GHSA-M8X7-R2RG-VH5G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 22:24 – Updated: 2026-03-31 22:24
VLAI?
Summary
FastMCP has a Command Injection vulnerability - Gemini CLI
Details

Server names containing shell metacharacters (e.g., &) can cause command injection on Windows when passed to fastmcp install claude-code or fastmcp install gemini-cli. These install paths use subprocess.run() with a list argument, but on Windows the target CLIs often resolve to .cmd wrappers that are executed through cmd.exe, which interprets metacharacters in the flattened command string.

PoC:

from fastmcp import FastMCP

mcp = FastMCP(name="test&calc")

@mcp.tool
def roll_dice(n_dice: int) -> list[int]:
    """Roll `n_dice` 6-sided dice and return the results."""
    return [random.randint(1, 6) for _ in range(n_dice)]
fastmcp install claude-code server.py   # or: fastmcp install gemini-cli server.py

On Windows, this opens Calculator via the &calc in the server name.

Impact: Arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running fastmcp install. Affects Windows hosts where the target CLI (one of claude, gemini) is installed as a .cmd wrapper. Does not affect macOS/Linux, and does not affect config-file-based install targets (cursor, goose, mcp-json).

Patched in #3522 by validating server names to reject shell metacharacters.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "fastmcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-64340"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T22:24:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server names containing shell metacharacters (e.g., `\u0026`) can cause command injection on Windows when passed to `fastmcp install claude-code` or `fastmcp install gemini-cli`. These install paths use `subprocess.run()` with a list argument, but on Windows the target CLIs often resolve to `.cmd` wrappers that are executed through `cmd.exe`, which interprets metacharacters in the flattened command string.\n\nPoC:\n```python\nfrom fastmcp import FastMCP\n\nmcp = FastMCP(name=\"test\u0026calc\")\n\n@mcp.tool\ndef roll_dice(n_dice: int) -\u003e list[int]:\n    \"\"\"Roll `n_dice` 6-sided dice and return the results.\"\"\"\n    return [random.randint(1, 6) for _ in range(n_dice)]\n```\n\n```\nfastmcp install claude-code server.py   # or: fastmcp install gemini-cli server.py\n```\n\nOn Windows, this opens Calculator via the `\u0026calc` in the server name.\n\nImpact:\nArbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running `fastmcp install`. Affects Windows hosts where the target CLI (one of claude, gemini) is installed as a `.cmd` wrapper. Does not affect macOS/Linux, and does not affect config-file-based install targets (cursor, goose, mcp-json).\n\nPatched in #3522 by validating server names to reject shell metacharacters.",
  "id": "GHSA-m8x7-r2rg-vh5g",
  "modified": "2026-03-31T22:24:15Z",
  "published": "2026-03-31T22:24:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PrefectHQ/fastmcp/security/advisories/GHSA-m8x7-r2rg-vh5g"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp/security/advisories/GHSA-m8x7-r2rg-vh5g"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/PrefectHQ/fastmcp/pull/3522"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/PrefectHQ/fastmcp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "FastMCP has a Command Injection vulnerability - Gemini CLI"
}


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