GHSA-M2H6-4XPQ-QW3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-27 20:24 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:47Summary
A broken access control vulnerability in Fleet's host transfer API allows a team maintainer to transfer hosts from any team into their own team, bypassing team isolation boundaries. Once transferred, the attacker gains full control over the stolen hosts, including the ability to execute scripts with root privileges.
Impact
The host transfer endpoints verify that the caller has write permission to the destination team but do not check whether the caller has any permission over the source team of the hosts being transferred.
Once hosts are transferred, the attacker's team MDM configuration is automatically applied to the stolen devices, and the attacker can execute scripts on them with root privileges. In multi-tenant Fleet deployments where teams represent business units, departments, or customers, this breaks all team isolation guarantees. A bulk transfer variant allows stealing all matching hosts fleet-wide in a single request.
Exploitation requires authentication as a team maintainer or team admin.
Workarounds
There is no workaround for this issue short of upgrading to a patched version. Organizations concerned about exploitation should audit host transfer activity in their Fleet logs for any unexpected team reassignments.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory:
Email Fleet at security@fleetdm.com Join #fleet in osquery Slack
Credits
Fleet thanks @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.81.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-27T20:24:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T19:16:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nA broken access control vulnerability in Fleet\u0027s host transfer API allows a team maintainer to transfer hosts from any team into their own team, bypassing team isolation boundaries. Once transferred, the attacker gains full control over the stolen hosts, including the ability to execute scripts with root privileges.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe host transfer endpoints verify that the caller has write permission to the destination team but do not check whether the caller has any permission over the source team of the hosts being transferred.\n\nOnce hosts are transferred, the attacker\u0027s team MDM configuration is automatically applied to the stolen devices, and the attacker can execute scripts on them with root privileges. In multi-tenant Fleet deployments where teams represent business units, departments, or customers, this breaks all team isolation guarantees. A bulk transfer variant allows stealing all matching hosts fleet-wide in a single request.\n\nExploitation requires authentication as a team maintainer or team admin.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no workaround for this issue short of upgrading to a patched version. Organizations concerned about exploitation should audit host transfer activity in their Fleet logs for any unexpected team reassignments.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\nEmail Fleet at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com)\nJoin #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)\n\n### Credits\n\nFleet thanks @secfox-ai for responsibly reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-m2h6-4xpq-qw3m",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:47:58Z",
"published": "2026-03-27T20:24:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-m2h6-4xpq-qw3m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29180"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/releases/tag/fleet-v4.81.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "A Fleet team maintainer can transfer hosts from any team via missing source team authorization"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.