdown\" so that we won\u0027t error out\n  and get stuck, if we ever hit weird state transitions\n  like this again.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-mjj8-gm8f-325h",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T15:31:18Z",
  "published": "2026-05-06T12:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43226"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19e384a7d00d888303a8285977cdf1970c6cccd6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81248b1eb3c5954cc1fc7b33b7c03e34d20cb8c8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/899ef00963ce76f9fc421a7d02335fe4ead6389b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bcd7c00691a2db9745817d5ea79262a503b135c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ff599a9be784a808c36765086e3db2144aa3b66"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a179ac7be8f5a650d0068040705f4cddd6ca369c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad22d24be635c6beab6a1fdd3f8b1f3c478d15da"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f0f729bdffb08af32e0f54521b81b8a9e0321f16"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}


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